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Synthesis
1.1  Introduction 
1.1.1  Employment and relationships
The romantic couple relationship is a cornerstone of many people’s daily lives. The 
romantic couple provides a foundation for exchanges of love, affection, support, and 
resources (Musick & Bumpass, 2012; Waite & Lehrer, 2003). A well-functioning relationship 
contributes to mental, physical, and social well-being (Proulx, Helms, & Buehler, 2007; 
Robles, Slatcher, Trombello, & McGinn, 2014; Umberson, Williams, Powers, Liu, & Needham, 
2006; Warner & Kelley-Moore, 2012), and to the well-being of children (Amato & Sobolewski, 
2001; Knopp et al., 2017). A romantic couple relationship can also serve as a buffer in 
dealing with adversity, thus reducing the influence of problems on the partners’ well-being 
(Røsand, Slinning, Eberhard-Gran, Røysamb, & Tambs, 2012; Warner & Kelley-Moore, 2012). 
Fundamental to sharing emotional, time, and economic resources is the quality of the 
partner relationship, which is the focus of the current dissertation.
 Next to family and relationship characteristics, the quality of a romantic couple 
relationship is affected by the partners’ work life. Work life and family life are two central 
domains, which are interconnected and affect each other (Eby, Maher, & Butts, 2010). 
Positive and negative experiences at work influence how partners act at home and 
therefore affect the partner relationship (Bakker & Demerouti, 2013; Eby et al., 2010). The 
benefits provided by employment, such as financial well-being and time structuring, also 
impact the family (Jahoda, 1981; Paul & Moser, 2009). Lack of labor market involvement 
may lead to poverty, which could influence communication and family dynamics and stir 
conflict between the partners (Conger et al., 1990; Conger, Conger, & Martin, 2010; Conger, 
Rueter, & Elder, 1999). Because the time people spend in employment cannot be spent on 
other tasks, employment is a major determinant of a couple’s division of care work and 
household labor, but also influences joint leisure activities (Grunow, Schulz, & Blossfeld, 
2012; Kalmijn & Bernasco, 2001; Mannino & Deutsch, 2007; Nitsche & Grunow, 2018). 
Furthermore, partners derive their self-esteem, identity, social status, and sense of control 
in part from their participation in the labor market (Jahoda, 1981; Meisenbach, 2010; Paul & 
Moser, 2009; Rao, 2017; Townsend, 2002; Warren, 2007). Work life inevitably spills over to 
the partner relationship, affecting how couples communicate with each other, how well 
they understand and empathize with each other, and how close they feel to one another 
(Danner-Vlaardingerbroek, Kluwer, Van Steenbergen, & Van Der Lippe, 2013; Debrot, 
Siegler, Klumb, & Schoebi, 2017; Ilies, Schwind, & Heller, 2007; Stevens, Kiger, & Riley, 2006). 
Hence, employment may affect families in both positive and negative ways. 
 Just as one’s own employment influences the relationship, the partner’s experiences 
in the labor market influence the relationship as well (Bakker & Demerouti, 2013; Eby et al., 
2010; Elder, Johnson, & Crosnoe, 2003). The partner’s labor market experiences influence 
the time structure, financial well-being, social status, and identity of the couple as well 
(Conger et al., 2010; Fuwa, 2004; Lane, 2009; Meisenbach, 2010). This suggests that it is 
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important to incorporate the experiences of both partners when studying the 
consequences of labor market experiences for the quality of the partner relationship. 
However, the labor market experiences of men may have different consequences for the 
relationship than women’s work experiences. Given the traditionally separate life spheres 
of men and women and continuing traditional gender role ideologies (Johnston & 
Swanson, 2006; Townsend, 2002), men’s and women’s employment experiences may 
impact the partner relationship differently. Therefore, this research pays special attention 
to gender differences. 
 Employment factors may not affect all relationships similarly. Personal preferences, 
personal characteristics, family circumstances, and the societal context may influence the 
consequences of employment-derived time structure, financial well-being, and identity 
for the quality of the partner relationship. These factors might, for instance, lead to a 
greater emphasis on traditional gender roles or increased financial demands. Thus, the 
current research includes their moderating influences as well. 
 This dissertation presents research on the consequences of employment for the 
quality of the partner relationship. It aims to answer two main questions: (i) To what extent 
do employment factors affect the quality of the partner relationship? (ii) Does the impact of 
employment factors on the quality of the partner relationship depend on individual gender 
norms, the family context, and the macro-economic situation?
1.1.2  Societal background 
Developments in the labor market have changed family life and relationship dynamics 
throughout the Western world. This research focuses on the Netherlands, Australia, and 
the United Kingdom as examples of countries where such developments have taken place. 
It furthermore includes a cross-country investigation of the influence of the macro- 
economic context in Europe. The labor market developments that have most influenced 
employment and partner relationships are women’s increased labor market participation, 
women’s increased contribution to the household income, the economic crisis, and the 
flexibilization of labor markets. These societal developments thus form the backdrop of 
this research. They have influenced the division of labor between partners by making it 
more equal or induced, while inducing economic hardship on many families.
Starting with women’s labor market participation, in most Western countries women 
steadily became more involved in paid work over the 20th century (Charles, 2011). Some 
countries, such as the Netherlands, experienced a rapid rise in female labor participation, 
while others, for instance the USA, started out with a relatively high proportion of women 
in the labor force (Charles, 2011). Figure 1.1 presents the extent to which women became 
more involved in the labor market in the EU 28 countries, Australia, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom. This development has led to changes in household organization 
and in the division of labor between partners (Brines, 1994), which may have affected the 
quality of partner relationships.
13
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Furthermore, women’s contribution to the household income has increased substantially 
in most Western countries since the 1970s (Nieuwenhuis, Van der Kolk, & Need, 2017), due 
to women’s increased educational attainment (Van Hek, Kraaykamp, & Wolbers, 2016) 
combined with their labor market participation (Charles, 2011). Women’s share of the 
household income especially rose in the Netherlands, Germany, and Spain, and to a lesser 
extent in the United Kingdom, between 1980 and 2010, while this trend leveled off in 
Australia and the USA during this period (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2017). This resulted in an 
increasing number of couples in which women earned more than their male partners 
(Klesment & Van Bavel, 2017). Women earn more than their male partners in 17 percent of 
Dutch couples1. Across Europe, this figure ranges from some 15 percent in Austria and the 
Czech Republic to more than 33 percent in Slovenia (see Klesment & Van Bavel, 2017; 
Wang, Parker, & Taylor, 2013; Winkler, Mcbride, & Andrews, 2005; Wooden & Hahn, 2014). 
 Not all macro-economic developments have led to greater labor market participation 
or to a higher income for men or women. The recent economic crisis in Europe, starting in 
2007, produced a sharp rise in unemployment in much of Europe (European Central Bank, 
2012). In the EU 28, unemployment rose from 6.3 percent in 2008 to 10.8 in 2013 (Figure 1.2). 
Unemployment rose especially rapidly in Spain and Greece, but in the Netherlands, too, 
the level of unemployment more than doubled between 2008 and 2013. Economic 
hardship due to unemployment of either partner may lead to tension within families 
(Brand, 2015; Conger et al., 2010; Schneider, Harknett, & McLanahan, 2016). Even couples 
not directly hit by the crisis may worry about their future economic situation and job 
security. As unemployment levels rise, many workers feel less secure in their jobs 
(Erlinghagen, 2008; Milner, Kavanagh, Krnjacki, Bentley, & Lamontagne, 2014).
 Beyond the economic crisis, globalization and the associated flexibilization of the labor 
market have increased employment insecurity (Blossfeld, Buchholz, Hofäcker, & Kolb, 2011; 
Blossfeld, Klijzing, Mills, & Kurz, 2005). As Figure 1.3 shows, the number of people with 
temporary employment contracts steadily increased in many European countries over 
the past decades, though this trend differs between countries. Temporary employment 
became more prevalent in the Netherlands between 2000 and 2016, while Australia and 
the United Kingdom saw a relatively stable trend. Globalization and flexibilization have 
resulted in increasing inequalities; in particular, younger people, women, and people 
from the lower classes or with a lower education have become less secure in their jobs 
(Blossfeld et al., 2005, 2011; Gebel & Giesecke, 2016). An insecure labor market, moreover, 
may produce feelings of insecurity even among those with permanent employment (Balz, 
2017; Erlinghagen, 2008).
1 Based on data from 2007 and 2011 in Klesment and Van Bavel (2017).
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1.1.3  Relationship quality
The quality of the partner relationship is the focus of the current research. That quality is 
generally defined as a person’s subjective evaluation of the couple relationship, reflecting 
numerous characteristics of the relationship such as support and communication (Spanier, 
1979). Two general indicators of relationship quality are satisfaction and happiness with 
the relationship. Satisfaction is considered to be more stable and specific, while happiness 
is more changeable and diffuse (Ilies, Wilson, & Wagner, 2009). People’s satisfaction with 
their partner relationship is the object of study here. Relationship satisfaction is strongly 
linked to relationship processes and characteristics, such as communication (Lavner, 
2  Data is interpolated and derived from national statistics. Sharp increases in labor force participation could 
potentially be due to changes in measurements of labor force participation. Graph represents the EU 28 countries 
excluding Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia because of 
missing data in the first several years.
Figure 1.1   Female labor force participation rate (women age 15+) in Australia, Europe 
(EU 28 countries), the Netherlands, and the UK.2 Source: World Bank (2017a).
Figure 1.2  Trends in unemployment rates. Source: World Bank (2017b).
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Karney, & Bradbury, 2016), relationship problems (Lavner, Karney, Williamson, & Bradbury, 
2017), conflict (Cui & Donnellan, 2009), and ways conflicts are solved (Kurdek, 1995). 
In addition to relationship satisfaction, this study examines family life satisfaction, using 
cross-national data. Family life satisfaction refers to one’s satisfaction with the nuclear 
family and specifically the partner relationship (Chapman & Guven, 2016; Greenstein, 2009; 
Hu & Yucel, 2018; Shim, Lee, & Kim, 2017; Wyrobková & Okrajek, 2014). It is sometimes used 
as a proxy for relationship satisfaction (Chapman & Guven, 2016).
1.2  Theoretical perspectives
Previous research has applied multiple key theoretical traditions to study and explain 
the influence of the division of employment and of economic hardship on partner 
relationships. These theories are presented below. This brief introduction is meaningful 
because several of the limitations encountered in previous work relate to the ability to 
differentiate between the mechanisms postulated by these theories. Indeed, better differ-
entiation of the mechanisms and extension of these theories are among the main 
contributions of the current research. Before discussing the theories, however, I argue the 
relevance of three perspectives to the study of the quality of partner relationships: the 
dyadic perspective, the gender perspective, and the longitudinal perspective. These 
perspectives should be kept in mind when discussing the theories applied and previous 
research.
 First, I argue that incorporating both partners’ experiences is valuable when applying 
theory to the study of the quality of partner relationships. The life course perspective 
states that people are embedded in social relationships and one’s own life is linked to 
the lives of significant others, known as the ‘linked lives’ principle (Elder, 1994; Elder et al., 
Figure 1.3   Temporary employees as a percentage of total employed population. 
Source: ILO (n.d.).
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2003). Because people lead ‘linked lives’, transitions in one person’s life influence others 
as well (Elder et al., 2003; Johnson & Booth, 1998). Hence, the employment experiences of 
both the individual and the partner influence the relationship (Bakker & Demerouti, 2013; 
Eby et al., 2010; Elder et al., 2003). This is referred to as the dyadic perspective.
 Second, I argue that a gender perspective is important, in combination with the 
dyadic perspective, as dyadic effects may not have a similar influence on men’s and 
women’s relationship satisfaction. Several of the theories applied in previous research do 
incorporate a gender perspective, either in their original form or in later adaptions. 
Hypotheses with gendered outcomes have been deduced. In short, these entail that 
perceptions of the partner relationship and the way the division of employment and 
economic hardship affects the quality of the partner relationship could differ between 
men and women. For example, employment is conventionally linked more to men, with 
women traditionally responsible for care work and household labor (Johnston & Swanson, 
2006; Thijs, Te Grotenhuis, & Scheepers, 2017; Townsend, 2002). Indeed, men generally 
attach more importance to their role as provider than women do, and men derive their 
sense of identity and status more strongly from employment (Coltrane & Shih, 2010; Doucet, 
2009; Meisenbach, 2010; Townsend, 2002). Thus, men’s employment may potentially have a 
greater influence on the quality of the relationship than women’s employment. 
 Third, aside from the dyadic and gender perspectives, I argue for inclusion of a 
longitudinal perspective. Life events may lead to changes in well-being, but over time, as 
people adapt and grow accustomed to new situations, well-being may return to its 
previous level (Headey, 2008, 2010; Lucas, 2007; Luhmann, Hofmann, Eid, & Lucas, 2012). 
However, important or impactful life events may have long-lasting effects on relationship 
satisfaction and well-being (Luhmann et al., 2012; Umberson, Williams, Powers, Chen, & 
Campbell, 2005). Changes in employment circumstances may lead to temporary changes 
in relationship quality, or if the employment events are particularly impactful they may 
bring about lasting change. Previous studies indeed suggest that changes in the dynamic 
between partners caused by employment factors may impact the quality of their 
relationship (Oppenheimer, 1997; Rao, 2017; Sherman, 2017). Changes in the division of 
employment between partners and changes in the economic situation of the household 
might trigger a re-evaluation and reappraisal of the relationship, with either favorable or 
unfavorable outcomes. 
1.2.1  Theories on the division of labor and relationship quality
Five main theories were identified from previous studies investigating the consequences 
of the division of employment between partners for partner relationships. Although they 
have been used to study very different types of questions, including the occurrence of 
certain divisions of employment, these theories may also guide expectations on 
relationship quality. These theories are the specialization theory (Becker, 1981, 1985), the 
relative resources or bargaining theory (Blood & Wolfe, 1960), the equity theory (Walster, 
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Walster, & Berscheid, 1978), the role collaboration or companionate perspective (Burgess, 
Locke, & Thomes, 1963; Rogers, 2004; Wilcox & Nock, 2006), and the ‘doing gender’ 
perspective (West & Zimmerman, 1987).
 Becker’s household specialization of labor theory argues that the utility of the 
household is highest when one partner specializes in employment and the other in care 
and domestic labor (Becker, 1981, 1985). Greater time investment in a particular task is said 
to lead to more productivity and thus increased relationship utility. Specialization in paid 
labor would thus result in higher hourly wages and a higher occupational status (Bardasi 
& Taylor, 2008), and therefore to reduced financial pressure. Specialization within 
households may also reduce time pressure. Indeed, studies have found that single-earner 
households experience less time pressure and work-family conflict than dual-earner 
households (Craig & Mullan, 2009; Nomaguchi, 2009). However, benefits of specialization, 
in terms of higher wages and reduced time pressure, are not always found (Byron, 2005; 
Pollmann-Schult, 2011). The basic principles of specialization bypass considerations of 
gender. The theory holds that when tasks are divided between partners, regardless of 
gender, the partner relationship is better off (Grunow, et al., 2012; Kalmijn, Loeve, & 
Manting, 2007). Becker (1981, 1985), however, argued that because women generally earn 
lower hourly wages than men and men have a comparative advantage in the labor market 
labor, women are more likely to perform the role of unpaid household labor in specialized 
households. Overall, according to the specialization of labor theory, both partners reap 
higher levels of relationship satisfaction when one partner is employed and the other is 
not formally employed but takes care of domestic tasks instead. 
 The relative resource or bargaining theory argues that the partner who brings more 
resources to the relationship has more power in the relationship (Blood & Wolfe, 1960). 
One’s labor earnings are important resources in this regard and hence a source of power 
within the relationship. Partners can use this power to avoid or ‘buy out’ unpleasant tasks 
and negotiate more favorable conditions (Coltrane, 2000). This theory has been used 
mainly to explain differences in household labor between partners. Empirical findings 
show that men’s contribution to household labor increases when women’s earnings rise 
to the point at which she earns equal to him or works as many hours, but his contribution 
within the home declines when she out-performs him (Baxter & Hewitt, 2013; Bittman, 
England, Sayer, Folbre, & Matheson, 2003; Brines, 1994; Coltrane, 2000; Grunow, et al., 2012; 
Legerski & Cornwall, 2010; Mannino & Deutsch, 2007). Though the theory appears unable 
to explain the division of household labor within female breadwinner couples, bargaining 
power could still be relevant to them, leading for example to other more favorable 
conditions in the relationship for one partner. All in all, the relative resource or bargaining 
theory implies that breadwinners are more satisfied with the relationship than their 
economically dependent partners. 
 Next, equity theory, as formulated by Walster et al. (1978), argues that partners put 
effort into the relationship and compare their own effort to their partner’s effort. People 
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want reciprocity in interpersonal relationships. They are distressed when they perceive a 
relationship to be inequitable, and aim to restore it to an equitable arrangement. One type 
of effort put into the relationship is the time devoted to household tasks. Here, two types of 
imbalance may exist, namely under-benefiting (contributing more than the partner) and 
over-benefiting (contributing less than the partner) (Walster et al., 1978). Previous authors 
have demonstrated that both under-benefiting and over-benefiting induce negative 
communication and feelings such as frustration, anger, guilt, and sadness (Guerrero, La 
Valley, & Farinelli, 2008; Lively, Steelman, & Powell, 2010; Sprecher, 2001a). Being in an 
inequitable relationship, hence, leads to less satisfaction with the relationship (Cate, Lloyd, 
Henton, & Larson, 1982; Sprecher, 2001b). Most previous research using an equity theory 
framework relates relationship quality to the division of household labor, particularly 
whether this division is perceived as unfair (e.g., Braun, Lewin-Epstein, Stier, & Baumgärtner, 
2008; Klumb, Hoppmann, & Staats, 2006; Lively et al., 2010; Shechory & Ziv, 2007). However, 
aside from the division of household labor, feelings of inequity could also arise from the 
division of employment. According to equity theory, it might therefore be deduced that 
the more partners’ labor market participation differs, the more dissatisfied they will be 
with the partner relationship.
 Next, both the companionate model of marriage (Wilcox & Nock, 2006) and the role 
collaboration perspective (Rogers, 2004) highlight the benefits of similar experiences 
between partners. Partners with similar experiences, for instance, in the labor market, might 
understand each other better and therefore share more emotional intimacy, improving 
the quality of the relationship (Rogers, 2004; Wilcox & Nock, 2006). The companionate 
model of marriage emphasizes love and ‘successful teamwork’, but also strong commitment 
to the relationship, in contrast to so-called individualistic and institutional models of 
marriage (Amato, 2009; Burgess et al., 1963; Cherlin, 2004). Furthermore, the companionate 
model of marriage emphasizes that the blurring of traditional gender roles and reduction 
of patriarchal authority leave more room for emotional intimacy and understanding 
(Burgess et al., 1963; Wilcox & Nock, 2006). The role collaboration perspective argues, 
based partly on bargaining theory, that people divide less enjoyable tasks more equitably 
when they have more similar resources (Rogers, 2004). These perspectives suggest that 
separate spheres would result in dissimilar experiences, leaving little room for emotional 
intimacy and understanding and inducing inequitable divisions of tasks. The implication 
is that the more similar partners’ labor market experiences are, the more satisfied the 
partners will be with the relationship.
 Lastly, the ‘doing gender’ theory has been used to study the consequences of the 
division of employment for couple relationships. This theory holds that gender is 
constructed through social interactions (West & Zimmerman, 1987). Thus, people are 
socialized to behave according to gendered attitudes, roles, and beliefs, which motivate 
them to act in gender-typical ways (Leaper & Friedman, 2007). People and their behavior 
are also evaluated according to gendered accountability structures, from which deviations 
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are discouraged (West & Zimmerman, 1987). Traditional ideals of masculinity and femininity 
are challenged when households diverge from the more traditional male breadwinner 
arrangement, and this may impact the partner relationship (Coughlin & Wade, 2012; 
Franklin & Menaker, 2014; Sherman, 2017). Although the doing gender theory has been 
influential in family studies, it has been criticized for, among other things, not sufficiently 
taking human agency and resistance to gender expectations into account (Connell, 2010; 
Deutsch, 2007). All in all, previous studies have concluded that relationships are of a lower 
quality the more they diverge from traditional male breadwinner arrangements (Weisshaar, 
2014).
1.2.2  Theories on economic hardship and relationship quality
Theories have also been introduced to investigate the consequences of economic 
hardship on relationship quality. Most prominent among these is the family stress model 
(Conger et al., 1990, 2002, 2010, 1999), though the spillover-crossover model has also been 
used (Bakker & Demerouti, 2013; Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, & Wethington, 1989). 
 According to the family stress model, low income and negative economic events that 
hit a family, such as unemployment or loss of income, raise the economic pressure that 
couples face (Conger et al., 1990, 1999, 2002, 2010). Such pressures may include unpaid 
bills, the need to cut expenses, and unmet material needs. Such situations cause emotional 
distress and may induce problems including depression, anger, anxiety, alienation, and 
anti-social behavior (Conger et al., 2002, 2010). Partners’ reactions to economic hardship 
influence the quality of the partner relationship, particularly if they entail “aggressive or 
angry responses, such as criticism, defensiveness, and insensitivity, as well as withdrawal 
of supportive behaviors” (Conger et al., 2002, p. 181). This model has been extended to 
include the negative consequences of economic hardship for parenting behavior and 
children via relationship quality (Conger et al., 2010; Mistry, Lowe, Benner, & Chien, 2008; 
Neppl, Senia, & Donnellan, 2016). Along similar lines, more economic resources has been 
argued to make relationships more stable, as resources enable couples to deal with 
potential economic setbacks (Oppenheimer, 1997). From the family stress model it may 
thus be deduced that the more economic problems couples encounter, the less satisfied 
the partners will be with their relationship. 
 The spillover-crossover model is more general than the family stress model and 
concerns how experiences at work influence the home domain, and the partner in 
particular (Bakker & Demerouti, 2013; Bolger et al., 1989). ‘Spillover’ is the transmission of 
concerns from an individual’s work life to their personal life, and ‘crossover’ is the 
transmission of concerns from an individual’s work life to their partner’s personal life. The 
model posits that high demands at work deplete personal resources, such as energy and 
emotional reserves (Bakker & Demerouti, 2013). Employees may therefore become 
exhausted and less concentrated, and even suffer psychosomatic problems due to work 
demands. These factors influence how people act at home. A depletion of resources may 
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make it difficult to combine work and family life. Overworked partners may exhibit a lack 
of support for the other and become irritable, ultimately influencing the quality of the 
partner relationship (Bakker & Demerouti, 2013; Danner-Vlaardingerbroek, Kluwer, Van 
Steenbergen, & Van der Lippe, 2016; Danner-Vlaardingerbroek et al., 2013; Liang, 2015; 
Stevens et al., 2006). Influences on the relationship stem from both partners’ employment, 
since each partner is influenced by the experiences of the other (so-called crossover, also 
termed inter-individual cross-domain transmission) (Bolger et al., 1989; Westman, Etzion, & 
Danon, 2001; Westman, Vinokur, Hamilton, & Roziner, 2004). Crossover may affect the 
partner directly via empathy or indirectly via communication with the partner (Westman 
et al., 2001, 2004). Thus, the spillover-crossover model implies that both a person’s own 
and the partner’s employment problems will negatively affect the quality of the partner 
relationship.
1.3  Previous literature
1.3.1   The literature on the division of employment and relationship quality
Most prior research on the consequences of the division of employment has used the 
specialization theory (and its derivatives), the bargaining theory, and the doing gender 
theory to guide hypotheses. Conclusions differ substantially. Some studies conclude that 
specialization in employment is related to higher relationship quality (Furdyna, Tucker, & 
James, 2008; Lee & Ono, 20083), while others find no influence or an opposite effect 
(Brennan, Barnett, & Gareis, 2001; Keizer & Komter, 2015; Keizer & Schenk, 2012; Schoen, 
Rogers, & Amato, 2006; Weisshaar, 2014). Hence, there seems to be no clear answer to the 
question of whether labor specialization helps relationships. 
 Weisshaar (2014) showed that unequal earnings in different-sex couples was associated 
with better relationship quality, supporting specialization. However, her comparison to 
same-sex couples led her to conclude that most of this difference was explained by the 
doing gender theory. Waismel-Manor, Levanon, and Tolbert (2016) found limited influence 
of the family economic structure on family satisfaction. However, they also found that a 
transition to a more equal earner division between the partners was related to a decline in 
family satisfaction, which they too interpreted in light of the doing gender perspective 
(Waismel-Manor et al., 2016). Other studies have found support for the bargaining theory; 
that is, higher earning partners were happier with their relationship (e.g., Lee & Ono, 20083; 
Rogers & DeBoer, 2001). Some authors have found that an equal division of employment 
(dual earners) fosters relationship quality (Hardie, Geist, & Lucas, 2014), whereas others 
have found limited influence (Keizer & Schenk, 2012) or no effects (Amato, Johnson, Booth, 
3  Lee and Ono (2008) found support for the specialization hypothesis among US men and among Japanese 
men and women and support for the bargaining theory among US women.
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& Rogers, 2003; Keizer & Komter, 2015). Gong (2007) reported that in couples where women 
worked more hours than their partner both men and women reported lower quality of 
their relationship, which was attributed to status inconsistency. Other research along 
these lines has focused on domestic violence or infidelity rather than relationship quality. 
These studies suggest that intimate partner violence is more prevalent among dual-earner 
than single-earner households (Franklin & Menaker, 2014), whereas male infidelity is more 
prevalent where income differences are larger, particularly when women are the main 
earner (Munsch, 2015). 
 While some authors have produced rather similar results, they have attributed their 
findings to different theoretical mechanisms (Furdyna et al., 2008; Lee & Ono, 2008; 
Weisshaar, 2014). Overall, research on the division of labor between partners provides no 
conclusive answer on whether the division of labor affects the partner relationship, and 
specifically its quality, and if it does, via what mechanisms this takes place.
1.3.2  The literature on economic hardship and relationship quality
Most previous research on economic hardship and relationship quality has used the family 
stress model to study whether and how economic problems affect the partner relationship. 
In accordance with this theory, findings indicate that economic hardship does negatively 
affect the quality of the partner relationship, via distress and behavior within the 
relationship (see, e.g., Aytaç & Rankin, 2009; Dew & Yorgason, 2009; Falconier & Epstein, 
2010; Gudmunson, Beutler, Israelsen, McCoy, & Hill, 2007; Hardie & Lucas, 2010; Hraba, 
Lorenz, & Pechačová, 2000; Kinnunen & Feldt, 2004; Kwon, Rueter, Lee, Koh, & Ok, 2003; 
Merolla, 2017; Shim et al., 2017; Vinokur, Price, & Caplan, 1996; Williams, Cheadle, & Goosby, 
2015). This mechanism has been thoroughly tested in diverse contexts, such as among 
couples in Argentina (Falconier & Epstein, 2010), the Czech Republic (Hraba et al., 2000), 
Finland (Kinnunen & Feldt, 2004), South Korea (Shim et al., 2017), Turkey (Aytaç & Rankin, 
2009), and the USA (Gudmunson et al., 2007). Much of the previous research, furthermore, 
has used dyadic designs, and although the majority applied cross-sectional surveys, the 
family stress model has also been supported by research using longitudinal designs 
(Neppl et al., 2016). This suggests that economic hardship is indeed related to lower 
relationship quality, in line with the family stress model.
 Conclusions from research on unemployment and relationship quality are slightly 
more ambiguous. Most such studies find that unemployment leads to worse relationship 
outcomes; that is, unemployment produces greater financial strain, which negatively 
affects the quality of the partner relationship (Kinnunen & Feldt, 2004; Larson, 1984; 
Wyrobková & Okrajek, 2014). Aside from inducing financial problems, unemployment also 
affects partners’ sense of well-being and self-worth (Jahoda, 1981; Paul & Moser, 2009), as 
demonstrated by qualitative research (Lane, 2009; Rao, 2017; Sherman, 2017). In contrast, 
some authors have suggested that it is not stable (unfavorable) employment situations, 
but primarily changes in employment that harms relationships (Van den Troost, Matthijs, 
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Vermulst, Gerris, & Welkenhuysen-Gybels, 2006). However, others found no such effect 
(Schoen et al., 2006). Studies on more extreme relationship outcomes have found that 
men who experienced economic hardship or were unemployed were more controlling 
and violent toward their partner (Schneider et al., 2016). Few studies have investigated the 
crossover effects of unemployment on relationship quality, as most focus on spillover. 
 Aside from current economic hardship, such as financial strain and unemployment, 
little research has investigated the consequences of future or expected economic 
hardship on relationship quality. However, a person’s expectations about the future are 
important for the partner relationship (Blossfeld et al., 2011, 2005; Hofmann & Hohmeyer, 
2013). The few studies that do exist focus primarily on job insecurity; only one investigated 
other reasons for future economic hardship (Kinnunen & Pulkkinen, 1998). That research 
found that people who expected economic strain in the future had lower quality 
relationships (Kinnunen & Pulkkinen, 1998). Research on job insecurity has concluded 
that people who experienced more job insecurity had lower quality family relationships 
(Barling & Macewen, 1992; Hughes & Galinsky, 1994; Hughes, Galinsky, & Morris, 1992; 
Mauno & Kinnunen, 1999). Hence, job insecurity does appear to spill over to relationships. 
 Beyond the spillover effects of job insecurity, little research has been conducted on 
the crossover effects of job insecurity. The (to my knowledge) single study investigating 
the crossover effects of job insecurity found no such effect (Mauno & Kinnunen, 1999).
1.4  Contribution of this dissertation
Building on previous studies’ contributions to our understanding of the links between 
employment and relationship quality, the current study seeks to advance the literature in 
four ways. First, it explicitly incorporates the dyadic nature of the partner relationship by 
including the employment experiences of both partners. Second, it better tests specific 
mechanisms that relate employment to relationship quality. Third, it explores the 
universality of these mechanisms, specifically investigating for whom employment is 
more influential for the quality of the partner relationships (e.g., men versus women and 
higher versus lower educated). Fourth, unlike previous cross-sectional studies, it uses 
high-quality longitudinal data and cross-national data. These contributions are further 
discussed below.
1.4.1  Dyadic perspective
First, I incorporate the dyadic experience of the couple. Given that people lead linked lives 
(Eby et al., 2010; Elder et al., 2003), a relationship is influenced not only by one’s own 
personal situation, but also by the characteristics of one’s partner’s situation (Bakker & 
Demerouti, 2013; Bolger et al., 1989). That is, a person’s perception of their partner 
relationship will be affected by their own, as well as by their partner’s experiences. 
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Neglecting the partner’s experiences could lead to misestimation of the influence of 
employment on the partner relationship, since only half of the actors in the relationship 
are investigated. For instance, partners may become less satisfied with their relationship if 
their partner becomes unemployed, perhaps even to the same degree (or more) as if they 
themselves become unemployed. By not investigating these influences, the consequences 
of unemployment for the partner relationship may be underestimated. To thoroughly test 
theories on economic hardship, it is thus important to incorporate the experiences of 
both partners. This study therefore, includes the employment experiences of both.
1.4.2  Theoretical mechanisms
Second, I formulate hypotheses from several theoretical angles and seek some indication 
of which mechanisms are actually at play. I do this in three ways, namely, by including the 
division of household labor, by investigating specific divisions of labor for which two 
theories differ in their expectations on relationship quality, and by including employment 
and income simultaneously.
 Regarding the inclusion of household labor, as partners divide both employment and 
household labor, both need to be investigated simultaneously. After all, one partner may 
do less household labor than the other because he or she is employed for more hours 
than the partner. Otherwise stated, the contribution in one domain may be dependent 
on the contribution in the other domain (Kalmijn & Monden, 2011). Previously, Kalmijn and 
Monden (2011) sought to disentangle equity and specialization mechanisms by defining 
couples’ division of labor based on partners’ involvement in employment and household 
labor. Using similar methods, this research distinguishes the implications of the theoretical 
notions of labor specialization and equity for people’s satisfaction with the partner 
relationship. 
 Moreover, some theories produce similar predictions on relationship quality for 
certain groups, but diverge in their predictions for other groups. Specifically, it may be 
deduced from both specialization theory and the doing gender perspective that people 
in dual-earner couples will be less satisfied with their relationship than people in male 
breadwinner couples. However, the predictions of these theories regarding female 
breadwinner couples diverge. Research on these couples is relatively scarce, since most 
studies on the division of employment and relationship quality have focused on 
dual-earner versus male breadwinner couples (Hardie et al., 2014; Waismel-Manor et al., 
2016; Weisshaar, 2014). Investigating female breadwinner couples may shed light on what 
theoretical mechanisms are most influential. 
 Additionally, scant previous research has included employment and income aspects 
simultaneously. This could be problematic since earnings as well as, or instead of, 
employment might cause employment to influence relationship quality. When taking 
income into account, the employment effect could indicate factors such as time structure 
and identity and status instead of poverty. The lack of clear differentiation arises both in 
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studies on the division of employment and income between partners (e.g. Bertrand, 
Kamenica, & Pan, 2015; Brennan et al., 2001; Weisshaar, 2014) and in research on economic 
hardship (e.g. Dew & Xiao, 2013; Williams et al., 2015). The current study thus incorporates 
both aspects simultaneously when appropriate to identify the mechanisms underlying 
the association between employment and couple relationships, apart from financial 
resources.
1.4.3  Conditional influences
Third, I study whether employment has a different influence on relationship quality 
depending on personal characteristics and attitudes, family context, and societal context. 
Most research implicitly assumes that any influence of the division of employment or 
economic hardship is rather universal. Few studies have investigated moderating effects. 
Neglecting these may lead to false rejection of hypotheses, since a positive effect for one 
group may be counterbalanced by a negative effect for another group. 
 Personal characteristics and attitudes may influence the extent to which employment 
factors affect the quality of the partner relationship. Yet, even gender has seldom been 
included as a moderating factor. However, gender is a crucial factor in relationships and in 
spillover from the work to the family domain. Traditionally, the male breadwinner model 
has been central in Western societies (Charles, 2011; Janssens, 1997). Even in contemporary 
Western societies, employment plays a stronger role for men’s identity and well-being 
than for women (Coltrane & Shih, 2010; Doucet, 2009; Meisenbach, 2010; Strandh, 
Hammarström, Nilsson, Nordenmark, & Russel, 2013; Townsend, 2002). Men’s employment 
may therefore affect the quality of the partner relationship differently than women’s 
employment. Similarly, gender role attitudes shape how people evaluate situations; while 
one person may be satisfied with a traditional role division, another may be less so 
(Hengstebeck, Helms, & Rodriguez, 2014). This study therefore examines differences in the 
influence of employment on relationship quality between men and women and between 
people with traditional and egalitarian gender role attitudes.
 Similarly, the family context may affect the influence of the division of employment 
and economic hardship on the quality of the partner relationship (Boss, Bryant, & Mancini, 
2017; Elder et al., 2003). Family circumstances may induce a particular time structure or 
financial demand or highlight particular roles of men and women as appropriate. For 
instance, the presence of children may call for more efficiency in the household and more 
financial resources, and simultaneously highlight divergences from traditional labor 
divisions between partners (Baxter, Buchler, Perales, & Western, 2014; Chaulk, Johnson, & 
Bulcroft, 2003; Mistry et al., 2008). Thus, the current study examines whether the influence 
of the division of labor and economic hardship on relationships is dependent on the 
presence of children.
 Similarly, the larger societal context may influence the association between employment 
and relationship quality. This has hardly been studied in previous research. Whereas some 
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literature indicates that the larger societal context could impact the link between 
employment and relationship quality (Hardie et al., 2014), only one previous study investigated 
cross-country differences (namely, Lee & Ono, 2008, which compared Japan to the USA). 
Findings thus far suggest that the relation between employment, or the division thereof, 
and relationship quality differs between countries. For example, the division of employment 
seems to affect individual well-being and the chance of divorce differently in different 
countries (Cooke et al., 2013; Kaplan & Stier, 2017; Stavrova, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011; 
Treas, Van der Lippe, & Tai, 2011). Therefore, this study investigates whether and how the 
quality of the partner relationship is differently affected by employment across countries. 
Specifically, it focuses on the impact of macro-economic circumstances and how these 
affect the influence of economic problems on couple relationships. 
1.4.4  Longitudinal and cross-national approach
Lastly, I use high-quality recent longitudinal and cross-national data. This is in contrast to 
many previous studies, which have relied on relatively old and cross-sectional data from a 
single country. For example, most research on relationship quality and female breadwinners 
uses US data from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s (Bertrand et al., 2015; Brennan et al., 
2001; Furdyna et al., 2008; Gong, 2007; Wilcox & Nock, 2006; Winslow, 2011). Additionally, 
conclusions may differ when using a longitudinal design rather than a cross-sectional 
design. Application of longitudinal data analyses constitutes a major advance on prior 
research (Conger et al., 2010), and helps to “account for some of the largest methodological 
hurdles to understanding the association between economic factors and relationship 
quality” (Hardie et al., 2014, p. 734). People may end their partner relationship due to a 
negative event and its influence on the quality of the partner relationship (Kalmijn et al., 
2007). These couples would not be captured by cross-sectional analysis.
 Use of longitudinal data also has theoretical implications. As noted earlier, some 
previous literature indicates that changes in employment may be more important for the 
quality of the partner relationship than stable arrangements (Hardie et al., 2014; Van den 
Troost et al., 2006), although this finding is not universal (Schoen et al., 2006). Changes in 
employment may lead partners to renegotiate the division of household labor (Baxter & 
Hewitt, 2013), which could impact the relationship (Kluwer, Heesink, Van de Vliert, 1996, 
2000). Such changes may induce stress and affect the relationship in the short term, but 
these effects may diminish over time as the partners grow accustomed to the new situation. 
 As noted before, because this study uses cross-national data, it is able to investigate 
whether partner relationships are similarly affected by employment factors across 
countries. Employing cross-national data allows investigation of the moderating impact of 
country characteristics, while also improving the generalizability of the results beyond 
single countries.
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1.5  Research design
This section discusses the data used, the research population and selection of respondents, 
and potential sources of selection bias. Four data sources were used. Three are dyadic 
longitudinal data sources: the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) (1997-2008); 
the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey (2001-2015); 
and the Dutch Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) (2008-2015). 
In these surveys, both partners were interviewed regarding their employment and 
relationship satisfaction, making them well suited to study relationships from a dyadic and 
longitudinal perspective. Also used was the cross-national data from the European Quality 
of Life Survey (EQLS) 2012, which covered 30 European countries. While the EQLS did not 
interview both partners, the main respondent did provide information on his or her 
partner’s employment.
 The current research centers inherently on people with a partner relationship, since 
only they can be satisfied or dissatisfied with their relationship. Furthermore, I selected 
people in a different-sex relationship. Many of the effects of employment on relationship 
quality may be gendered, which was of special interest in this study. The number of 
same-sex couples in the datasets used was too small to investigate them separately from 
different-sex couples. Combining same-sex and different-sex couples would have led to 
misestimation of the gendered effects of partner employment and the division of 
employment, which differ between same-sex and different-sex couples (Weisshaar, 2014). 
Also, the analyses include only partners living in the same household, excluding those 
who were in a relationship but did not live with their partner. These latter partners often 
did not share a financial or economic household. Hence, the mechanisms linking 
household economics to relationship satisfaction would not apply, or would apply less, in 
their situation. In addition, non-cohabiting partners were not included in the dyadic 
longitudinal data used. Lastly, because the main mechanisms examined relate to 
employment factors, couples were selected in which both partners were of working age. 
Hence, people under the age of 25 or older than 55 or 65 were excluded, either in the 
main analyses or robustness analyses, to account for entry to and exit from the labor 
market (OECD, 2016; Visser, Gesthuizen, Kraaykamp, & Wolbers, 2016).
 To some extent the data used may exhibit some selectivity. People in low-quality 
relationships may divorce, leading to an overall higher level of satisfaction among the 
couples in my samples. However some arguments can be made against this claim. First, 
couples that divorce are no longer couples, so they are not of interest to this research. 
Furthermore, low relationship quality at certain time points or for longer periods does not 
always lead to separation; and the reverse is also true, couples with a relatively low level of 
distress also separate (Amato & Hohmann-Marriott, 2007; Hirschberger, Srivastava, Marsh, 
Cowan, & Cowan, 2009). Hence, selection due to divorce may be less substantial than 
perhaps expected. Furthermore, my longitudinal studies observe couples that eventually 
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divorce up to the point at which they separate. A decline in relationship quality following 
a particular event (e.g., job loss) is probably captured in the data, since partners do not 
separate immediately; the decision to divorce takes time (Gottman, 1993; Willén & 
Montgomery, 2006). However, people who are relatively dissatisfied with their relationship 
may have a lower sense of well-being and therefore be less willing to participate in 
surveys, skewing the samples somewhat toward those who are relatively satisfied with 
their relationship.
 Furthermore, many of the questions studied concern the employment and relationship 
characteristics of both partners, such as the division of employment. Measurement of 
these generally requires direct questioning of both respondent and partner. Therefore, for 
the dyadic studies I selected couples in which both partners participated or both 
responded to the particular questions that were required for my measurements. This led 
to selection of couples in which both partners responded to the surveys. Nonetheless, 
people whose partner participated in the survey and provided a valid answer on 
relationship satisfaction were found to be slightly more satisfied with their relationship 
than partnered individuals whose partner did not participate in the survey (see Table A1.1 
in Appendix 1).
1.6  Outline of the dissertation and summary of each chapter
This dissertation presents my investigation of the research questions in four empirical 
chapters which examine if and how employment factors affect the partner relationship. 
Table 1.1 summarizes the outline of this dissertation. The first two chapters investigate the 
division of employment between partners and its consequences for relationship quality. 
Chapter 2 examines whether the combined division of employment and household labor 
within couples influenced satisfaction with the partner relationship. Chapter 3 investigates 
the consequences of women being the main provider for relationship satisfaction. 
 The next two chapters concern the effects of economic hardship on the quality of the 
partner relationship. Economic problems faced by an individual, by the partner, and by 
the couple collectively may influence the quality of the partner relationship in different 
ways. Chapter 4 examines the effect of current economic hardship and expectations 
about future economic hardship on the quality of family relationships. The final empirical 
chapter, chapter 5, investigates the consequences of job insecurity, both one’s own and 
one’s partner’s, for relationship satisfaction.
1.6.1  The division of employment: Specialization and equity
The first study (chapter 2) investigates the consequences of couples’ division of time spent 
on employment and on household labor for satisfaction with the partner relationship. 
Combining employment and household labor, rather than including only one of the two 
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types of labor, enabled me to distinguish between the theoretical notions of specialization 
and equity (based on Kalmijn & Monden, 2011). Specialization relates to differentiation in 
the content of tasks (employment versus household labor), whereas equity in terms of 
hours indicates similarity in time devoted to family needs (irrespective of the content of 
tasks). I studied the direct effects of equity in hours and specialization on relationship 
satisfaction and  but more importantly, I investigated the extent to which these associations 
differed for people with egalitarian gender role attitudes and for people with children. 
Figure 1.4 outlines this study. 
 This study builds upon previous research in multiple ways: by combining the division 
of employment and household labor, by investigating gender differences in the effects of 
these divisions, by clarifying the moderating influence of gender role attitudes, and by 
using dyadic longitudinal data. The dyadic data from the British Household Panel Survey 
(1997-2008) was used to test the hypotheses.
 Surprisingly, no main effects were found for equity in terms of hours spent and for 
specialization on relationship satisfaction. The results do suggest that among men with 
egalitarian gender role attitudes, equity in hours positively affects relationship satisfaction. 
Moreover, specialization was found to be related to lower relationship satisfaction among 
men with egalitarian gender role attitudes. No conditional effects were found for women 
or for the presence of children. In conclusion, there are no indications of a universal, 
direct association between the level of specialization and equity in hours and couples’ 
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relationship satisfaction. However, under certain conditions the division of labor does 
appear to influence men’s relationship satisfaction. These findings suggest that when 
couples’ division of tasks is in accordance with men’s preferences, men are more satisfied 
with the partner relationship.
1.6.2  The division of employment: Female breadwinner couples
The second study (chapter 3) concerns women who earn more than their male partner. It 
aims to determine whether people are less satisfied with their partner relationship when 
the woman becomes the main provider. It also examines whether these transitions have 
a different influence on relationship satisfaction depending on partners’ gender role 
attitudes, that is, whether they hold egalitarian or traditional gender attitudes. Figure 1.5 
presents the outline of this study. The goal was to disentangle which mechanisms link the 
division of employment between partners to their relationship satisfaction, by studying 
female breadwinner couples and by combining the division of employment with labor 
earnings between partners. Female breadwinner couples were defined as couples in 
which women earned more than their employed male partner or where women were the 
single earner because their partner was unable to work or was a homemaker. Hence, I 
differentiated single earners from dual earners in which one out-earned the other, which 
proved to be important for the study. Hypotheses were formulated based on specialization, 
bargaining, role collaboration, and the doing gender theories. 
 This study expands on previous literature by considering two dimensions of bread -
winning, namely, income and employment; in investigating gender differences; by studying 
whether gender role attitudes moderate these associations; and by using dyadic longitudinal 
data. To study the hypotheses, 15 waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics 
in Australia panel survey were used, covering relationships between 2001 and 2015.
Figure 1.4   Research model chapter 2, the division of labor and relationship satisfaction
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Results associate becoming a female breadwinner with a decline in relationship satisfaction 
among women, and to a lesser extent among men, especially when men became unable 
to work due to unemployment or illness. The decline in men’s satisfaction following men’s 
inability to work was mostly attributed to the decline in income and employment hours. 
In dual-earner couples where women out-earned their partner, both men and women 
were generally less satisfied with their relationship. While hypothesized, gender role attitudes 
did not influence these associations. The results provide most support for the doing gender 
perspective, though it is not fully or consistently upheld. 
1.6.3  Economic hardship: Current and expected hardship
The third study of this dissertation (chapter 4) investigates how precarious economic 
circumstances influence satisfaction with family life. Figure 1.6 presents an overview. 
Based on the family stress model, both current economic hardship and expectations 
about future economic hardship were expected to influence satisfaction with family life, 
since both factors raise the stress people experience. Additionally, I hypothesized that 
current and expected economic hardship amplify each other’s consequences for satisfaction. 
I expected that precariousness would be more harmful to family life satisfaction when 
children were involved and when national-level unemployment was steeply rising. 
 This study expands on previous research and on the family stress model by investigating 
the consequences of both current and expected economic (financial and employment) 
problems for relationship quality. Furthermore, it advances the literature by including the 
labor market experience of both partners and by investigating the moderating influence 
of the presence and number of children. Lastly, the differential influence of the macro- 
economic situation is investigated using cross-national European data from the European 
Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) 2012 covering 30 European countries. 
 The results indicate that people who experience economic hardship are less satisfied 
with their family life. People who expect economic hardship are also less satisfied with 
their family life, indicating the importance of expectations about the future for family 
well-being. Economic expectations’ negative influence on families was generally not 
Figure 1.5  Research model chapter 3, female breadwinners and relationship satisfaction
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more severe among people currently experiencing more economic difficulties. This 
indicates that more affluent families are also susceptible to negative expectations about 
economic hardship, and their prosperity does not provide a sufficient buffer against this 
insecurity. Family life satisfaction did not suffer more under economic hardship or 
expected hardship when children were involved. An exception was that expecting a 
financial decline was especially harmful to satisfaction among people with larger families. 
Lastly, current and expected economic hardship were not found to be more harmful 
when unemployment was rising more steeply in a country. That last indicates that 
economic crises do not amplify the influence of economic hardship on family life 
satisfaction, even though economic crises lead to more widespread economic hardship 
and expected hardship.
1.6.4  Economic hardship: Job insecurity 
The fourth study (chapter 5) concerns subjective job insecurity and relationship satisfaction. 
Economic transitions, such as economic crisis, flexibilization of the labor market, and 
globalization, have undermined job security in many countries. Many people feel insecure 
about their job continuation, and this insecurity could influence their partner relationship. 
This chapter examines whether a person’s own and their partner’s job insecurity affects 
satisfaction with the partner relationship. Furthermore, it investigates whether these 
effects differ between men and women and between people with a higher and lower 
education. Figure 1.7 presents an overview.
 This study advances on prior research in several ways, namely by incorporating 
both the spillover and crossover effects of job insecurity, by investigating gender and 
educational differences in these effects, and by using dyadic longitudinal data. I based my 
Figure 1.6   Research model chapter 4, economic hardship and expected economic 
hardship and relationship satisfaction
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hypotheses on the spillover-crossover model and resource perspective. For the study, 
I used the Dutch Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) panel 
(2008-2015).
 The results indicate that men and women were less satisfied with their relationship 
when they felt more insecure about their job. Women were also less satisfied with their 
partner relationship when their male partner experienced greater job insecurity, but 
interestingly not vice versa. Among the lower educated, relationship satisfaction was 
affected by job insecurity, especially among men, while people in higher educated 
couples were not or were hardly influenced by job insecurity. In conclusion, the spillover 
effects of job insecurity do appear to negatively influence satisfaction with the partner 
relationship, but crossover seems to affect only women’s relationship satisfaction. The 
lower educated were found to be especially vulnerable to the effects of job insecurity, and 
their relationship satisfaction seemed to be particularly affected by insecure labor market 
positions.
1.7  Future directions, implications and conclusion
1.7.1  Limitations and directions for future research
While this research extended and improved upon previous research, it held several 
drawbacks. It relied on a single measurement of relationship quality, namely one’s 
satisfaction with the partner relationship or a similar formulation. While this provided a 
good indication of relationship quality (Helms, 2013), future research may want to consider 
multiple survey items and measurements to more elaborately capture different aspects of 
relationship quality. Similarly, future researchers could include an instrument that is more 
precise or sensitive in detecting change in the quality of the partner relationship. While 
these were available in relatively small-scale cross-sectional studies, they were largely 
unavailable in reliable cross-national and longitudinal data. Similarly, many of the more 
Figure 1.7  Research model chapter 5, job insecurity and relationship satisfaction
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subjective measurements, such as job insecurity, were also measured with single items. 
These could also be measured more precisely, which may prove better able to pick up 
smaller, more subtle effects. However, it should be noted that the measurements used 
here should be able to pick up larger, more influential effects, and any influences 
overlooked are likely to be relatively minor.
 Furthermore, while I found indications that certain mechanisms linked employment 
to the quality of the partner relationship, I was unable to formally test these specific 
mechanisms with measurements that captured the causal chain. Some previous studies 
have tested these specific processes. While it is less necessary to investigate already 
established mechanisms (such as the family stress model, which has been supported by 
previous studies, see Conger et al., 2010), the mechanisms of theoretical extensions do 
need to be tested. Future research could investigate specific mechanisms such as one’s 
own job insecurity and the partner’s job insecurity in connection with relationship quality 
with intermediating factors such as economic pressure, stress, and anger (see Mauno & 
Kinnunen, 1999). In addition, the mechanisms associated with some of the theories have 
been tested less often, at least in the context of employment and relationship quality. The 
doing gender perspective is an example in this regard. Few of the previous studies on 
employment and relationship quality guided by the doing gender perspective tested 
specific mechanisms; this may thus be a fruitful direction for future research.
 Along similar lines, while theories, hypotheses, and previous research indicate causal 
relationships between employment factors and the quality of the partner relationship, 
these are difficult to establish. By using longitudinal panel data, I have been able to make 
this claim more convincingly than most previous studies, but even with longitudinal 
panel data I am unable to make definitive claims about the causal direction (Finkel, 1995). 
Other studies suggest that the quality of the partner relationship also influences work 
factors and the division of labor between partners (Kluwer, 2017; Schoen et al., 2006; 
Ten Brummelhuis, Van der Lippe, & Kluwer, 2010).
 Additionally, the empirical chapters use various high-quality data sources appropriate 
for answering the respective questions. One data source would not have been sufficient 
to answer all of these questions, for example, due to a lack of statistical power in the 
relevant categories. For instance, too few female breadwinner couples may have been 
included. Use of various different sources and studying different countries means that 
the empirical studies do not refer to the same context. At the same time, it must be noted 
that I found little indication that employment was differently related to the quality of 
the relationship in different countries. Future research would greatly benefit from reliable 
cross-national, preferably longitudinal, data with extensive measurements of relationship 
quality.
 Furthermore, this research primarily studied white (or native) different-sex couples. 
Minority groups were generally underrepresented in the datasets or were too small to 
distinguish and make statistical claims about them. While this is not necessarily a large 
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problem when investigating a general population, it may become a problem if findings 
are extrapolated to particular social groups. Specific mechanisms linking employment to 
the quality of the partner relationship may be different in different social groups (Conger 
et al., 2002; Furdyna et al., 2008; Weisshaar, 2014). Minority groups are interesting to 
investigate in their own right, and such research may serve an additional purpose, as 
investigating different social groups may help us to better understand how employment 
affects the partner relationship. For example, Weisshaar (2014) used same-sex couples to 
investigate which mechanisms link the division of labor to relationship outcomes.
 Lastly, while I investigated whether economic hardship and the division of employment 
were differently related to relationship quality depending on one’s attitudes, characteristics, 
and the family and macro-economic context, other moderating factors could be studied 
as well. Promising examples for future research include the differential influence of the 
social network, such as friendship networks and the extended family, and the normative 
climate in these networks and in the general society.
1.7.2  Policy implications
I began this chapter by noting the importance of the quality of the partner relationship 
for the well-being of the partners and their children, and the risk of divorce (Amato & 
Sobolewski, 2001; Knopp et al., 2017; Proulx et al., 2007; Tach & Halpern-Meekin, 2012). 
These consequences make relationship quality a relevant topic for policymakers. However, 
because factors that affect the quality of the partner relationship are primarily in the 
private sphere (Bradbury, Fincham, & Beach, 2000; Fincham & Beach, 2010), policymakers 
may be reluctant to intervene directly. Yet, this research points to indirect ways to improve 
the quality of partner relationships within society. Indeed, the work domain influences 
relationship quality. Precarious economic circumstances, such as poverty, unemployment, 
and job insecurity, influence the quality of the partner relationship. Therefore, in policy - 
making on, for example, flexibilization, governments could consider the consequences for 
family relationships. Or they could at least acknowledge the possible negative influence of 
macro-economic policies on couples. Additionally, policies that aim to reduce precarious 
labor market circumstances, poverty, or job insecurity will have the additional benefit of 
improving relationship quality. Policies that make employment more stable will benefit 
relationships as well, and generous unemployment and disability benefits may improve 
recipients’ relationship quality.
 Labor market policies do not affect everyone equally. The social groups most affected 
by increasingly precarious work are, for instance, the lower educated and migrant 
populations – as these groups are already overrepresented in precarious employment 
positions (Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2014; Näswall & De Witte, 2003; Wolbers, 2000). 
This research indicates that among the lower educated population the quality of partner 
relationships is especially vulnerable to precarious labor positions. Therefore, policies that 
make precarious work more precarious may worsen the cumulative disadvantage facing 
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certain groups. Social policies that widen the security gap between precarious and 
non-precarious work induce greater social inequalities, even extending to partner 
relationships. Instead, policymakers could consider policies that protect the social 
positions of already vulnerable groups, thereby protecting the quality of their partner 
relationships. 
1.7.3  General conclusion
The quality of contemporary partner relationships does seem to have been affected by 
major societal developments. Women’s increased participation in the labor market has 
brought new divisions of labor as today, men are not always the main breadwinner, and 
women are not only homemakers. Additionally, major macroeconomic developments 
have changed the economic conditions of couples. This research demonstrates that new 
divisions of labor and economic hardship affect couples’ satisfaction with their relationship.
 First, men appear to be most satisfied with their partner relationship if their division 
of employment is aligned with the gender role attitudes they hold. Men seem more 
satisfied with their relationship when they are the main breadwinner in the relationship or 
when they are in a dual-earner household in which both partners earn about the same. 
Importantly, however, men become less satisfied with their relationship if women become 
the main provider. This seems to hold irrespective of men’s personal attitudes toward 
appropriate gendered behavior. Women’s relationship satisfaction seems to be less 
affected by the division of labor than men’s relationship satisfaction, up to the point where 
women become the main provider for the family. At that point, women become less 
satisfied in their relationship. The increased participation of women in the labor market 
therefore seems to have had little influence on relationship satisfaction, as long as the 
gendered division of labor does not result in female dominance (i.e., as long as women do 
not become the main earner). For men it is important for the division to follow their 
attitudes toward appropriate gender roles. This finding highlights the continuity of 
traditional gender roles in the larger societal context. Progress has been achieved, since 
relationships do not necessarily suffer when women’s labor participation is equal to men’s. 
However, this progress still seems to have a long way to go before gender equality is 
achieved, given that relationship quality declines when women’s work hours or earnings 
surpass those of men. These general conclusions seem to be mostly in line with the doing 
gender perspective, while less support is found for the more gender-blind theoretical 
perspectives. Therefore, gender and gendered expectations continue to play a fundamental 
role in relationship dynamics in contemporary society.
 Second, next to the division of labor between partners, the economic hardship that 
couples face affects their relationship quality. The macro-economic circumstances studied 
here, specifically, the economic crisis and the flexibilization and globalization of labor 
markets, affected how satisfied partners were as a couple. This research found that the 
relationship between partners suffered when they were exposed to economic hardship. 
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Those who were unemployed or experiencing financial problems reported less satisfaction 
with their relationship. However, not only did the current situation affect the partner 
relationship, expectations about the future were also influential. Relationship quality was 
generally lower among those who felt insecure about future earnings or job position. 
The consequences of economic trends are not equally distributed across social groups. 
The lower educated seem especially vulnerable to job insecurity (Berglund & Wallinder, 
2015; De Lange, Gesthuizen, & Wolbers, 2012). Moreover, this study found that job insecurity 
among lower educated couples led to a larger decline in relationship quality than among 
higher educated couples. The negative consequences of job insecurity for relationships 
are thus to some extent concentrated among already vulnerable groups. These general 
conclusions largely mirror the family stress model, which I have extended by including 
expectations about the future economic situation. 
 Third, while people become less satisfied with their relationship when they personally 
have economic problems, the effects of the partner’s job position differ between men 
and women. Women become less satisfied with their relationship if their male partner 
becomes unemployed or insecure in his job. In contrast, men’s perception of the 
relationship seems less influenced by women’s job loss or job insecurity. This suggests 
that the job position of men is deemed more important than that of women, at least by 
men. This may be due to men’s generally larger financial contribution to the household, 
which makes their employment more necessary for the financial well-being of the couple. 
Or it could be linked to gender role attitudes which value men’s job position more than 
women’s job position. Hence, male economic dominance and internalized and societal 
preconceptions of appropriate male and female roles continue to shape work and family 
relationships today. 
 Lastly, employment’s effects on the partner relationship turned out to be rather 
universal. Though men’s and women’s employment affected the partner relationship 
differently, the associations between employment and relationship satisfaction were 
largely unaffected by the family context, macro-economic context, and to a lesser extent, 
by gender role attitudes. The mechanisms therefore seem largely independent of the 
family and macro-economic context. This is surprising given the large differences between 
individuals, families, and societies. While these differences affect the prevalence of certain 
divisions of employment or employment conditions, they do not affect the degree to 
which employment influences the partner relationship. 
 I began this dissertation by asking to what extent employment factors affect the 
quality of the partner relationship. This research clearly showed that the work domain and 
the family domain are linked. A couple’s division of employment and the economic 
hardship they face influence the quality of the partner relationship. Employment thereby 
influences the partner relationship aside from providing financial resources. Particularly, 
traditional conceptions of gendered behavior continue to play an important role in 
employment and partner relationships in modern Western societies.
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Household Chores and Relationship Satisfaction: A Test of the Specialization and Equity 
Hypotheses. European Sociological Review, 33(2), 195–208.
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Couples’ division of employment and household labor and relationship satisfaction
2.1  Introduction and research question
Satisfaction with the partner relationship is key for both personal and children’s well-being. 
To explain satisfaction with partner relationships, researchers have frequently studied the 
division of employment and household labor within a family (Barstad, 2014; Hardie et al., 
2014; Keizer & Schenk, 2012; Kluwer et al., 1996; Oshio, Nozaki, & Kobayashi, 2012; Tai & 
Baxter, 2018). Especially the ideas of specialization and equity have been frequently linked 
to relationship satisfaction. Specialization theory states that when women and men 
specialize in either employment or household labor, household utility is higher (Becker, 
1985), which subsequently would lead to more satisfying partner relationships (e.g. Oshio 
et al., 2012). Equity theory argues that when both partners contribute equitably to the 
common good (i.e., the family), relationship satisfaction will be higher (Walster et al., 1978; 
Wilcox & Nock, 2006). 
 Previous research often studied either couples’ division of employment or division of 
household labor. When studying only one of those two domains, equity and specialization 
represent two extremes of a single dimension: an equal amount of labor is seen as 
equitable4, an unequal amount as specialized. Kalmijn and Monden (2011) advocated to 
study couples’ division of employment and household labor simultaneously. Then, equity 
refers to similarity in the total time investments partners make (whether on employment 
and/or household labor), and specialization explicitly refers to partners performing 
different types of tasks (employment versus household labor). As a result, equity in hours 
and specialization are no longer simply contrasts. For instance, if one partner spends 
40 hours on employment and the other partner spends 40 hours on household labor, 
the couple can be characterized as highly specialized but also as equitable in time input. 
In our article, we choose this strategy of studying couples’ time division of employment 
and household labor to disentangle equity in hours and specialization.
 Prior studies on the association between couples’ division of labor and relationship 
satisfaction provided inconclusive results. Among the studies that focus on the division 
of household labor, some indicated that a traditional division increased happiness and 
satisfaction with the relationship (Oshio et al., 2012; Wilcox & Nock, 2006), whereas others 
showed that a more equal division of household labor was related to higher levels of 
relationship satisfaction (Amato et al., 2003; Barstad, 2014; Oshio et al., 2012; Tai & Baxter, 
2018). In research on the division of employment, some studies found that an equal division 
of employment (e.g., dual-earners) fostered relationship satisfaction (Hardie et al., 2014), 
whereas others found limited (Keizer and Schenk, 2012), or even negative effects (Amato 
et al., 2003). Defining couples’ division of labor based on partners’ involvement in both 
employment and household labor was done by Kalmijn and Monden (2011), but their 
study focused on mental well-being rather than relationship satisfaction. They found clear 
4 Although equity concerns the difference in the outcome-input ratio between partners, we here only study input.
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support for the positive influence of equity on mental well-being, but weak evidence was 
found regarding a positive effect of specialization on well-being.
 Additionally, we propose it is important to assess whether the influence of specialization 
and hours-equity on relationship satisfaction depends on people’s preferences and 
circumstances. Neglecting conditional factors may lead to falsely rejecting specialization 
or equity hypotheses; a positive effect for a certain group may be counterbalanced by a 
negative effect for another group. In this contribution, we will therefore assess whether 
the effect of hours-equity and specialization on relationship satisfaction differs between 
people with traditional and egalitarian gender role attitudes, and between people with 
and without young children. Especially gender role attitudes and the presence of children 
are argued to be influential on people’s evaluations of the division of labor (Perales, Baxter, 
& Tai, 2015).
 In sum, our main contribution to the literature of partner’s relationship satisfaction is 
a simultaneous testing of expectations on hours-equity and specialization in the division 
of employment and household labor. Furthermore, we investigate possible moderating 
influences of gender role attitudes and children in the family. Our research question reads: 
To what extent are equity in hours and specialization of employment and household labor 
between partners related to relationship satisfaction, and to what extent are these associations 
affected by egalitarian gender role attitudes and the presence of young children?
 To test our expectations we employ information on 21,302 observations of 8,204 
respondents in 4,102 relationships from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). 
This provides us with the unique opportunity to include information on both partners’ 
employment and household labor simultaneously. 
2.2  Theoretical framework and hypotheses
Before deriving hypotheses, it is important to explicate the difference between 
specialization and equity in hours. Specialization relates to differentiation in the content of 
tasks within a family, whereas hours-equity indicates similarity in time both partners 
devote to family needs. Figure 2.1 illustrates four examples. Example 1 comprises people 
in couples which are equitable in hours and unspecialized. It refers to situations in which 
both partners spend a similar amount of time on employment and on household labor. In 
this illustration, both partners spend the same amount of time in total (40 hours) on the 
family’s needs (indicating equity), and the content of these efforts are the same in ratio; 
both partners spend 50% of their total time on employment (indicating unspecialization). 
Example 2 illustrates couples that are equitable in hours and specialized. While both 
partners contribute the same amount of time in total (indicating equity), the content of 
their time contribution differs (indicating specialization); partner 1 is only engaged in 
employment while partner 2 is solely involved in household labor. In examples 3 and 4, 
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the couple is characterized as unequitable, because there is a large difference between 
both partners in total hours spent on family needs. However, the third example is 
characterized as unspecialized because both partners spend the same proportion of their 
total time investments on employment (here, 50%), while in the fourth example these 
proportions are highly different (100% and 0% employment, respectively), indicating that 
partners are specialized in the types of tasks they perform.
2.2.1  Specialization and relationship satisfaction: main effects
In this article we derive hypotheses on the influence of specialization on relationship 
satisfaction based upon the companionate model of marriage, the specialization of 
marriage theory, and the gender model of marriage.
 The idea of companionate marriages highlights that spouses who are both engaged 
in the labor market and both conduct household labor, share common experiences 
(Wilcox & Nock, 2006). Around these common experiences, partners build conversations 
and this increases empathetic and mutual understanding of both positive and negative 
experiences. Contrarily, conflicts of authority are expected to arise more frequently when 
people are less equal in labor market involvement or household tasks compared to their 
partner (Bittman et al., 2003), inducing emotional and social distance (Wilcox & Nock, 
2006). Hence, companionate marriages may be characterized by less conflict and higher 
relationship satisfaction as compared to other types of marriages (Amato, 2012; Wilcox & 
Dew, 2010). Thus, we expect that: (Hypothesis 1a) The lower the level of specialization in a 
family, the higher a person’s relationship satisfaction.
Figure 2.1   Examples to illustrate the difference between specialisation and equity in hours
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A contrasting expectation is formulated using Becker’s specialization of labor theory 
(Becker, 1981, 1985). The presumption of this theory is that higher levels of specialization in 
a family result in higher levels of utility since productivity increases with more time 
investments in a particular task (Becker, 1981, 1985; Kalmijn & Monden, 2011). This point of 
view seems especially applicable to labor market participation: specialization in paid labor 
will result in higher hourly wages and a higher occupational status (Bardasi & Taylor, 2008), 
which are important economic factors for a couple. Via the reduction of financial strain, 
income is positively related to people’s satisfaction with the partner relationship (Conger 
et al., 2010; Hardie et al., 2014; Oshio et al., 2012). This efficiency argument may hold for 
household labor as well; increased engagement in household labor may lead to a more 
efficient, well-organized household. In sum, specialization is believed to increase the gains 
of a relationship (Becker, 1985) since partners produce complementary goods. Therefore, 
our contrasting hypothesis reads: (Hypothesis 1b) The higher the level of specialization of 
a couple, the higher a person’s relationship satisfaction.
2.2.2  Specialization and relationship satisfaction: conditional effects
The contrasting hypotheses formulated above could both find support, because they 
likely apply to different people. In principle, both companionate marriage theory and 
specialization theory are gender-blind; specialization would have the same impact no 
matter whether it is a man or a woman who specializes in paid employment. Contrastingly, 
the gender model of marriage highlights the gendered roles of men and women in 
society (Wilcox & Nock, 2006). This theory implies that people are socialized to ‘do gender’: 
To behave in accordance with gender stereotypes, which would be consistently reaffirmed 
during the life course (Leaper & Friedman, 2007; West & Zimmerman, 1987). From these 
notions it follows that both men and women are internally and externally motivated to 
act gender-typically within a partner relationship (Wilcox & Nock, 2006). Obviously, 
gender role attitudes shape couples’ division of labor as partners will try to work out an 
arrangement that matches their attitudes (Hengstebeck et al., 2014). However, a couple’s 
division of labor may deviate from their preferences due to existing constraints. 
This tension between the preferred and the actual situation could result in lower 
satisfaction with the partner relationship. Accordingly, specialization in a family may be 
more positively related to relationship satisfaction if this situation corresponds to a 
person’s attitudes towards this division5. People with more traditional gender role 
attitudes likely prefer a more specialized division, with the female partner as homemaker, 
and the male partner as breadwinner, while egalitarian gender role attitudes emphasize 
that men and women should share both paid and household labor (Constantin & Voicu, 
2015; Greenstein, 2009). So we expect people to be more satisfied with their partner 
5  Note that our argument assumes that specialized couples follow the traditional gendered division of labour. 
Although our measurement of specialization is gender-blind, we checked whether results differed between 
traditional and non-traditional specialization in the robustness analyses.
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relationship when specialization in the division of labor corresponds with their attitudes 
towards this division. We therefore hypothesize: (Hypothesis 2) For people with egalitarian 
gender role attitudes the influence of specialization of a couple on a person’s relationship 
satisfaction is more negative (or less positive) than for people with traditional gender role 
attitudes.
 Next, the presence of young children may influence how specialization relates to 
relationship satisfaction. Evaluations of the division of labor change with the birth of a 
child (Perales et al., 2015). Research showed that after the birth of a child, both men and 
women are more likely to emphasize motherhood as women’s key role (Baxter et al., 2014). 
This implies that a specialized division of labor in which the wife takes up the caring tasks 
(and the husband employment) matches parents’ preferences more strongly than 
childless couples’ preferences. In addition, one could argue that the efficient character of 
specialization (increased productivity with increasing time investments in a particular 
task; Becker, 1985) seems especially valuable in times of stress and high family demands. 
Because of these arguments we expect: (Hypothesis 3) For people with young children the 
influence of specialization of a couple on a person’s relationship satisfaction is more positive 
(or less negative) than for people without young children.
2.2.3  Equity in hours and relationship satisfaction: main effects
Next to specialization, hours-equity within couples is expected to associate with 
relationship satisfaction. Note that equity is not the same as equality; where the latter 
focuses on sameness, the first is about fairness. Regarding equity, Walster et al. (1978) 
argue that people evaluate the efforts they put into a relationship and compare them to 
the results of these efforts. People compare this input-output ratio to their partner’s, and 
if these ratios differ they will perceive such a division as unfair (Sprecher, 2001a; Walster 
et al., 1978). This imbalance is assumed to make people anxious, leading to lower levels of 
relationship satisfaction. Moreover, partners who find themselves in inequitable arrangements 
are likely motivated to gain or restore equity (Walster et al., 1978). This may result in 
negotiation processes between partners inducing possible conflicts (Kalmijn & Monden, 
2011). Here we only focus on the input people make in terms of time involved in 
employment and household labor. Similar to research that focuses on the division of 
household labor, it is assumed that time-imbalances induce feelings of unfairness over 
this division (Jansen, Weber, Kraaykamp, & Verbakel, 2016). 
 In principle, two types of imbalance may be distinguished, under-benefiting 
(contributing more than the partner) and over-benefiting (contributing less than the 
partner) (Walster et al., 1978). Previous research indicated that people who under-benefit 
become more frustrated and angry, use more destructive and anti-social emotional 
expressions, and perceive more sadness (Guerrero et al., 2008; Sprecher, 2001a). Over- 
benefiting is associated with feelings of guilt (Sprecher, 2001a), and with using more 
prosocial and antisocial emotional expressions (Guerrero et al., 2008). Subsequently, both 
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under-benefiting and over-benefiting may lead to lower levels of relationship satisfaction 
(Guerrero et al., 2008). We expect: (Hypothesis 4) The higher the level of hours-equity of a 
couple, the higher a person’s relationship satisfaction.
2.2.4  Equity in hours and relationship satisfaction: conditional effects
People do not perceive all arrangements with dissimilar time-investments as unfair to the 
same degree (Tai & Baxter, 2018). Distributive justice theory indicates that perceived 
fairness of a division of family work is shaped by outcomes, comparisons, and justifications 
(Thompson, 1991). People with more traditional gender role attitudes are likely more 
supportive of an unequal division of household labour and employment between 
partners (Constantin & Voicu, 2015; Davis & Greenstein, 2009). Due to socialization, unequal 
contributions in specific domains are perceived as legitimate by more traditional partners. 
In contrast, egalitarian gender role attitudes encompass the ideal of an equal sharing of 
employment and household labour between men and women (Constantin & Voicu, 2015; 
Davis & Greenstein, 2009). To our opinion this ideal may go beyond the specific division of 
tasks, but is also related to the general (equitable) contribution partners make. An 
inequitable division of labour between partners defies this ideal, for then partners do not 
make equal efforts to their household. Hence, people with more egalitarian gender role 
attitudes will oppose inequitable partner arrangements more often. Thus we hypothesize: 
(Hypothesis 5) For people with egalitarian gender role attitudes the influence of hours-equity of 
a couple on a person’s relationship satisfaction is more positive than for people with traditional 
gender role attitudes.
 Lastly, hours-inequity may be more detrimental for relationship satisfaction under 
certain circumstances. Especially under the conditions of stress and time pressure, someone 
may be more annoyed by a partner’s lack of contribution to the family. Young children in 
the household incite difficulties in combining work and family life (Van der Lippe, Jager, & 
Kops, 2006). Therefore, the presence of young children could strengthen feelings of unfairness 
in inequitable couples, which in turn lowers relationship satisfaction. Furthermore, 
the welcoming of children may instigate a re-evaluation of earlier agreements between 
partners; because new activities and labor such as childcare and cleaning are required 
(Keizer & Schenk, 2012), a revision of the previously agreed-on division of tasks is likely 
needed as well. This re-evaluation may create a new awareness regarding the (un)fairness 
of the division of family and work obligations (Perales et al., 2015), which may reduce 
relationship satisfaction (Barstad, 2014). We hypothesize that: (Hypothesis 6) For people 
with children the influence of hours-equity of a couple on a person’s relationship satisfaction 
is more positive than for people without children.
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2.3  Data and method
2.3.1  Data
To test our hypotheses, we employed the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This annual 
panel survey has been held since 1991. All members of over 5,000 households were interviewed 
and re-interviewed in subsequent years (Taylor, Brice, Buck, & Prentice-Lane, 2010). In situations 
where households split-up (divorce, leaving the parental home), all members of newly 
formed household were interviewed as well. The BHPS sample was extended in 1999 with 
Scottish and Welsh households and in 2001 with Northern Irish households (Taylor et al., 
2010). For further information on BHPS, see https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps. 
 Information on relationship satisfaction has been included in the survey since wave 
1996 onwards, with the exception of wave 2001. Questions on gender role attitudes have 
been asked in uneven years only (i.e., 1997, 1999 and so on). Since in our panel design 
independent variables are used to explain variation in relationship satisfaction in the next 
year, we used the 1997, 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2007 BHPS waves to construct independent 
variables (T-1 years) and the subsequent years to measure relationship satisfaction (T years). 
We restrict our analytic sample to individuals living in different-sex relationships who 
cohabit with their partner in year T-1, leading to 46,468 observations. We excluded 
observations in which a respondent and his/her partner were not living in the same 
household in the subsequent wave or if this was unknown (5.7 percent); a respondent did 
not participate in both subsequent years (3.5 percent); or the partner did not participate 
in both years (7.9 percent). Our research interest focused on people of working age. We 
therefore excluded observations of respondents or partners younger than 25 years or 
older than 60 years of age (32.5 percent). Observations with missing values on relationship 
satisfaction at time-point T or T-1 were omitted (8.4 percent). Missing values were primarily 
on relationship-duration, household income, education, and gender role attitudes6. 
Observations with missing values on independent variables were excluded (2.7 percent) 
as well as observations with missing information on partner’s characteristics (6.4 percent). 
Furthermore, 644 (2.9 percent) respondents reported on different partners during the 
course of the BHPS due to divorce or separation and subsequent repartnering. To ensure 
adequate nesting, these observations were excluded. After these selections, we estimated 
models with 21,302 observations of 8,204 respondents in 4,102 relationships. 
 
2.3.2  Measurements
Our dependent variable, relationship satisfaction, was measured by asking people how 
satisfied they are with their husband, wife or partner. The scale ranged from one (‘not 
satisfied at all’) to seven (‘completely satisfied’). Although one-item measurements of 
6   Missing values on education and household income were imputed with the values of the previous or 
subsequent wave. Duration of the partner relationship was imputed using multiple imputation with age of 
both partners, marital status, and age of the youngest child.
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relationship satisfaction are obviously less reliable than multiple item scales, this and 
similar single item measures has been frequently used in prior research (e.g. Hardie et al., 
2014; Keizer & Schenk, 2012). The distribution of relationship satisfaction was highly skewed 
with a mean of 6.25. Therefore, an exponential transformation was applied (e Relationship 
satisfaction). 
 Specialization and hours-equity were based on employment hours and hours spent on 
household labor. Employment hours were measured by summing the answers to the 
questions ‘thinking about your (main) job, how many hours, excluding overtime and meal 
breaks, are you expected to work in a normal week?’ and ‘how many hours overtime do 
you usually work in a normal week?’. The variable household labor hours was measured by 
asking respondents ‘about how many hours do you spend on housework in an average 
week, such as time spent cooking, cleaning and doing the laundry?’ To construct 
specialization and hours-equity four aspects were used, namely men’s employment hours 
(EM), men’s household labor hours (HM), women’s employment hours (EW), and women’s 
household labor hours (HW). Following Kalmijn and Monden (2011), the concepts of 
specialization and hours-equity in the household were measured as:
Specialization = | (EM/ (EM + HM)) - (EW/ (EW + HW))|
Hours-equity = 1 - | (EM + HM) - (EW + HW)| / (EM + HM + EW + HW)
Specialization is a dissimilarity index, 0 meaning no specialization at all, and 1 the maximum 
level of specialization. The measurement of hours-equity represents relative similarity in 
hours engaged in both types of labor, 0 representing no hours-equity, 1 full hours-equity. 
For people who were not employed, the number of hours engaged in employment was 
set to .01 (close to zero), allowing us to compute levels of specialization for them as well. In 
our sample the correlation between hours-equity and specialization was -0.380. Figure 2.2 
shows a scatter plot of observed couples by hours-equity and specialization. For each 
quadrant, the number of cases is provided. This figure shows that equitable, unspecialized 
couples were most common in our sample (upper left quadrant; N = 5,682). These are 
couples in which both partners are relatively similar in the total number of hours they 
spend as well as in the content of their contribution. Least common were couples who 
divide employment and household labor in an unspecialized and unequitable manner 
(lower left quadrant; N = 1,052). The upper right quadrant comprises couples who divide 
labor in a specialized and equitable manner (N = 1,960). In these couples, partners 
contribute a relatively similar amount of time to the total household needs, but whereas 
one partner spends his/her time primarily on household labor, the other spends it mostly 
on employment. Our sample included a similar amount of couples who are characterized 
as being specialized and unequitable (lower right quadrant; N = 1,955). In these couples, 
one partner contributes relatively much more time towards the needs of the household 
than the other, and the types of tasks they perform differs strongly too.
49
Couples’ division of employment and household labor and relationship satisfaction
It is important to emphasize that our specialization and hours-equity indices are only 
based on partners’ time investments in employment and household labor; another highly 
relevant element of a households’ divisions of labor - time spent on childcare - is unavailable 
in the BHPS data. One could argue that especially female hours will be underestimated 
by this omission, and hence that our specialization and equity indices may be biased. 
Information on the actual division of childcare7 among BHPS couples revealed that in the 
majority of couples, childcare is indeed mainly performed by women (62.2 percent versus 
2.8 percent mainly by men and 35.0 percent jointly). Furthermore, we found that couples, 
in which women contributed most to childcare, were more specialized and less equitable 
than couples who divided childcare jointly. If we assume that specialized couples in our 
sample were predominantly ‘traditionally specialized couples’ (i.e., male employment 
and female household work), our measure of specialization excluding childcare can be 
expected to be underestimated. Whether our equity measure will be underestimated or 
overestimated depends on whether it was the man or the woman who contributed more 
hours according to our original measure. However, it seems a plausible assumption that 
the relatively low levels of hours-equity in couples with the woman as main provider of 
childcare were due to the underestimation of female hours; hence, if we could include 
the hours spent on childcare, equity levels would probably be higher. How this may affect 
our results is discussed in our robustness checks.
7  Based on the question: “Who is mainly responsible for looking after the child(ren)?” We distinguished mainly 
the mother; jointly; mainly the father.
Figure 2.2   Scatter plot of hours-equity and specialisation, the number of house-
hold-observations are provided per quadrant
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Gender role attitudes were measured using two statements, namely ‘A pre-school child is 
likely to suffer if his or her mother works’ and ‘All in all, family life suffers when the woman 
has a full-time job’. Answer categories ranged from one (‘strongly agree’) to five (‘strongly 
disagree’). Together, these questions indicated the level of disagreement with the 
traditional family model involving a male breadwinner and female homemaker (Constantin 
& Voicu, 2015). The variables constituted a reliable scale (α = .832). We averaged the two items 
to construct a scale with higher scores representing egalitarian gender roles (a missing value 
on one item was allowed).
 The presence of children in the household was measured with dummy variables: ‘no 
children’, ‘youngest child 0 to 4 years old’, ‘youngest child 5 to 11 years old’, ‘youngest child 
12 to 18 years old’. This categorization corresponded with our theoretical mechanism 
regarding the care-dependency of children in a family.
 Individual-level controls included in this study were relationship satisfaction in the 
previous wave, age (categories 25 to 34 years, 35 to 44 years, and 45 to 60 years to account 
for non-linearity), educational attainment (ISCED-classification), and health problems or 
disabilities of both partners (no, one, two or more health problems or disabilities, for example 
high blood pressure, depression, alcohol, arthritis). The relationship-level controls included 
marital status (0 = married, 1 = cohabiting), and duration of the (cohabiting) partner 
relationship in years (Pronzato, 2011), imputed with partner’s duration score when missing. 
When relationship duration as reported by the respondent differed from that of the 
partner, mean values were taken. Other control variables were relationship duration squared, 
household income (sum of total annual earnings before taxes, indexed per wave in deciles), 
and total hours of household labor and employment of the two individuals. The latter was 
included to account for the fact that the hours-equity measure is affected by the size 
of the denominator, i.e., couples’ total hours of employment and household labor. 
Conclusions did not alter when total hours of employment and the total hours of 
household labor were included separately. All continuous variables were mean-centered. 
Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables.
2.3.3  Analytical strategy
The dataset was organized in a ‘standard reciprocal pairwise’ design, indicating that both 
the respondent and the partner were included, allowing the incorporation of individual, 
partner and relationship characteristics (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006). This dyadic structure 
was combined with a person-period-file structure, to account for multiple observations of 
individuals. As a result each line in the dataset represented one observation of a 
respondent. In each line, characteristics of the respondent, the partner and the relationship 
at that particular time point were recorded. Our model was a small adaptation to Kenny’s 
et. al. (2006) model for dyadic longitudinal data, and was computed using the MIXED 
procedure in SPSS.
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Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics for women, men, and couples
Women Men Couples
(N = 10,651) (N = 10,651) (N = 10,651)
Range Mean/% SD Mean/% SD Mean/% SD
Relationship satisfaction 1-7 6.18 1.16 6.32 1.03
Relationship sat. t-1 1-7 6.23 1.13 6.35 1.00
Relationship sat. (exp) 2.27-1096.63 711.40 425.59 756.34 409.04
Relationship sat. t-1 (exp) 2.27-1096.63 732.92 420.52 771.14 404.13
Employment hours 0-100 21.75 17.70 32.35 21.62
Household chores hours 0-99 17.25 11.07 5.42 5.59
Education 1-7 3.73 1.69 3.83 1.70
Age
  25 to 34 0-1 30.49 24.06
  35 to 44 0-1 34.48 34.80
  45 to 60 0-1 35.04 41.14
Egalitarian gender role atti. 1-5 3.13 0.99 2.94 0.95
Health problem or disability
  None 0-1 43.33 49.76
  One 0-1 30.01 29.72
  Several 0-1 26.66 20.52
Partner health problem or disability
  None 0-1 49.76 43.33
  One 0-1 29.72 30.01
  Several 0-1 20.52 26.66
Specialization 0-1 0.66 0.31
Equity 0-1 0.41 0.35
Total hours (employment 
+ household labor) 2-233
76.77 29.51
Relationship duration  
(in years)
0.08-41.92 12.01 9.71
Household income 1-10 5.50 2.87
Marital status
  Married 0-1 85.81
  Cohabiting 0-1 14.19
Children in the household  
  None 0-1 44.17
  Youngest child 0-4 0-1 19.19
  Youngest child 5-11 0-1 23.63
  Youngest child 12-18 0-1 13.00
Source: BHPS 1997-2008. The total of N = 21,302 (10,561 female and 10,561 male) observations are nested in N = 8,204 
respondents and in N = 10,561 relationship observations of N = 4,102 couples
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One of the issues with dyadic data is the violation of the independence assumption. In our 
case, it means that relationship satisfaction of a respondent will be more similar to that of 
the partner than to that of a random individual. In the BHPS data, respondents’ relationship 
satisfaction was correlated 0.331 to their partners’ relationship satisfaction. We explicitly 
included in the model the covariance between respondent’s and partner’s relationship 
satisfaction to account for the fact that unobserved circumstances may affect partners alike. 
Another violation of the independence assumption refers to the longitudinal aspect of the 
data, namely that the data contain on average 2.6 observations per individual. To account 
for unmeasured time-constant individual characteristics that may affect relationship 
satisfaction, a random intercept per person was included. 
 Lastly, previous research showed that effects of predictors on relationship satisfaction 
differ between men and women (Hardie et al., 2014). We therefore estimated a two- 
intercept model where coefficients were calculated separately for men and women. 
Actually, this model is similar to a model for men and women separately, but it takes 
into account the covariance between partners’ relationship satisfaction. In additional 
analyses differences between men and women were tested. Significant (p<0.05) 
differences are indicated by bold in Table 2.2 and 2.3. Model statistics are shown in 
Appendix 2 Table A2.1
2.4  Results
2.4.1  Main effects of specialization and equity on relationship satisfaction
Table 2.2 shows the main effects of specialization and equity without (Model 1) and with 
(Model 2) control variables. No direct effects of specialization and equity on relationship 
satisfaction could be observed for both men and women. So, no support was found for 
hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 4.
 We will briefly discuss the results regarding the control variables. First, couples’ total 
hours of employment and household labor, and household income appeared not to be 
related to relationship satisfaction. Relationship duration had a curvilinear effect: partner 
satisfaction decreased with rising relationship duration, but this effect levelled off. 
Furthermore, people who cohabited were less satisfied with their relationship than their 
married counterparts. People were less satisfied with the partner relationship when 
underage children were present in the household. We also observed that the higher 
educated were less satisfied with their relationship than lower educated people. Men (but 
not women) aged 45 to 60 reported more relationship satisfaction as compared to 
younger men. An egalitarian gender role attitude did not affect a person’s relationship 
satisfaction directly. Personal health problems or disabilities showed to be unrelated to 
relationship satisfaction. Lastly, both men and women were less satisfied with their 
relationship when their partner had health problems or disabilities. 
53
Couples’ division of employment and household labor and relationship satisfaction
2.4.2  Conditional effects of specialization and equity: gender role attitudes
Interaction effects between specialization and modern gender role attitudes are displayed 
in Table 2.3 (Model 3). For men, egalitarian gender role attitudes significantly moderated 
the association between specialization in family obligations and relationship satisfaction 
(b = -24.525). The more egalitarian men’s gender role attitudes, the more strongly 
specialization reduced relationship satisfaction. Our findings therefore supported 
Hypothesis 2 for men. If men’s attitudes align with their actual situation, they are more 
satisfied with their relationship. Surprisingly, this moderation was not found for women. 
 In Table 2.3 (Model 4) results are shown regarding the moderating influence of gender 
role attitudes on the link between hours-equity and relationship satisfaction. For men, 
the significant interaction effect (b = 32.682) indicates that egalitarian gender role attitudes 
among men indeed led to a more positive association between hours-equity and 
relationship satisfaction. Apparently, more egalitarian men valued equity in household 
obligations more highly than traditional men, which caused them to experience more 
satisfaction with their relationship. This finding was in line with Hypothesis 4. Again, this 
conditional effect was not found for women. Note that the differences between men and 
women in the interaction effects were not statistically significant.
2.4.3  Conditional effects of specialization and equity: young children
Interaction effects regarding the presence of young children are presented in the lower 
panel of Table 2.3. Models 5 show that the presence of pre-school children did not affect 
how specialization influences relationship satisfaction of both men and women. Also, for 
both men and women, the presence of young children did not affect the association 
between equity in the family and relationship satisfaction (Models 6). 
 In sum, it seems that only men’s and not women’s relationship satisfaction was affected 
by the division of tasks in the family, but only under certain conditions; it depended on 
men’s gender role attitudes, but not on the presence of children. 
2.4.4  Robustness analyses
We performed several robustness checks to assess whether certain decisions and data 
limitations affected our conclusions. First, we investigated whether our results were robust 
for not including childcare in our measurements of specialization and hours-equity, which 
was not possible with the data used. One could argue that the bias in our specialization 
and hours-equity measures were strongest for couples with children, and more particularly, 
young children as they are generally more time-consuming. Therefore, we conducted 
separate analyses for (1) couples with and without children and (2) couples with varying 
ages of their youngest child (see Appendix 2 Table A2.2 and A2.3). The effects of hours- 
equity and specialization on relationship satisfaction as well as the moderating effect of 
gender role attitudes did not seem to differ between people with and without children 
and not between couples with varying ages of their youngest child. The results provided 
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similar conclusions, therefore suggesting that our conclusions were relatively robust.
 Second, to check whether the absence of the main effect of specialization may be 
due to the fact that for some couples, a specialized division of labor could be forced upon 
by undesirable circumstances (such as unemployment or disability), we applied several 
sample restrictions to exclude potential ‘undesired’ specialized couples: (a) we limited our 
sample to couples in which both partners were employed, homemaker, or on maternity 
leave, and (b) we only selected couples with a total number of work hours of at least 35 
hours a week. These robustness analyses (shown in Appendix 2 Table A2.4 and A2.5) did 
not lead to other conclusions. 
 Third, we differentiated our gender-blind specialization measure into non-traditional 
specialization (men spending relatively less time on employment than their spouse) from 
traditional specialization (see Appendix 2 Table A2.6). Also, these analyses indicated no 
differences in the influence of specialization on relationship satisfaction between these 
groups. Furthermore, we differentiated under-benefiting from over-benefiting in 
hours-equity. The results (shown in Appendix 2 Table A2.7) indicated that both had similar 
effects on relationship satisfaction.
 Fourth, we addressed the skewed distribution of relationship satisfaction by dichotomizing 
relationship satisfaction (non-satisfied versus satisfied). The logistic analyses provided 
similar conclusions (see Appendix 2 Table A2.8).
 Lastly, to investigate potential selectivity of relatively satisfied couples in our sample, 
we examined whether couples who did and did not separate in the course of the BHPS 
data collection differed in hours-equity and specialization, which was not the case (see 
Appendix 2 Table A2.9). Also, the influence of equity and specialization on relationship 
satisfaction did not differ by whether a couple broke up during the observation period 
(see Appendix 2 Table A2.10).
 Overall, our main conclusion from all checks presented above was that the results 
presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 were fairly robust. 
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Chapter 2
2.5  Conclusion and discussion
This study investigated the association between relationship satisfaction and the division 
of employment and household labor in a family. Previous research has frequently applied 
the concepts of equity and specialization to deal with family obligations. Whereas equity 
in hours implies that both partners contribute a similar amount of time to the family’s 
needs, specialization indicates a division in the type of tasks (Kalmijn & Monden, 2011). 
Moreover, we assessed whether the effects of hours-equity and specialization were 
conditional on preferences and circumstances, in particular on gender role attitudes and 
the presence of children in the household. 
 A first relevant finding was that no universal, direct association was found between 
specialization and hours-equity on the one hand and relationship satisfaction on the 
other hand, in contrast to findings on specialization, equity, and well-being (Kalmijn & 
Monden, 2011). However, we did find support for the claim that specialization and 
hours-equity are beneficial or detrimental for relationship satisfaction for men under 
some conditions. Compared to men with traditional gender role attitudes, egalitarian 
men were found to be less satisfied when the couples’ division of labor was more 
specialized and inequitable. These findings suggested that if couples’ division of tasks is in 
accordance with men’s preferences, men experience more satisfaction with their partner 
relationship. In contrast to our expectations, our results showed that specialization was 
not more strongly positively linked to relationship satisfaction when children were 
involved than when no young children were present. Importantly, we found no influence 
of hours-equity and specialization on women’s relationship satisfaction. Therefore, future 
research may want to search for other conditional factors affecting this relationship, 
especially for women. The fact that only men seemed affected by the family’s level of 
hours-equity and specialization (conditional on gender role attitudes), suggests that 
women’s satisfaction with the partner relationship is less influenced by a family’s division 
of tasks than men’s. This is in line with Kalmijn and Monden (2011), who found stronger 
effects of equity and specialization on well-being for men than for women. The distributive 
justice framework argues that women do not always perceive an inequitable division of 
labor as unfair, since perceiving a division as unfair is shaped by the valued outcomes, 
comparison referents, and justifications (Thompson, 1991). Perhaps a preliminary answer 
to our puzzling finding that women were not affected by the division of labour, is that 
women do not compare their partner’s input to their own, but to the input of other men.
 This study employed a strong longitudinal and dyadic design. Nevertheless, there 
were drawbacks. First, relationship satisfaction was only measured with a single item. Yet, 
relationship satisfaction may hold various dimensions. Future research preferably should 
employ a broader definition of relationship satisfaction. This could also solve the issue of 
the skewed dependent variable, which can only be partly resolved by using an exponential 
transformation. Second, we could not take childcare into account in our definition of 
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specialization and hours-equity, while this is an important and salient part of the division 
of tasks between partners (Kluwer, 2011). By not including childcare the levels of 
hours-equity and specialization were possibly underestimated, potentially biasing our 
results. While our robustness checks for this omission did not indicate strong bias, we 
strongly recommend future research to take childcare obligations into account. In 
addition, our measurements of hours-equity and specialization may have been affected 
by the use of general time assessments instead of time-diary data since especially 
traditional men tend to overestimate their time spent on household labor (Kan, 2007; 
Schulz & Grunow, 2012). Furthermore, couples value domestic work and employment 
differently, where employment presumably provides more benefits than domestic labor. 
Different valuation of household tasks versus employment did not influence the 
association between hours-equity, specialization, and well-being (Kalmijn & Monden, 
2011), but it could nevertheless affect their associations with relationship satisfaction. 
Lastly, while we use a unidimensional concept of gender role attitudes, gender role 
ideology have been argued to be a multidimensional concept (Grunow, Begall, & Buchler; 
2018). Incorporating multidimensional concepts of gender role attitudes could provide 
further insights on the moderating influence of gender role attitudes on the relationship 
the division of labor and relationship outcomes.
 Overall, our study clearly highlights the importance of assessing conditional factors. 
Insignificant main results could be due to opposing effects of specialization or hours-equity 
for specific groups. In our case, men’s relationship satisfaction benefited from hours-equity 
and unspecialization especially when they held egalitarian gender attitudes.

* A slightly different version is currently under review at an international journal.
Co-author is Belinda Hewitt.
Female breadwinners and relationship 
satisfaction. Longitudinal comparisons with 
equal-earners and male breadwinners.
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3.1  Introduction and research question
3.1.1  Introduction and research question
Women’s increased participation in the labor market has undermined the male bread - 
winner model of family life. Even though men continue to earn more than women on 
average, in most developed countries a significant minority of women are now the 
primary breadwinner. Recent studies suggest that in about 25 percent of all couples in the USA 
and Australia women earn more than their male partner (Drago, Black, & Wooden, 2005; 
Wang et al., 2013; Winkler et al., 2005), and in Europe this percentage ranges from about 
15 percent in Austria, the Czech Republic, and Italy up to more than 30 percent in Lithuania 
and Slovenia (among women aged 25 to 45 Klesment & Van Bavel, 2017). While women’s 
secondary work often improves the financial well-being and stability of dual-earner 
households (Oppenheimer, 1997; Rogers, 2004), female breadwinner households pose 
more fundamental challenges to traditional gendered expectations within couple 
relationships and may therefore have different implications for the quality and stability of 
the partner relationship.
 According to previous research, men and women in female breadwinner couples are 
less satisfied or happy with their partner relationships (e.g. Bertrand et al., 2015). However, 
these studies have generally disregarded the circumstances that led to being a female 
breadwinner couple, which is either that the couple take a gender-equal approach to their 
relationship, which may be positively associated with relationship quality, or, more often, 
that the male partner is unable to work due to unemployment or illness, which may have 
negative consequences for relationship quality (Drago et al., 2005; Kramer & Kramer, 2016). 
Overlooking the factors which led to a certain arrangement, could lead to misstate the 
negative associations of being in a female breadwinner household found in previous 
research. 
 This study aims to broaden our understanding of female breadwinners by investigating 
the question: To what extent do people in female breadwinner arrangements differ in 
relationship satisfaction from when they were in other arrangements and does this differ 
depending on gender role attitudes? We excluded same-sex couples and by female-bread-
winner household we specifically refer to those households where the female partner 
earns the majority of household income or is the single-earner (and vice versa for male 
breadwinner households). We use 15 waves of panel data from the Household, Income 
and Labour Dynamics in Australia survey (HILDA, melbourneinstitute.unimelb.edu.au/
hilda) and estimate fixed effects models because we are interested in differences between 
breadwinner arrangements over time. We examine relationship satisfaction which 
concerns people’s cognitive evaluation of how happy or satisfied they are in their partner 
relationship and is a widely used concept for studying relationship quality (Helms, 2013).
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3.1.2  Background
Breadwinning in the previous research literature has mostly been defined as being the 
sole or dominant earner in a household who typically works full time (Chesley, 2017). From 
this definition both employment status and income should be taken into consideration 
when studying breadwinning. Throughout this paper breadwinner-couples are defined 
as couples where one person provides the majority of household income or is the 
single-earner (Chesley, 2017). However, the majority of previous research only examines 
earnings, with few studies taking into account employment status. To our knowledge no 
previous research has incorporated both income and employment status into their 
definition of household breadwinning. This may be problematic because any possible 
negative effect of income differences on relationship quality could be due to one partner 
not working as well as, or instead of, differences in income. In this study we incorporate 
both dimensions of breadwinning into a breadwinning-typology. By simultaneously 
studying both aspects, we aim to further disentangle the mechanisms that affect the 
quality of the partner relationship. 
 Income is of course one of the main benefits from employment. People who have a 
higher income than their partner have more power in the relationship and more 
independence from the relationship (Oppenheimer, 1997; Rogers, 2004). An emerging 
body of research has examined the differences in relationship quality for those in female 
breadwinner arrangements compared to those in more traditional arrangements, mostly 
in the USA. The majority of studies that defined breadwinning in terms of earnings or 
income found that people in relationships where the woman out-earned her male partner 
had poorer relationship outcomes, including lower levels of marital happiness (Bertrand et 
al., 2015; Wilcox & Nock, 2006; Zhang, 2015), poorer marital (role) quality (Brennan et al., 
2001) and higher levels of intimate partner violence (Atkinson, Greenstein, & Lang, 2005). 
Although the majority of breadwinner research has examined American couples, Zhang 
(2015) also found poorer outcomes for Chinese female breadwinner couples, who had 
lower marital happiness and greater marital instability. Of the research reviewed, no 
studies found positive associations between female breadwinner households and 
relationship quality, but some research found no associations (Furdyna et al., 2008; Gong, 
2007). The sole longitudinal study indicated that changes in household earnings and 
breadwinning status was associated with relationship conflict, but being in a stable female 
breadwinner household was not (Winslow, 2011). 
 Although these studies used diverse measurements of income, their conclusions 
seem relatively similar. Some used labor earnings (Brennan et al., 2001; Wilcox & Nock, 
2006), while others used income from both labor and other sources (Furdyna et al., 2008; 
Gong, 2007; Zhang, 2015). Related research indicates the importance of incorporating 
several forms of income and to use income after taxes (Van Bavel & Klesment, 2017). 
Different forms of ‘earned’ (e.g. wages, business income) and ‘unearned’ income (e.g. 
public transfers, investments) are included since these comprise one’s contribution to the 
65
Female breadwinners and relationship satisfaction
household. Income after taxes may be especially important since the income after taxes is 
what people contribute to the household, determines their prosperity, and is possibly the 
income one compares to the partner’s contribution, and changes in tax policies are taken 
into account.
 Aside from providing income, employment provides several benefits such as a sense 
of purpose and identity (Paul & Moser, 2009). However, few studies examined breadwinning 
in terms of employment status and relationship quality, and the conclusions were not very 
consistent. For instance, Gong (2007) found among American couples that women (but 
not men) reported a lower quality of partner relationship when they were employed for 
more hours than their male partner. Franklin and Menaker (2014), on the other hand, 
showed that intimate partner violence was more prevalent in American households 
where both partners worked compared to couples where only one (either the man or 
woman) was employed. Their study suggests that having a primary worker in a household, 
irrespective of whether it is the female or male partner, reduced intimate partner violence. 
 The consequences of becoming a female breadwinner couple could depend on the 
gender role attitudes men and women have (although not all studies found this 
moderating effect (Brennan et al., 2001; Gong, 2007; Zhang, 2015)). While some couples 
form female breadwinner household because of egalitarian attitudes, others become so 
due to economic problems (Drago et al., 2005; Kramer & Kramer, 2016). These groups can 
be differentiated by looking at one’s gender role attitudes (Drago et al., 2005). Several 
studies (who studied income/earnings differences) found that being a female breadwinner 
couple was associated with lower relationship quality for people with more traditional 
gender role values (Atkinson et al., 2005; Coughlin & Wade, 2012; Furdyna et al., 2008; 
Zhang, 2015). Hence, people who transition to a female breadwinner arrangement may 
become especially less satisfied when they have more traditional gender role values, 
while it has no or less influence on egalitarian people.
 Almost no previous studies have examined the associations between female 
breadwinning and relationship quality from a longitudinal perspective (Winslow, 2011). 
This is important, because after a change in breadwinning arrangements couples have to 
renegotiate a new division of household labor (Baxter & Hewitt, 2013). This may cause 
more stress and strain on the relationship in the short term, which is likely to diminish over 
time. In addition, some people may terminate the relationship because of changes in 
breadwinning and the associated strain in the partner relationship (Kalmijn et al., 2007) 
and these couples would not be captured by the cross-sectional analysis. The selection of 
relatively satisfied couples could bias the results in especially cross-sectional studies. 
Thereby the extant literature on female breadwinning may underestimate the impact for 
relationship quality, especially for couples who become a female breadwinner out of 
financial necessity. Therefore, we use longitudinal panel data. 
 Furthermore, as noted before, the majority of the discussed literature used American 
data from the late 1980’s to mid-1990’s (e.g. Bertrand et al., 2015; Brennan et al., 2001). In this 
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paper we investigated female breadwinners and relationships satisfaction among Australian 
couples between 2001 and 2015. Previous research has shown that Australia has a strong 
male breadwinner culture and division of household labor (Baxter & Hewitt, 2013; Bittman 
et al., 2003). This is predominantly underpinned by labor market conditions and cultural 
attitudes towards parenting (Craig & Mullan, 2011). Women’s overall labor market 
participation in Australia is about the OECD average (OECD, 2018), but the majority of 
Australian women work part-time, particularly when they have young children (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2017). In addition to working part-time a significant proportion 
of Australian women leave the workforce after having children, between 2001 and 2015 
women aged 25 – 44 were around three times more likely than men to be out of the labor 
force (ABS, 2017). Major labor market reforms, such as the introduction of near-universal 
paid parental leave in 2011, have resulted in some small improvements in mothers’ return to 
work and labor market engagement after birth (Martin et al., 2015). Nevertheless, women 
in their childbearing years are far less likely to be in the labor force than men (ABS, 2017).
 In addition to examining the Australian context, our study builds on the previous 
research in several important ways. First, we incorporate both income and employment 
status into our definition of household breadwinning. We further differentiate whether 
one or both partners are not working due to unemployment or home duties. Second, we 
use a longitudinal household panel to investigate changes in household arrangements 
instead of contrasting stable household arrangements, and account for selective factors 
that are stable over time. Third, we investigate whether changing to a female breadwinner 
household was less influential for people’s relationship satisfaction when they have more 
egalitarian gender role attitudes.
3.2  Theoretical framework and hypotheses
A longitudinal perspective of change in relationship satisfaction may be fruitful in guiding 
our hypotheses. According to adaption theory, important life events may affect relationship 
satisfaction and well-being, at least in the short-term (Luhmann et al., 2012). For example, 
unemployment or loss of income could induce hostile communication between partners 
(Rao, 2017; Sherman, 2017), while becoming a dual-earner could enhance financial stability 
and therefore improve relationship well-being (Oppenheimer, 1997; Rogers, 2004). Hence, 
we assume that changes in breadwinning arrangements within couples can trigger a 
re-evaluation and reappraisal of the relationship (Kalmijn et al., 2007; Rao, 2017), which 
underpins our hypotheses below.
 There are several theoretical traditions that explain why differences between spouses in 
income and employment status may be associated with relationship satisfaction; including 
the household specialization of labor theory (Becker 1981, 1985), relative resource or 
bargaining perspectives (Blood & Wolfe, 1960), the role collaboration and companionate 
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model of marriage perspectives (Rogers, 2004; Wilcox & Nock, 2006), and the doing 
gender perspective (West & Zimmerman, 1987). The household specialization of labor 
perspective argues that household utility and productivity is highest when one partner 
specializes in employment and the other in home duties (Becker, 1981, 1985). The allocation 
of household labor is based on each partner’s comparative advantage in the labor market 
(Becker, 1981, 1985). This theory suggests that more specialized division of labor within the 
couple would result in a better functioning household with less financial difficulties and 
stress, and hence induce relationship satisfaction (see Chapter 2). Indeed, research 
suggests that men and women in the more specialized single-earner couples experience 
less time pressure and less work-family conflict than dual-earner couples (Craig & Mullan, 
2009), although this is not always found (Byron, 2005). More complementary roles could 
therefore increase relationship satisfaction.
 The basic principle of specialization is gender neutral, namely that when tasks are 
divided between partners, the partner relationship is better (Kalmijn et al., 2007). However, 
because women generally earn less than men and are often disadvantaged in the labor 
market, and have (according to Becker) an competitive advantage in unpaid family labor, 
they are more often allocated the role of home duties and caregiving in specialized 
households (Becker, 1985). Although female breadwinner couples generally have a lower 
income (Winslow-Bowe, 2006), due to the gender pay-gap and male unemployment, 
if we take the decline in income into account, the benefits from specialization should 
come afore. If specialization is beneficial regardless of who is the breadwinner, people in 
male or female breadwinner couples would be similarly satisfied with the partner 
relationship. Assuming that changes in breadwinning can impact relationship satisfaction 
we would expect: (Hypothesis 1a) Men and women who change to a female or male 
breadwinner household will have higher levels of relationship satisfaction than when they were 
in an equal earner household.
 The relative resource or bargaining perspectives have also been posed to explain 
people’s behavior in a couple, influencing the quality of the partner relationship (Brines, 
1994; Rogers, 2004). These perspectives argue that power within intimate relationships is 
based on the different economic resources each partner brings to the relationship (Blood 
& Wolfe, 1960). This power can be used to avoid or ‘buy out’ unpleasant tasks and to 
negotiate more favorable conditions. Hence, one with more resources relative to his or her 
partner is able to define the conditions of the relationship more in accordance with his or 
her wishes. Income and employment are important sources of power within couples. 
One with higher income or who is employed while the partner is not, have more power 
within the couple, enabling them to better negotiate a satisfying partner relationship. 
These perspectives have been primarily used to study the division of household labor 
between partners, but other negotiations could be subject to the differences in power as 
well. Yet despite the fact that female breadwinners have more power than their partner, 
these women do more household labor relative to their partner compared to equal-earner 
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couples (Baxter & Hewitt, 2013; Bittman et al., 2003). Nevertheless, female breadwinner 
women may still be able to determine other decisions, making the relationship more 
suited to their wishes than their partners. Hence, we would expect: (Hypothesis 1b) 
Women who change to a female breadwinner household will have higher levels of relationship 
satisfaction than when they were in an equal earner or male breadwinner household, while 
men become less satisfied with the partner relationship.
 In contrast to the specialization theory and bargain perspectives, both the 
companionate model of marriage and role collaboration perspectives argue that partners 
will be more satisfied with their relationship when they share tasks and engage in more 
similar activities (Rogers, 2004; Wilcox & Nock, 2006). The companionate model of marriage 
emphasizes that the blurring of traditional gender roles leads to more emotional intimacy 
between partners, and stands in contrast to earlier institutional models of marriage 
(Burgess et al., 1963). Shared experiences, such as experiences in the labor market, the 
reduction or elimination of patriarchal authority and power, and more possibilities for 
men’s emotion work, would lead to more understanding and emotional intimacy between 
partners (Burgess et al., 1963; Wilcox & Nock, 2006). The role collaboration perspective 
posits that when the resources and contributions are more equal between partners, 
partners have more common experiences, such as employment, and divide less enjoyable 
tasks more equitable, increasing the affection between partners (Rogers, 2004). Equal 
resources lead to more equal power within the relationship, making the outcomes of 
negotiations between partners (such as household labor) more equitable, inducing 
relationship quality (Brines & Joyner, 1999; Risman & Johnson-Sumerford, 1998). Thus, the 
companionate model of marriage and role collaboration perspectives suggest that if 
partners engage in similar labor activities, the commonly shared positive and negative 
experiences foster empathy, mutual understanding, and collaboration. This in turn 
improves satisfaction with the relationship implying that dual-earner couples are more 
satisfied with the relationship than people in both male and female breadwinner couples. 
Therefore we would expect that: (Hypothesis 1c) Men and women who change to a female 
or male breadwinner household will have lower levels of relationship satisfaction than when 
they were in an equal earner household.
 The doing gender perspective emphasizes gender relations, which may be important 
for female breadwinner arrangements. According to the doing gender perspective, 
gender is constructed through social interactions which reaffirm gender and gendered 
expectations (West & Zimmerman, 1987). People and their behavior are evaluated 
according to these gendered accountability structures and deviations are discouraged 
through internal and external pressures. While influential, the doing gender perspective 
has been criticized for not sufficiently taking human agency and resistance towards 
gender expectations into account (Connell, 2010; Deutsch, 2007). This may be important 
when studying female breadwinners, since some couples become a female breadwinner 
couple because they defy traditional gender role expectations about separate life spheres 
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(Drago et al., 2005; Kramer & Kramer, 2016). However, within different-sex couples men’s 
masculinity and identity continues to be strongly tied to being the household breadwinner 
(Townsend, 2002), and women’s identity to care work and mothering (Johnston & 
Swanson, 2006). These traditional ideals of masculinity and femininity are challenged 
when a household diverts from a male breadwinner arrangement (Coughlin & Wade, 
2012; Franklin & Menaker, 2014; Sherman, 2017). The inconsistency between being male 
but not fulfilling the provider role is in contrast with gendered expectations. This could 
diminish men’s self-worth and simultaneously reduce women’s regard for their partner, 
reducing both men and women’s satisfaction with the relationship (Rao, 2017; Sherman, 
2017). Hence, becoming a female breadwinner couple may be negatively associated with 
relationship quality compared to being an equal earner couple, because a female 
breadwinner arrangement is more divergent from the masculine ideal. Therefore, we 
would expect: (Hypothesis 1d) Men and women who change to a female breadwinner 
household will have lower levels of relationship satisfaction than when they were in an equal 
earner or male breadwinner household.
 Not everyone adheres to the traditional gender roles emphasized in the doing 
gender theory to the same degree, and as indicated earlier this may be important for 
reactions to changes in breadwinning arrangements. Gender role attitudes are a frame of 
reference with which people judge the division of labor between partners (Hengstebeck 
et al., 2014). Some female breadwinner couples are formed due to gender egalitarian 
ideology, whereas others become so because of men’s employment difficulties (Drago et 
al., 2005; Kramer & Kramer, 2016). Even though gender role attitudes may shape the 
couples’ division of labor, people may deviate from these preferences due to constraints, 
such as employment opportunities (Drago et al., 2005; Kramer & Kramer, 2016). When 
people deviate more from their preferred division of labor, they may become more 
dissatisfied with their relationship (see also Chapter 2). People who are traditional in their 
gender role attitudes likely find becoming a female breadwinner couple contrasts more 
strongly with their beliefs than people with egalitarian attitudes (Coughlin & Wade, 2012). 
In contrast to people with more egalitarian ideologies, more traditional people may feel 
uncomfortable with female breadwinner arrangements compared to equal earner or 
male breadwinner arrangements, reducing their relationship satisfaction. Hence, our 
second hypothesis reads: (Hypothesis 2) The more traditional one’s gender role attitudes, the 
more becoming in a female breadwinner household will lower one’s level of relationship 
satisfaction.
 As mentioned previously, our definition of breadwinning distinguishes between 
single earners, dual-earners with unequal income, and dual-earners with relatively equal 
income. We would expect that differences in relationship satisfaction will be more 
prominent between single-earner couples and dual-earners with equal income than 
between dual-earners with unequal income and dual-earners with an equal income. This 
because differences in the level of specialization, role collaboration, and gender typical 
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behavior (the driving forces behind our hypotheses) will be more prominent between the 
former than between the latter.
3.3  Data and method
3.3.1  Data
We used 15 waves of the HILDA survey to test our hypotheses. The HILDA survey is an 
annual household panel survey where the same people were surveyed which began with 
a national probability sample of Australian private households in 2001. This formed the 
basis of the panel and was gradually extended to include any new household members. 
The sample was replenished in Wave 11 to retain cross-sectional representativeness. 
The household response rate was 66 percent in Wave 1 (Wooden & Watson, 2002). 
Within households, data were collected from all household members over age 15 using 
face-to-face interviews, phone-interviews and self-completed questionnaires, with a 
response rate of 92.3 percent in Wave 1 (Wooden & Watson, 2002). The wave-on-wave 
response rates ranged from 86.9 (Wave 2) to 97.0 percent (main sample Wave 15). Attrition 
was higher among people who were younger, born in a non-English speaking country, 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander, single, unemployed, or among people who worked in 
lower-skilled occupations (Summerfield et al., 2016). 
 Of the initial 217,917 observations, we selected observations of people in a relationship 
who were living with a partner, with or without children, and who lived without others 
(for instance parents) (N = 126,161). Our operationalization of breadwinner households, 
described in detail below, used information from both partners, we therefore restricted 
the analytic sample to couples where both partners responded in a certain wave 
(N = 119,742), and were in a different-sex relationship (excluding 1,339 observations). 
We then selected couples where both partners were of working age (ages 25 to 60 to deal 
with selective entry and exit of the labor force) (N = 79,798), but could be either employed, 
unemployed, or not in the labor force due to being a homemaker, ill or disabled, or a full 
time caregiver for an ill or disabled person (N = 75,726). Of the remaining respondents, 
474 individuals separated and subsequently repartnered, which causes nesting issues. 
We selected the observations of the first observed partners of these individuals, and 
excluded the observations of these individuals with subsequent partners (2,048 
observations). This selection criterion kept couples which dissolved over time in our sample, 
reducing selectivity bias of highly satisfied couples. We also exclude 6,163 observations 
with missing values on the dependent variable, mostly by not completing the self- 
completion questionnaire. After these selections, our sample consisted of 67,515 
observations (33,300 for men, 34,215 for women), of 11,890 people (5,878 men, 6,012 
women) in 6,260 relationships. The average number of wave-observations was 5.7 per 
person for both men and women (see Table 3.1). The data were largely balanced, but in 
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some instances only one partner was included, mostly due to a missing value of the other 
partner on the dependent variable. Missing values of the independent variables were 
imputed in Stata with truncated multiple imputation methods (5 datasets) using gender, 
(partner’s) age, and the variables described in Table 3.1 using a long format where we 
imputed missing values (amount shown in Table 3.1), but not whole-wave missing data 
(Young & Johnson, 2015). 
3.3.2  Measurements
Relationship satisfaction was measured using the question “How satisfied are you with 
your relationship with your partner?” which was asked in the self-completion questionnaire. 
The scale ranged from zero (‘completely dissatisfied’) to ten (‘completely satisfied’). See 
Table 3.1 for descriptive statistics of all variables. Although single-item measurements are 
less reliable than multiple-item scales, this and similar questions are widely used as 
indicators of relationship satisfaction (e.g. Hardie et al., 2014).
 Breadwinning was derived from several variables. First, based on individual responses 
to the main daily activity, we first coded whether people were employed, unable to work 
(Kramer & Kramer, 2016), or a homemaker (primarily responsible home duties, child care or 
looking after an ill or disabled person). If both partners were employed, we used people’s 
income to determine who earned more in a couple which were grouped in the following 
categories; woman earned less than 40 percent of the couple’s income, both earned 
about equal percent (both contribute between 40 and 60 percent), or woman earned 60 
percent or more of the couple’s income (Winslow, 2011; Zhang, 2015). Income was based 
on the disposable income earned over the previous financial year, including wages and 
salary, business income, investments, and benefits, minus the estimated taxes, as 
recommended by Van Bavel and Klesment (2017) (see Summerfield et al., 2016 for the 
calculation). Our breadwinning arrangement typology comprised eight categories taking 
into account income contribution and employment status. We identified two groups of 
equal earners, (1) couples where both partners were employed and earned approximately 
similar income or (2) couples where neither partner was employed. Three groups of male 
breadwinner couples were identified, (3) both partners were employed, but man earned 
more than his partner, (4) man was employed and his partner was unable to work, and (5) 
man was employed and his partner was a homemaker. Lastly, female breadwinner couples 
were categorized as (6) both partners were employed, but woman earned more than her 
partner (7) woman was employed and her partner was unable to work due to 
unemployment or illness, (8) woman was employed and her partner was a homemaker. 
Changes in the household breadwinner can therefore be due to men’s or women’s 
change in labor force participation and loss or gain in income. Hence, a couple may have 
transferred to a female breadwinner arrangement when she started earning more, when 
he experienced a decline in income, or when he became unable to work or a homemaker.
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Table 3.1  Descriptive statistics before mean centering
 Men Women
(N = 33,300) (N = 34,215 )
Number 
of values 
imputed
Range Mean/% SD Mean/% SD
Relationship satisfaction 0 0-10 8.36 1.80 8.16 1.95
Breadwinner 
Equal earner
Equal earnings, both employed 0 0-1 30.43 30.33
Both not employed 0 0-1 3.20 3.19
Male breadwinner
Both employed, man earned more 0 0-1 35.46 35.57
Man empl., woman unable to work 0 0-1 3.47 3.52
Man employed, woman homemaker 0 0-1 16.59 16.55
Female breadwinner
Both empl. woman earned more 0 0-1 7.96 7.92
Woman empl., man unable to work 0 0-1 2.22 2.25
Woman empl., man homemaker 0 0-1 0.67 0.68
Egalitarian gender role attitudes 1,156 -2.049-1.048 0.00 0.58 0.16 0.59
Couple’s work hours 145 0-224 66.72 25.24 66.86 25.32
Household labor hours 1,121 0-128 6.28 6.17 18.13 13.16
Men’s share of household labor 3,734 0-1 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.22
Financial prosperity 289 1-6 3.87 0.77 3.90 0.76
Household income (log) 0 0-14.209 11.27 0.69 11.28 0.69
Married (ref.=cohabiting) 0 0-1 81.86 81.60
Number of children aged 0-4 0 0-4 0.37 0.68 0.37 0.68
Number of children aged 5-9 0 0-4 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.65
Number of children aged 10-14 0 0-5 0.35 0.66 0.35 0.66
Number of children aged 15-24 0 0-5 0.26 0.57 0.26 0.57
Self-rated general health 714 1-5 3.48 0.89 3.55 0.89
Partner’s self-rated general health 2393 1-5 3.55 0.89 3.48 0.88
Men Women
(N = 5,878) (N = 6,012)
Mean SD Mean SD
Number of observations  1-15 5.67 4.41 5.69 4.41
Source: HILDA 2001-2015
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 Egalitarian gender role attitudes were measured using two items which indicated adherence 
to the male breadwinner ideology. While gender role ideologies are multidimensional 
(Grunow et al., 2018), many previous studies used unidimensional scales. We used two 
questions specifically about adherence to the male breadwinner ideology to investigate 
this specific part of gender role attitudes which could be argued to be most critical for our 
hypotheses: “It is better for everyone involved if the man earns the money and the woman 
takes care of the home and children” and “children do just as well if the mother earns the 
money and the father cares for the home and the children”. The answer categories ranged 
from one (‘strongly disagree’) to seven (‘strongly agree’). We generated a scale using 
Principle Factor Analysis, the factor loadings were -0.62 and 0.62 respectively. Higher 
scores on the scale indicate more egalitarian gender role attitudes regarding breadwinning. 
Questions on gender role attitudes were only asked in waves 1, 5, 8, 11, 15. We averaged all 
known scores to provide a non-varying indicator for gender role attitudes to ease 
interpretation of the interaction-coefficients. 
 We controlled for several variables. Couple’s joint labor market hours, household income 
(logged), and subjective financial prosperity were controlled for. The latter was measured 
by a question indicating how prosperous a person felt his or her household was given 
their current needs and financial responsibilities, ranging from one (‘very poor’) to six 
(‘prosperous’). These variables were included to control for possible (subjective) economic 
changes associated with becoming a female breadwinner. This ensures that effects of 
breadwinning do not represent objective or subjective effects of economic hardship. 
Our overall conclusions were similar when we did not include these control variables, 
but without controls men unable to work were marginally (p<.10) less satisfied with their 
relationship. In addition, we controlled for marital status (married versus cohabiting 
relationship), number of dependent children (aged 0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14, and 15 to 24), 
self-assessed general health (ranging one ‘poor’ to five ‘excellent’), and partner’s self-assessed 
general health (also ranging one ‘poor’ to five ‘excellent’), which may be important 
confounding variables as suggested by previous literature. Lastly, we controlled for the 
number of hours per week a person spent on household labor and men’s share of household 
labor. This was derived from a question asking how much time each partner spent on 
household labor in a typical week. Men’s share of household labor was calculated by 
dividing his contribution by sum of both partners’ contribution. Information about a 
person’s partner (on their employment hours, income, health, and household labor) were 
asked directly to the partner, which avoids selective under- or over-reporting of the 
partner’s characteristics. 
3.3.3  Analytical strategy
We used fixed effects models in Stata to test our hypotheses. These analyses study the 
within-person variation and avoid bias due to time-invariant factors, although bias to 
unobserved time-variant factors is possible (Allison, 2009) (see Appendix 3 A3.1 for the 
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changes in relationship satisfaction and breadwinner arrangements). Fixed effects models 
have the advantage of modelling changes instead of levels, which could take into account 
over- or underreporting of relationship satisfaction (Hardie et al., 2014). Essentially the 
models are difference models wherein the scores are the within individual differences 
averaged over all respondents who were observed in each type of arrangement. The first 
difference scores are the differences between an individuals’ level of relationship 
satisfaction when they were in one breadwinner arrangement compared to when they 
changed into another breadwinner arrangement. The models only take into account 
people who change and the ‘direction’ of change is not taken into account. Instead, 
the differences between the same individual in each state is investigated. The models 
also take into account any unmeasured factors that remain stable over time, for example 
country of birth. Thus they account for selection of people into the various breadwinning 
arrangements based on unmeasured characteristics over time that remain stable, 
however, they do not account for selection of unmeasured factors that may change over 
time. Variances are clustered in individuals using the Huber and White or sandwich 
estimator. The analyses were unweighted.
 The analyses were conducted separately for men (Table 3.2) and women (Table 3.3), 
and we also estimated the three models with gender interactions with all variables, 
and significant differences between men and women are indicated by bold coefficients 
in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. To test Hypotheses 1a-c, Model 1 (Table 3.2 and 3.3) studied 
breadwinner arrangements without taking any other variables into account, and in Model 2 
(Table 3.2 and 3.3) we added the control variables. In Model 3 in Table 3.4 we tested 
Hypothesis 2 by including interactions between breadwinner arrangements and gender 
role attitudes.
 Our hypotheses were concerned with differences between two pairs of breadwinner 
arrangements, the first concerned the difference in relationship satisfaction between 
equal earner and female breadwinner arrangements, and the second concerned the 
difference in relationship satisfaction between male breadwinner and female breadwinner 
arrangements. To formally test this, every model is run twice with different reference 
groups; the first using equal earner couples where both partners were employed as the 
reference group (in Models 1a to 3a) and for the second male breadwinner households 
where both partner were employed and the male partner earned more (in Models 1b 
to 3b) as the reference group. The equal earner and male breadwinner categories 
represented the more dominant breadwinning arrangements within households and 
were chosen because of the relatively large number of transitions with female breadwinner 
arrangements.
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3.4  Results
3.4.1  Relationship satisfaction and female breadwinners arrangements
The results from our fixed effects panel analyses for men are shown in Table 3.2. We start 
with discussing the results for men. The results of Model 1a for men suggest that men 
became marginally (p<0.1) less satisfied with the relationship when both partners were 
employed but the female partner earned more (b = -0.064) compared to when they were 
in an equal earner arrangement (both employed). This difference remained and increased 
in significance when the control variables were included in Model 2a (b = -0.079). Model 
1a also showed that men became less satisfied with the relationship when they 
transitioned to a female breadwinner arrangement where the woman was employed and 
he was unable to work (b = -0.225) compared to when they were in an equal earner 
arrangement. This difference was no longer significant when we took the control variables 
into account in Model 2a; especially the couple’s combined work hours, household 
income, and financial prosperity explained this difference. 
 The results showed largely similar findings when we compared men in female 
breadwinner arrangements to men in male breadwinner arrangement in Models 1b and 
2b in Table 3.2. While the association in Model 1b was not significant, including the control 
variables in Model 2b showed that men became less satisfied with the relationship when 
his partner earned more than him, compared to when he out-earned her (b = -0.084). 
Men became also less satisfied with the relationship when the woman was employed and 
the man was unable to work (b = -0.203, in Model 1b) compared to when they were in a 
male breadwinner arrangement where both were employed, but the man earned more 
than the woman. This difference was no longer significant when we included the couple’s 
work hours, income, and financial prosperity in Model 2b. Notably, men’s relationship 
satisfaction did not differ significantly between an equal earner or male breadwinner 
arrangement and couples where women were employed and men were the homemaker.
 For women, the results in Table 3.3 in Model 1a showed that women became 
(marginally (p<.10)) less satisfied with the relationship when they changed to an 
arrangement where both partners were employed, but she earned more than her partner 
compared to when they were in an equal earner arrangement, with both partners 
employed (b = -0.071). This difference increased in significance when the control variables 
were included in Model 2a (b = -0.099). Also, women became less satisfied when they 
were employed, but the man was unable to work, than when in an equal earner couple, 
where both partners were employed (b = -0.339) in Model 1a. This difference decreased 
in size when the control variables were included in Model 2a, but remained significant 
(b = -0.256). Women who transitioned from an equal earner arrangement (both employed) 
to a female breadwinner arrangement where she was employed and he was the 
homemaker did not change significantly in their relationship satisfaction.
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Model 1b for women showed that women became less satisfied with the relationship 
when they transitioned to an arrangement where she was employed and their male 
partner was unable to work compared to when they were in a male breadwinner 
arrangement (both partners employed, man earned more) (b = -0.247). The magnitude of 
this association reduced but remained significant (b = -0.213) when we took the control 
variables into account in Model 2b. Women who started earning more than their partners 
were not less satisfied compared to when they were in a male breadwinner arrangement 
(both partners employed, man earned more). Also, women who changed to a female 
breadwinner/male homemaker arrangement were not less satisfied compared to when 
they were in male breadwinner arrangements. 
 The association between changes in breadwinning arrangements and relationships 
satisfaction were largely similar between men and women, since the coefficients for 
female breadwinner arrangements did not differ significantly between men and women. 
Additionally, the models revealed that differences between men when in an equal-earner 
compared to a male-breadwinner arrangement were not related to changes in relationship 
satisfaction when the control variables were taken into account. There was one important 
exception; we consistently found that men and women became more satisfied with the 
relationship when they were in a male breadwinner arrangement where he was employed 
and she was a homemaker. 
 The results of Models 2a and 2b are summarized in Figure 3.1. The results largely 
confirmed Hypothesis 1c for men and women, in which we expected that people who 
transitioned to a female breadwinner arrangements would be less satisfied with the 
partner relationship than when they were in equal earner or male breadwinner 
arrangements. The negative association between men’s unemployment and men’s and 
(to a lesser degree) women’s relationship satisfaction seems partly driven by financial and 
economic circumstances. The fact that we did not find a significant difference for women 
in a female breadwinner/male homemaker arrangement may be in part due to the small 
number of households with this arrangement (see Table A3.1 in Appendix 3). However, the 
coefficient was positive for men and women when the control variables were taken into 
account, which suggests that men and women in female breadwinner/male homemaker 
arrangements were probably not less satisfied in their relationship than when they were in 
other arrangements. 
 Our results also suggested that some of the control variables were important. 
Relationship satisfaction rose higher with higher levels of financial prosperity and income, 
and better health of the respondent or their partner. Men became slightly less satisfied 
with the relationship as their household labor increased, but this was not associated with 
women’s satisfaction. Changes in the division of household labor or the number of work 
hours were not related to changes in relationship satisfaction. People who married or had 
(older) children were less satisfied with their relationship. 
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Table 3.3 shows the results of the model examining the moderation effect of gender role 
attitudes on the association between differences in household breadwinner arrangements 
and differences in relationship satisfaction. None of the interactions between gender role 
attitudes and female breadwinner arrangements were significant for men or women. 
Hence, the associations between changes in female breadwinner arrangement and changes 
in relationship satisfaction seem equally applicable for people with more egalitarian 
and traditional gender role attitudes. Hence, we found little support for Hypothesis 2, 
our results did not indicate that gender role attitudes are important for the associations 
between breadwinner household and relationship satisfaction. This is in contrast to 
previous research (e.g. Furdyna et al., 2008), but in line with others (e.g. Gong, 2007). 
3.4.2  Robustness analyses
We conducted several checks for robustness. First, previous research mainly used relative 
income to define breadwinner arrangements without taking employment arrangements 
into account (Wilcox & Nock, 2006; Winslow, 2011; Zhang, 2015), while others used only 
employment arrangements (e.g. Franklin & Menaker, 2014). Comparing the results of these 
approaches (see Appendix 3 Table A3.2 and A3.3) with our approach suggested that these 
other approach may have led to a slight overestimation of the influence of relative income 
on relationship satisfaction for women, and a small underestimation for men, while the 
employment measure led to relatively similar conclusions.
 Second, in our main analyses we defined the category ‘both partners were employed, 
but woman earned more than her partner’ as couple where she earned more than 60 
percent of the household income. However, other studies used a 50 percent cutoff point 
for relative household income (e.g. Klesment & Van Bavel, 2017). The results are largely 
similar when we also used this 50 percent cutoff point (see Appendix 3 Table A3.4 and 
A3.5). An exception was that men who transitioned to arrrangments where both partners 
were employed but women where the main provider did not differ in relationship 
satisfaction from when they were in an male breadwinner arrangement (both employed, 
man earned more). This indicated that especially a larger income difference was negatively 
linked to men’s satisfaction. 
 Third, we investigated income differences by studying difference in (gross) hourly 
wage to take the differences in employment hours into account (results shown in 
Appendix 3 Table A3.6 and A3.7. The results were very similar for men. The results differed 
slightly for women; women did not become less satisfied with the relationship when they 
started earning more than their male partner compared to when they both earned 
approximately the same.
 Lastly, some significant results in Table 3.2 and 3.3 for both men and women were 
found with female breadwinner households where the male partner was not working. 
This category included men who were unemployed and not working due to illness or 
disability (Kramer & Kramer, 2016). We undertook additional analysis to determine whether 
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Figure 3.1  Men and women’s relationship satisfaction and breadwinner status. a = significant 
(p<.10) difference with equal earnings both employed, b = significant (p<.10) difference 
with both employed, woman earned more. Results from Models 2a and 2b, Table 3.2 and 
3.3. The calculations refer to respondents in cohabiting couples, with an average number 
of couple’s work hours, (division of ) household labor hours, number of children, income 
and prosperity, and (partner’s) health
a, b 
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the results changed if we differentiated between men who were not working due to 
unemployment from those not working due to illness (see Table A3.8 and A3.9 in Appendix 
3). There were no large differences in men’s relationship satisfaction. For women these 
additional analyses suggested that being in a female breadwinner household where the 
male partner was not working due to illness or disability has a stronger negative association 
with women’s relationship satisfaction than being in a female breadwinner household 
where her partner was unemployed, which did not reach significance.
3.5  Conclusion and discussion
Although female breadwinner couples are an increasingly prevalent arrangement in most 
contemporary Western countries, the consequences of becoming a female breadwinner 
household for relationship outcomes have been understudied. Becoming a female 
breadwinner couple could have important implications for family life, because this may 
induce a renegotiation of household labor, create uncertainty, and could result in a 
re-evaluation of the relationship in general. The current paper investigated if changing to 
or from a female breadwinner arrangement was related to changes in one’s satisfaction 
with the relationship among Australian different-sex couples. In contrast to previous 
research which almost exclusively used a cross-sectional perspective (Bertrand et al., 2015; 
Furdyna et al., 2008; Wilcox & Nock, 2006; Zhang, 2015), this study is among the first to 
investigate the link between female breadwinners and relationship outcomes from a 
longitudinal perspective. This longitudinal perspective may be especially important given 
the transient nature of female breadwinner arrangements (Drago et al., 2005; Winkler et al., 
2005), particularly because this transient nature negatively affects relationship quality 
(Winslow, 2011). 
 Expectations were formulated based on the (gender neutral) specialization of 
household labor theory (Becker, 1985), bargaining theory (Blood & Wolfe, 1960), the role 
collaboration perspective (Rogers, 2004), and the doing gender perspective (West & 
Zimmerman, 1987). In contrast to previous studies on female breadwinners (Bertrand et 
al., 2015; Brennan et al., 2001; Winslow, 2011), our definition of breadwinning arrangements 
took both employment status and income into account. This has deepened our 
understanding of the mechanisms of the formation of female breadwinner households 
and their consequences for relationship satisfaction. Our results largely indicated that men 
and women were less satisfied with their relationship when women were the main 
provider than when they both contributed about equally to the household income or 
when men were the main provider. Men and women were less satisfied with their 
relationship when men were not employed due to illness or unemployment. For men this 
was largely due to the economic consequences (e.g. a lower income). Women were 
primarily less satisfied with their relationship when men were unable to work due to illness 
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or disability, highlighting the far-reaching impact of partner’s illness. Importantly, even 
when both were employed, men and women were largely less satisfied with the 
relationship when she earned more than him. People were especially less satisfied when 
the income differences were larger, while smaller differences seemed less influential. No 
differences in relationship satisfaction were found between people in female breadwinner/
male homemaker from when they were in other arrangements. Our findings are mostly in 
line with the doing gender perspective; people were more satisfied when they were in 
more traditional arrangements (dual-earner where men earn more, male breadwinner/
female homemaker) or relatively equal arrangements (dual-earner with similar income) 
than in arrangements diverting further from this traditional ideal (female breadwinner 
arrangements). However, all in all, we found that the consequences of becoming a female 
breadwinner couple for relationship satisfaction were relatively small, even in a relatively 
conservative country as Australia. Possibly, the differences in relationships satisfaction 
between people female breadwinners and other arrangements are smaller in more 
egalitarian countries. This finding is reassuring for contemporary societies where women 
are increasingly becoming more educated than men and have the potential to earn more 
than their male partners (Klesment & Van Bavel, 2017; Van Bavel & Klesment, 2017).
 Men and women were less satisfied with the relationship when men were unable 
to work due to unemployment or illness, but not when women were unable to work. 
This emphasizes the gendered nature of breadwinning where men’s contributions to 
household finances are regarded as more important than women’s. Additionally, perhaps 
men’s illness requires a greater renegotiation of household arrangements or induces 
inequitable arrangements both in employment and home duties. This remains a topic for 
future investigation. 
 Even though our findings are in line with the doing gender perspective, people’s 
personal gender role attitudes does not seem to influence these relationships. This shows 
that people become less satisfied when they become a female-breadwinner household, 
regardless of their own personal gender role attitudes. This conclusion is similar to findings 
by Gong (2007) and Brennan et al.’s (2001), but in contrast to others (Atkinson et al., 2005; 
Coughlin & Wade, 2012; Furdyna et al., 2008; Zhang, 2015). This finding may indicate the 
dominance of traditional values about the divisions of labor between partners in Australia, 
as even though people may be relatively egalitarian in their attitudes, becoming a female 
breadwinner couple is still similarly detrimental for people’s relationships.
 Our research had a number of limitations. Our modeling strategy investigated only 
the general consequences of changes in breadwinner arrangements. A longer scope and 
longitudinal investigation after such a change could be informative to study the adaptation 
process predicted by adaption and set-point theory. Additionally, there were a limited 
number of transitions between certain groups, particularly with female breadwinner/
male homemaker households. This may bias our results to be more conservative, 
overlooking possible positive or negative effects of for relationship satisfaction for these 
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groups. Also, while we hypothesized certain mechanisms how relationships are influenced 
by becoming a female breadwinner household, such as re-evaluation and reappraisal of 
the relationship, we did not have the data to explicitly investigate these mechanisms in 
this study. Lastly, our measurements were not always ideal. Relationship satisfaction was 
measured with a single item asking people’s general appraisal of the partner relationship. 
However, relationship satisfaction holds various dimensions and future research may 
employ are broader definition of relationship satisfaction. Moreover, our measurement of 
gender role attitudes asks about people’s general opinion concerning the division of 
labor within couples. Even though this opinion concerns people’s rejection of female 
breadwinner arrangements, this measurement may concern people’s opinion about 
generalized others, instead of their preferences towards their personal situation. 
Furthermore, it is a unidimensional instead of a multidimensional measurement of gender 
role ideology (see Grunow, et al. 2018). This may be an additional reason of our null-finding 
regarding the moderation by gender role attitudes. Others have suggested masculinity 
and femininity as moderating factors in related fields (Kluwer, 2011), which may also be a 
promising direction for future research. Finally, while our use of fixed effects models 
enables us to control for selection on unmeasured factors that are stable over time, it does 
not account for time varying unmeasured factors. With relation to the formation of female 
breadwinner households, unmeasured factors such as changing work-family orientation, 
could also be important in selecting households into certain breadwinner states and our 
results need to be interpreted with this in mind. We encourage future research to build 
upon these limitations.
 Despite these limitations, this study expanded upon previous research by showing 
that becoming a female breadwinner or women’s increasing relative contribution to 
household finances were generally associated with worse couple’s relationship 
(Oppenheimer, 1997; Rogers, 2004). People in Australia were less satisfied with their 
relationship when women were the main provider for the family. When men became 
unable to work due to unemployment or illness, both men and women became much 
less satisfied with the partner relationship. Even when both partners remained employed, 
people were less satisfied when she had a higher income, highlighting the gendered 
nature of breadwinning. 
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4.1  Introduction and research question
Many families have experienced economic hardship during the recent economic crises in 
Europe, such as the loss of employment or income (Eurofound, 2015; Standing, 2011). 
Although direct consequences of economic hardship are largely employment-related, 
they likely spill over to people’s family life because economic difficulties may foster 
conflicts between partners due to stress, frustration, depression and because it 
complicates making future plans for the family. While previous research often studied 
individual consequences for a person who loses a job or income, all family members may 
suffer from precarious circumstances, implying that economic crises hit more people than 
the ones directly involved. This study thus aims to enlarge our knowledge about people’s 
satisfaction with family life and the consequences of economic hardship for family life 
satisfaction by simultaneously considering two key dimensions of hardship, namely 
current and expected economic hardship; and by examining under which circumstances 
economic hardship reduces family life satisfaction more strongly. 
 While economic hardship encompasses both current economic hardship and people’s 
uncertainty for their economic future (Standing, 2011), most research on economic 
circumstances and family well-being focusses on one of the two. This article will therefore 
improve upon this research by simultaneously examining current economic hardship and 
expectations about future economic hardship. More precisely, this study focusses on 
(current and expected) financial difficulties and unemployment as two primary indicators 
of economic hardship. In prior studies, a focus on the consequences of current economic 
hardship dominated research on family well-being. These studies generally concluded 
that people who perceived or experienced economic hardship reported a lower quality of 
their partner relationship, reported more conflict between family members, and were less 
satisfied with their family life (see for instance Conger et al., 2010; Currie, Duque, & Garfinkel, 
2015; Dew & Yorgason, 2009; Shim et al., 2017; Vinokur et al., 1996; Williams et al., 2015). The 
current study explicitly focuses on family life satisfaction, which can be defined as “a 
conscious cognitive judgment of one’s family life in which the criteria for the judgment are 
up to the individual” (Zabriskie & Ward, 2013, p. 449). This judgment includes an evaluation 
of the relationship with their spouse, children, and parents. Because satisfaction with 
family life is strongly related to family functioning, cohesion, and communication (Zabriskie 
& Ward, 2013), it is a valuable overarching indicator to study family well-being. Family life 
satisfaction generally interpreted as referring to the nuclear family and specifically the 
partner relationship (Chapman & Guven, 2016; Greenstein, 2009; Shim et al., 2017).
 This article will extend previous research findings also by investigating whether expected 
economic hardship in the near future reduces family life satisfaction. People’s perceptions 
and expectations on future problems likely influence families regardless of actual current 
hardship (Rosino, 2016). Families make plans for the future, and these plans are partly 
based on their perceived economic prospects. Expecting economic hardship may make 
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planning for the future troublesome and more difficult (Hofmann & Hohmeyer, 2013), and 
the uncertainty about a family’s economic future deteriorates its members’ well-being 
(Modrek & Cullen, 2013; Standing, 2011). Prior research on the relationship between 
people’s expectations about their future economic hardship and family well-being is very 
scarce, but available research on relationship quality has shown that couples who are 
uncertain about the future report lower quality relationships, less affection, and poorer 
family communication (Kinnunen & Pulkkinen, 1998; Larson, Wilson, & Beley, 1994; Mauno, 
Cheng, & Lim, 2017; Mauno & Kinnunen, 1999). Other studies suggested that people are 
more prone to postpone long-term family investments and commitments when they 
experience economic uncertainty (De Lange, Wolbers, Gesthuizen, & Ultee, 2014; Hofmann 
& Hohmeyer, 2013). By simultaneously investigating current and expected economic 
hardship it is possible to disentangle whether expected economic hardship harms family 
life satisfaction over and above current hardship, and whether the expectation of future 
economic difficulties is even more harmful for those who already experience economic 
hardship.
 Another important contribution of this study is its assessment whether the impact of 
economic hardship on family life satisfaction depends on different contextual circumstances. 
Whether economic circumstances translate to perceptions of hardship and stress may depend 
partly on the family and societal context (Boss et al., 2017). Previous studies primarily 
investigated direct associations between current economic hardship and family well-being 
as well as the mechanism explaining them (e.g. Williams et al., 2015). What remains unclear is 
whether economic hardship reduces family life satisfaction differently for people in different 
situations. This article aims to bridge this gap by studying two possibly moderating factors: 
the presence of children in the household and the macro-economic situation in a country. 
Previous studies indicated that parents are more rejecting of financial risks than childless 
people (Chaulk et al., 2003), and being able to provide for their children showed to be 
especially important for mothers’ well-being (Mistry et al., 2008). These findings highlight 
the importance parents place on taking financial responsibility for their children. Because 
parents have more financial responsibilities than childless couples do, economic problems 
may especially be harmful for parents’ personal and family well-being. Research also indicated 
that children have more psychological and behavioral problems when they experience 
economic hardship (Conger et al., 2002, 2010; Neppl et al., 2016). Their problems could 
potentially transfer to parents’ satisfaction with family life, again leading to the expectation 
that economic problems hit couples with children harder than couples without children.
 Previous research has mainly studied the influence of financial difficulties on families 
during macro-economic recession (see for instance Aytaç & Rankin, 2009; Conger et al., 
1990; Kwon et al., 2003). It remains unclear if this macro-economic context affects the 
degree to which hardship influences a person’s family life. Related research in the field of 
personal well-being suggests that economic difficulties influence someone’s well-being 
differently in diverse macro-economic contexts. Empirical support for this expectation is 
91
Current and expected economic hardship and satisfaction with family life in Europe
mixed. The well-being of lower educated women is more strongly affected by changes 
in macro-level unemployment than the well-being of other women (Currie et al., 2015), 
whereas macro-level unemployment does not alter the influence of personal unemployment 
on well-being (Eichhorn, 2012; Oesch & Lipps, 2012). In the current study it is acknowledged 
that not all countries experienced the same degree of economic hardship during the 
previous crisis, and this variation is used as a natural experiment. By studying changes in 
unemployment in various European countries, this article investigates whether the 
severity of an economic crisis influences how people’s perceptions of their own labor 
circumstances is related to their satisfaction with family life.
 In sum, this study builds upon previous research in several ways. First, it studies 
whether the expectation of economic hardship influences satisfaction with family life 
alongside with or in combination with current hardship. Second, it investigates whether 
the associations between current and expected economic hardship and family life 
satisfaction differ for people with or without children and for people in countries with a 
lower or higher rise in unemployment. In this paper we also take differences between 
men and women into account by studying whether economic hardship influences men’s 
and women’s family life satisfaction differently. Men’s employment is often regarded to be 
more important for families due to a larger economic contribution to the household and 
due to internalized and societal traditional gender roles (Shim et al., 2017; Williams et al., 
2015). Hence, men and women may react differently to economic hardship, which could 
affect their family life satisfaction in another way (Shim et al., 2017; Williams et al., 2015).
 The research question reads: To what extent do current and expected economic hardship 
affect satisfaction with family life, and how do these associations differ between families with 
and without children and in times of greater unemployment? This research question will be 
answered using data from the European Quality of Life Study (EQLS) of 2012, which 
provided information on 13,013 partnered individuals of working age across 30 European 
countries. The EQLS data provide a unique opportunity to simultaneously investigate the 
relationship between economic hardship and satisfaction with family life at the height of 
the European economic crisis across countries in various degrees of economic downturn. 
This cross-national variation in (changes in) unemployment enables us to study consequences 
of a country’s unemployment situation for the impact of economic hardship on a person’s 
satisfaction with their family life.
4.2  Theoretical framework and hypotheses
4.2.1  The family stress model: main effects
Previous research focusing on current economic hardship and conflict within a partner 
relationship often departs from the family stress model (Conger et al., 1990, 2010). This model 
was designed to study the consequences of the Midwest farm crisis in the 1980s for 
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families and has found confirmation during other crises across the globe (e.g. Aytaç & 
Rankin, 2009; Falconier & Epstein, 2010; Kwon et al., 2003). A basic proposition of family 
stress theory states that negative economic events increase the economic pressure 
people experience (Conger et al., 1990, 2010). Economic pressure includes unmet material 
needs, inability to pay bills, and financial cut backs. How people react towards negative 
economic conditions depends on their perception of these conditions (Boss et al., 2017; 
Hill, 1958). Previous studies emphasized the importance to differentiate between objective 
and subjective experiences of stressful circumstances. Objective negative economic 
events such as job loss lead to subjective experiences of these events, resulting in stress 
(Hill, 1958; Rosino, 2016). The subjective experiences or perceptions do not have to 
originate from actual events and can induce stress similarly to objective experiences (Hill, 
1958). When people perceive an event as stressful or frustrating, it is presumed they 
become more emotionally and behaviorally distressed, as expected from for instance 
frustration-aggression arguments and the ABC-X model (Berkowitz, 1989; Hill, 1958). 
Emotional consequences of economic pressure may include depression and anger. Both 
influence satisfaction with family life negatively because these increase “aggressive or 
angry responses, such as criticism, defensiveness, and insensitivity, as well as withdrawal 
of supportive behaviors” (Conger et al., 2002, p. 181). Anger also causes hostility between 
partners and therefore augments possible conflict, impacting the quality of the partner 
relationship (Kluwer & Johnson, 2007), while depression induces emotional withdrawal 
and distancing, reducing satisfaction with family life (see also Conger et al., 2010).
 Aside from the indirect consequences of economic pressure via stress, anger, and 
depression, economic pressure also has a more direct effect on people’s satisfaction with 
family life. Economic hardship causes partners to have arguments over financial issues, 
and these quarrels proved more problematic and recurrent than arguments about other 
issues (Papp, Cummings, & Goeke-Morey, 2009). Next to inducing financial pressure, 
unemployment reduces people’s structured time, social contact, sense of purpose, status 
and activity, which are important psychological needs (Paul & Moser, 2009). The lack of 
fulfilment of these needs results in more distress, which in turn might result in people 
being less satisfied with their family life. Therefore, it is expected that: (Hypothesis 1) When 
people experience current economic hardship, they are less satisfied with family life.
 Similar to present-day economic hardship, the expectation of economic hardship 
likely influences family life. Perceptions of the future can shape current behavior and thus 
influence families (Mantler, Matejicek, Matheson, & Anisman, 2005; Rosino, 2016). People 
who are uncertain about their future economic situation likely anticipate an economic 
pressure in the near future and therefore may become more distressed, anxious and both 
emotionally and physically exhausted (Mantler et al., 2005; Standing, 2011). According to 
the family stress model, such emotional consequences induce more aggressiveness and 
angry responses towards a partner, and less supportive behavior, such as showing 
empathy and interest, and listening (Conger et al., 2002). Economic insecurity has been 
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found to reduce marital adjustment, family communication, affective involvement, and 
the quality of the relationship (Kinnunen & Pulkkinen, 1998; Larson et al., 1994; Mauno et 
al., 2017). Accordingly, expecting future economic hardship may have similar consequences 
for a person’s family life satisfaction as current economic hardship. Moreover, expecting 
economic hardship may result in postponement of long-term family commitments. 
People may be less inclined to marry or to have children when they are uncertain about 
future employment, earnings, or their households’ economic situation (De Lange et al., 
2014; Hofmann & Hohmeyer, 2013). Delay of long-term commitments has been found to 
be negatively related to perceived quality of partner relationships (Wiik, Keizer, & 
Lappegård, 2012). Therefore, the second hypothesis reads: (Hypothesis 2) When people 
expect economic hardship, they are less satisfied with family life.
 Moreover, people who currently experience economic hardship may be less able to 
handle future economic hardship. When people experience a decline in income, they 
need to adjust their spending to their new level of income. However, when people are 
already barely able to make ends meet, an additional loss of income would require extra 
financial cutbacks even though families may be unable to do so without cutting back on 
important needs. Therefore, expecting economic hardship may be especially stressful for 
families that are already experiencing economic hardship. Hence: (Hypothesis 3) Expected 
economic hardship is more detrimental for people’s satisfaction with family life when they 
currently experience more economic hardship.
4.2.2   Conditional influences of having children and macro-level 
unemployment
It is likely that not all people react to economic hardship to the same degree. The impact 
of current and expected economic hardship on family life satisfaction is argued to depend 
on the presence of children and the rise of unemployment in a country. First, the extended 
family stress model – which incorporated parenting and children’s well-being into the 
original family stress model (Conger et al., 2002, 2010) – argues that the experience of 
economic pressure not only results in lower-quality interactions with the partner, but may 
also lead to more aggressive or angry responses in the interaction with children (Conger 
et al., 2002, 2010; Neppl et al., 2016). It is argued that emotional and relational consequences 
of economic pressure make parenting more harsh, inconsistent, and uninvolved (see 
Conger et al., 2010 for a review). The extended family stress model hypothesizes that 
children in families with economic difficulties experience more psychological (e.g. anxiety 
and depression) and behavioral problems (e.g. aggressive and antisocial), and children are 
less attached to their parents (Neppl et al., 2016). We expect that such behavioral problems 
would also relate negatively to parental family life satisfaction. In addition, because parents 
likely have more financial responsibilities than childless people (Chaulk et al., 2003), current 
and expected hardship may be more stressful for parents than non-parents. Negative 
economic events, may be perceived as a more substantial problem and therefore will be 
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experienced as more stressful by parents than by people without children (Boss et al., 
2017), because of their need and strong desire to financially take care of their children 
(Mistry et al., 2008). Taking all arguments together it is hypothesized that: (Hypothesis 4) 
(a) Current and (b) expected economic hardship are more detrimental for people’s satisfaction 
with family life if they have children.
 Second, macro-economic circumstances may influence whether personal hardship is 
perceived as stressful (Boss et al., 2017). Specifically, the unemployment situation in a 
country may influence the impact of economic hardship on family life satisfaction. High 
and rising unemployment rates signal few job vacancies. Moreover, rising unemployment 
levels in a country amplify stress among people who experience or expect economic 
hardship since they observe limited opportunities to improve their income or employment 
situation (Oesch & Lipps, 2012). Congruent with these arguments, Currie et al. (2015) found 
that a rise in unemployment was especially harmful for the well-being of lower-educated 
mothers, who could be considered to be in more precarious positions than their high-
er-educated female counterparts. Additionally, people were also found to experience 
more work stress when there had been more layoffs in their company (Modrek & Cullen, 
2013), suggesting that being at risk of becoming unemployed is more stressful in situations 
where many people lose their jobs. Our final hypothesis is: (Hypothesis 5) (a) Current and 
(b) expected economic hardship are more detrimental for people’s satisfaction with family life in 
countries with a large rise in unemployment.
4.3  Data and method
4.3.1  Data
The European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) of 2012 was used to test our hypotheses. EQLS 
data were collected in EU27 countries in late 2011, and the beginning of 2012 using 
face-to-face interviews. In the summer of 2012 interviews were held in seven additional 
countries, namely Croatia, Iceland, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. The response rate was 41.3 percent in the 
EU27 countries and 44.7 percent in the other countries (see www.eurofound.europa.eu). 
Because of missing information on country characteristics, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, 
Montenegro, and Serbia were omitted from the analyses. Only people who cohabited 
with a different-sex partner and lived independently of their own or partner’s parents 
were selected for this study. The sample was further restricted to people of working age 
(18 to 65 years old) and whose main daily activity was either being employed, unemployed, 
or homemaker, therefore excluding people who were retired, unable to work due to 
long-term illness or disability, or in education. Next, we selected people whose partner 
was also of working age (18 to 65 years old) and were also either employed, unemployed, 
or homemaker. These criteria ensured that this study solely included people whose 
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financial situation reflected their personal or their partner’s circumstances rather than 
their parents’ resources, and referred to people’s satisfaction with their own family life 
instead of satisfaction with their family of origin. Following these inclusion criteria, the 
sample consisted of 13,013 individuals across 30 countries. Missing values on independent 
variables were multiply imputed per country using all other independent variables and 
main daily activity of both partners, and work hours as predictor variables. The question 
on expected job loss was only applicable to people in employment. Consequently, 
analyses regarding expected job loss were based on a restricted sample of 10,177 
employed persons.
4.3.2  Measurements
The dependent variable satisfaction with family life was measured by asking people how 
satisfied they were with their family life. The scale ranged from one (‘very dissatisfied’) to 
ten (‘very satisfied’). This question was generally interpreted as referring to the nuclear 
family (Chapman & Guven, 2016; Greenstein, 2009; Shim et al., 2017). Similar questions have 
been included in, for instance, the Satisfaction With Family Life Scale (Zabriskie & Ward, 
2013). The distribution of this dependent variable was highly skewed (mean = 8.47), which 
was taken into account in the robustness analyses by using a negative binomial multilevel 
modelling (see Appendix 4 Tables A4.3 and A4.4). These analyses led to similar conclusions 
as using the original scale.
 As mentioned before, current economic hardship was operationalized as experiencing 
financial hardship and unemployment. Financial hardship was measured using the concept 
of making ends meet. Respondents were asked: “Thinking of your household’s total 
monthly income: is your household able to make ends meet?” Answer categories ranged 
from one (‘with great difficulty’) to six (‘very easily’). The scale was reversed so that higher 
scores implied more financial hardship. Unemployment was measured with a binary 
variable for the respondent and the partner separately: ‘not unemployed’ (0) versus 
‘unemployed’ (1). Partner’s unemployment was included for its importance for couple’s 
well-being (see Chapter 2 and 3).
 Expected economic hardship was indicated by the expectation that the future 
household situation was likely to be worse and by expecting job loss. Expected financial 
situation was measured with the question: “When it comes to the financial situation of 
your household, what are your expectations for the 12 months to come, will the next 12 
months be (1) better, (2) worse or (3) the same?” The same was used as the reference 
category. For employed people expecting job loss was measured with the question: “How 
likely or unlikely do you think it is that you might lose your job in the next 6 months” The 
answer categories ranged from ‘very unlikely’ to ‘very likely’. Because of non-linearity this 
indicator was included categorically, and for reasons of parsimony the categories were 
reduced to three groups: ‘job loss is unlikely’, ‘job loss is neither likely nor unlikely’, and ‘job 
loss is likely’.
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Table 4.1   Descriptive statistics for the full and the employed sample,  
before grand-mean centering
Full sample Employed
sample
Countries
(N = 13,033) (N = 10,177) (N = 30)
Nr. of 
values 
imputed
Range Mean/% SD Mean/% SD Mean/% SD
Satisfaction with family life 0 1-10 8.47 1.66 8.54 1.59
Current economic hardship
Financial hardship 116 1-6 3.35 1.25 3.18 1.18
Unemployed (ref.=not) 0 0-1 8.50
Partner unemployed 
(ref.=not)
0 0-1 6.38 4.70
Expected economic hardship
Future financial situation
Same 938 0-1 50.96 53.06
Better 938 0-1 19.48 18.58
Worse 938 0-1 29.55 28.36
Expected job loss
Unlikely 494 0-1 69.29
Neither likely nor unlikely 494 0-1 16.11
Likely 494 0-1 14.60
Male (ref.=female) 0 0-1 43.16 50.02
Age 0 18-65 42.26 10.03 42.58 9.85
Education
Less than upper secondary 97 0-1 24.81 18.48
Upper secondary 97 0-1 45.21 46.70
Tertiary 97 0-1 29.97 34.82
Children under 25
None 0 0-1 12.31 13.13
One or two 0 0-1 53.34 53.27
Three or more 0 0-1 11.29 9.72
Support 118 0-1 0.95 0.13 0.96 0.12
Country characteristics
Change in Unemployment % 0 -1.7-10.3 3.64 3.64
GDP/1000 0 7.8-113.2 34.02 22.39
Social protection expenditure 0 12.9-31.2     22.73 5.38
Source: EQLS 2012, Eurostat
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The presence of children was measured as the number of children under 25 years living 
in the household. The age of 25 was chosen as upper limit since parental financial 
 responsibilities often continue beyond children’s age of 18. The variable consisted of three 
categories; ‘no children under 25’ (0), ‘one or two children under 25’ (1), and ‘three or more 
children under 25’ (2). The macro-economic circumstances in a country were measured as 
the change in unemployment as percentage of the economically active population (aged 
20 to 64) between 2008 and 2011, derived from Eurostat. Individual-level control variables 
included were gender, age, educational attainment (ISCED-classification, in three categories), 
and support. Support was measured as the mean of whether people could depend on 
help from (0) nobody versus (1) institutions, family members, relatives, friends, neighbors, 
or someone else in the following situations: help around the house when ill, advice about 
a serious personal or family matter, help with looking for a job, wanting someone to talk 
to, and urgently raise money to face an emergency. All these control variables could 
potentially influence the level of economic hardship people experience and their level of 
family life satisfaction. The country-level controls that were included were GDP per capita 
in current market prices in Euros divided by 1000, and social protection expenditure as 
percentage of the GDP8, which were derived from Eurostat. These factors could influence 
family life satisfaction and economic hardship, and are related to the level of contextual 
unemployment (e.g. GDP affects family life satisfaction, Greenstein, 2009). Table 4.1 shows 
descriptive statistics for all variables for the full sample and for the subsample of 
employed-only. The full sample is used when analyzing the influence of current financial 
hardship, current unemployment, and expected financial situation. The sample of only 
employed respondents is used when analyzing the influence of expected job loss, since 
one’s expectations about potential job loss are inherently only asked among those 
currently having a job. All continuous variables were grand-mean centered. Table A4.1 in 
Appendix 4 shows the mean satisfaction with family life, the macro-level indicators (before 
grand-mean centering), and the number of respondents per country.
4.3.3  Analytical strategy
The associations between the four indicators of economic hardship and family life 
satisfaction were considered bivariately first (see Figure 4.1). Next, multivariate analyses 
were conducted using multilevel analyses to take into account that individuals were 
nested in countries (intraclass correlation is .033). The explained variance is calculated 
based on the Snijders and Boskes’ method (R2 S&B) (LaHuis, Hartman, Hakoyama, & Clark, 
2014). The main effects of economic hardship and the interaction between current and 
future economic hardship were shown in Table 4.2. Model 1 showed the main associations 
between satisfaction with family life and financial hardship, unemployment, and expectations 
about the financial situation and includes all control variables. The associations between 
8 Conclusions were the same when we used a broader welfare indicator, namely welfare regime type.
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expected job loss and satisfaction with family life are presented in Model 2 as these were 
based on the subsample of employed people, since inherently only employed people 
may be expected to lose their jobs. Models 3 and 4 showed the interaction between 
current and expected economic hardship. Table 4.3 shows the interactions between 
economic hardship, the presence of children and change in macro-level unemployment. 
These gender interactions were included in Models 5 to 14, and were controlled for all 
other variables. Differences between men and women are indicated by bold coefficients 
in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Difference were tested by simultaneously interacting all indicators 
with gender in additional analyses. 
4.4  Results
4.4.1  Bivariate analyses
A first step was to test whether people who experienced or expected economic hardship 
were less satisfied with their family life. Figure 4.1 shows the association between current 
financial hardship and satisfaction with family life and indicated that people indeed were 
less satisfied with their family life when they experienced more financial hardship. In 
addition, people who themselves were unemployed or whose partner was unemployed 
were less satisfied with their family life. Figure 4.1 also showed that people, who expected 
their future financial situation to worsen, reported a lower satisfaction than people who 
expected financial stability. People who expected to be better off financially were most 
satisfaction with their family life. Lastly, people who found it likely that they would lose 
their job showed less satisfaction with their family life than people who expected job 
stability, but people who found it likely to lose their job were more satisfied than people 
who found it neither likely nor unlikely. So, uncertainty seems to be harmful for a person’s 
family life satisfaction.
 Exploration of the associations between the measurements of economic hardship 
(not shown) supported, first, the general idea that employment and financial situations go 
hand in hand: Current unemployment (of either respondent or partner) was associated 
with more current financial hardship and expected job loss was associated with worse 
expected financial situation. Second, it revealed that those currently in disadvantaged 
positions (either in unemployment or financial hardship) expected to have either better or 
worse financial situations in future compared to those currently in advantaged positions, 
who in turn were more likely to expect no change of their situation.
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4.4.2  Satisfaction with family life and economic hardship
Table 4.2 reports the associations between economic hardship and family life satisfaction 
from the multilevel analyses holding all other aspects constant. Model 19 shows that 
people who experienced more financial hardship were less satisfied with their family life 
(b = -0.175). Also, people expressed lower satisfaction when they or their partner were 
unemployed (b = -0.168 and b = -0.149 respectively). The negative association between 
partner’s unemployment and satisfaction with family life was only significant for women, 
indicating women’s lower satisfaction with their family life when their partner was 
unemployed. All in all, findings supported Hypothesis 1 on the detrimental effect of 
current economic hardship for family life satisfaction.
 Model 1 also showed that people who expected their financial situation to worsen 
were less satisfied with their family life (b = -0.223), while people who expected to be 
9 R2(S&B) = 0.015 for full sample when only the control variables were included.
Figure 4.1   The association between economic hardship and satisfaction with family life, 
bivariate results
7.0 
7.5 
8.0 
8.5 
9.0 
9.5 
10.0 
Ve
ry 
ea
sil
y
 
Ea
sil
y
Fa
irly
 ea
sil
y
 
Wi
th 
so
me
 di
ffic
ult
y
 
Wi
th 
 di
ffic
ult
y
 
Wi
th 
gr
ea
t d
iffi
cu
lty
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 fa
m
ily
 li
fe
 
Financial deprivation (making ends meet) 
7.0 
7.5 
8.0 
8.5 
9.0 
9.5 
10.0 
No
t u
ne
mp
loy
ed
Un
em
plo
ye
d
No
t u
ne
mp
loy
ed
Un
em
plo
ye
d 0
 
 
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 fa
m
ily
 li
fe
 
Respondent Partner 
7.0 
7.5 
8.0 
8.5 
9.0 
9.5 
10.0 
 Better  Same  Worse 
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 fa
m
ily
 li
fe
 
Future financial situation 
7.0 
7.5 
8.0 
8.5 
9.0 
9.5 
10.0 
Unlikely  Neither likely 
nor unlikely 
 Likely 
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 fa
m
ily
 li
fe
 
Expected job loss 
100
Chapter 4
better off in the near future showed more satisfaction (b = 0.147). Model 210 (based on 
employed people only) adds to this that family life satisfaction was higher among people 
who found it unlikely to lose their job as compared to people who found it likely or who 
found it neither likely nor unlikely (b = -0.145 and b = -0.264 respectively). These findings 
supported Hypothesis 2. Analyses gave no indication of gender differences in these 
effects. All other economic hardship indicators in Model 2 showed similar results for 
people who were employed compared to the full sample (in Model 1) with the exception 
that partner unemployment was no longer negatively related to satisfaction with family 
life. Additional analyses showed that of all indicators for economic hardship, only the 
influence for current financial hardship varied over countries. 
 Regarding the control variables in the models, men showed to be more satisfied with 
their family life than women. Age did not affect family life satisfaction. The higher educated 
reported more satisfaction with their family life than the lower educated. People with one 
or two children under 25 in the household were more satisfied with their family life than 
people without children in the full sample, but not in the sample of only employed 
respondents. People who expected to receive more support from the social network 
were more satisfied with their family life (women more than men). The country-level 
indicators did not influence satisfaction with family life, with the notable exception of 
social protection expenditure which was negatively related to satisfaction with family life 
for men.
 Models 3 and 4 in Table 4.2 showed whether expecting financial hardship (Model 3) 
or expecting job loss (Model 4) was especially harmful for people’s satisfaction with family 
life when they currently experienced financial hardship, as expected in Hypothesis 3. 
Model 3 showed that expecting to be financially worse off in the next year did not amplify 
the negative influence of current financial hardship. The interaction results of Model 4 
were presented in Figure 4.2 to facilitate interpretation. These results indicated that among 
those with most current financial hardship, family life satisfaction was not associated with 
expected job loss, whereas we expected that in such situation, differences in family life 
satisfaction would be especially large between those who find it likely versus unlikely to 
lose their job in the next year. In sum, we reject Hypothesis 3; expecting economic 
hardship was not more detrimental for people’s satisfaction with family life when they 
currently experienced more economic hardship.
10 R2(S&B) = 0.010 for employed-only sample when only the control variables were included.
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Table 4.3   Current and expected economic hardship and satisfaction with family life, 
and the dependency on the presence of children and change in macro-level 
unemployment
Model 5 Model 10
Financial hardship (full sample) B  SE B  SE
Financial hardship -0.179 *** 0.021 -0.178 *** 0.022
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
   One or two children 0.084 ** 0.032
   Three or more children 0.097 0.050
Financial hardship * One or two children 0.019 0.025
Financial hardship * Three or more children -0.045 0.037
% Change Unemployment 0.028 0.017
Financial hardship * % Change Unemployment    0.002  0.007
Model 6 Model 11
Respondent’s unemployment (full sample) B  SE B  SE
Unemployed (ref.=not) -0.254 ** 0.083 -0.185 ** 0.060
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
   One or two children 0.074 * 0.033
   Three or more children 0.060 0.052
Unemployment * One or two children 0.104 0.108
Unemployment * Three or more children 0.295 0.170
% Change Unemployment 0.027 0.018
Unemployment * % Change Unemployment    0.018  0.017
Model 7 Model 12
Partner unemployment (full sample) B  SE B  SE
Partner Unemployed (ref.=not) -0.124 0.094 -0.162 0.055 0.084
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
   One or two children 0.081 * 0.032
   Three or more children 0.113 * 0.051
Partner unemployment * One or two children 0.046 0.123
Partner unemployment * Three or more children -0.424 * 0.195
% Change Unemployment 0.026 0.018
Partner unemployment *  
% Change Unemployment
   0.018  0.024
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Table 4.3   Continued
Model 8 Model 13
Future financial situation (full sample) B  SE B  SE
Expected financial situation (ref.=same)
   Better financial future 0.131 0.068 0.157 ** 0.051
   Worse financial future -0.209 *** 0.058 -0.201 *** 0.049
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
   One or two children 0.064 0.044
   Three or more children 0.202 ** 0.073
Better financial future * One or two children 0.058 0.086
Better financial future * Three or more children -0.141 0.132
Worse financial future * One or two children 0.030 0.072
Worse financial future * Three or more children -0.278 * 0.117
% Change Unemployment 0.022 0.019
Better financial future * % Change 
Unemployment
0.002 0.015
Worse financial future * % Change 
Unemployment
   0.019  0.016
Model 9 Model 14
Expected job loss (only employed sample) B  SE B  SE
Expected job loss (ref.=unlikely)
   Job loss, neither likely nor unlikely -0.451 *** 0.074 -0.258 *** 0.045
   Job loss, likely -0.146 0.078 -0.144 ** 0.052
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
   One or two children -0.007 0.040
   Three or more children 0.099 0.068
Job loss, neither * One or two children 0.325 *** 0.094
Job loss, neither * Three or more children 0.154 0.168
Job loss, likely * One or two children 0.021 0.096
Job loss, likely * Three or more children -0.092 0.157
% Change Unemployment 0.013 0.017
Job loss, neither * % Change Unemployment 0.019 0.014
Job loss, likely * % Change Unemployment    0.018  0.015
Source: EQLS 2012. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Bold is significant (p<.05) differences between men and women. 
Results based on multilevel models; N=13,013 for the full sample, N=10,177 for the only employed sample, across 
30 countries. Controlled for all other variables included in Table 4.2.
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4.4.3  Conditional influences
Table 4.3 shows the models with interactions between the presence of children, change 
in country’s level of unemployment, and economic hardship; the variances for these 
models are shown in Table A4.2 in Appendix 4. In line with Hypothesis 4, we found some 
support that economic hardship reduced family life satisfaction especially if three or more 
children lived in the household. More precisely, having an unemployed partner reduced 
satisfaction with family life for women with three of more children, but not for childless 
women (Model 7), and expecting a financial decline was more detrimental for family life 
satisfaction for women with three or more children compared to childless women (Model 8). 
However, contrary to the hypothesis, current financial hardship (Model 5), unemployment 
(Model 6), and expected job loss (Model 9) were not more detrimental for people with 
children than for childless people. All in all, Hypothesis 4 cannot be confirmed unequivocally. 
 Lastly, results concerning the conditional influence of change in the percentage of 
unemployed in a country (Hypothesis 5) were reported in models 10 to 14 in Table 4.311. 
No indication was found that economic hardship was more detrimental for people’s 
satisfaction with family life in countries that had experienced a larger rise in unemployment, 
for all interaction coefficients were non-significant.
11  Model 14 did not converge when job loss was set random over countries, therefore these dummies were 
restricted to be fixed in this model.
Figure 4.2   Moderation between financial deprivation, expected job loss,  
and family life satisfaction
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4.4.4  Robustness analyses
Several checks for robustness were conducted. First and foremost, multilevel negative 
binomial analyses designed for count-variables were conducted because this type of 
analysis is designed to deal with highly skewed dependent variables (the scale of family 
life satisfaction was reversed for these analyses). See Appendix 4 Tables A4.3 and A4.4. 
Differences were limited. The analyses only indicated that the main effect of partner 
unemployment and its interaction with the presence of children were not related to 
satisfaction with family life. Other results were robust.
 Second, we restricted the age selection to 25 - 55 to deal with possible selectivity in 
the youngest and oldest age groups; generally lower educated are employed at a younger 
age, and are less likely to retire early. These analyses did not lead to different conclusions 
(see Appendix 4 Table A4.5 and A4.6), but in these models the interaction between 
financial decline and presence of children was no longer significant.
 Third, in our current measurement of individual and partner unemployment, 
homemakers and employed people were combined in the reference category for reasons 
of parsimony. Differentiating employed people from homemakers provided the same 
conclusions (see Appendix 4 Table A4.7). 
 Fourth, the reference category for the presence of children included both people 
without children and people with children who had left the household. Possibly, the 
absence of moderation by presence of children was caused by this ambiguity. Therefore, 
we distinguished two groups, people without children in the household (1) below age 
40 and (2) above age 40. This led to similar conclusions, but expected financial decline 
and presence of children was no longer significant (see Appendix 4 Table A4.8).
 Fifth, it was checked whether the measurement of the macro-economic circumstances 
influenced the associations between economic difficulties and satisfaction with family 
life. Alternatives that were tested (see Appendix 4 Table A4.9) included the moderating 
influence of (1) relative change in unemployment levels between 2008 and 2011, (2) the 
unemployment percentage in a country in 2011, (3) GDP per capita, (4) the average GDP 
growth between 2008 and 2011, and (5) the GDP growth in 2011. All models showed that 
the macro-economic circumstances did not (consistently) influence the effect between 
economic hardship and family life satisfaction.
 Overall our robustness checks suggested that the main findings were generally robust. 
The direct associations between financial and employment difficulties and satisfaction 
with family life were robust for all measurements and selections that were made, with two 
exceptions. First, unemployment of the partner was not negatively related to satisfaction 
in our negatively binomial analyses. Second, interactions between unemployment of the 
partner and future financial situation with the presence of children were not very robust. 
Therefore, these results should be interpreted with care.
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4.5  Conclusion and discussion
This study investigated how satisfaction with family life is influenced by various forms of 
economic hardship. More specifically, we studied whether people were less satisfied with 
their family life if they experience more economic hardship or expect more economic 
hardship in the near future. Additionally, we investigated if expecting economic hardship 
was especially harmful for people’s satisfaction when they currently experience more 
economic hardship. 
 Our main finding is that people who currently experienced and perceived economic 
hardship were less satisfied with their family life. This conclusion is in line with previous 
studies (e.g. Shim et al., 2017; Williams et al., 2015). While previous studies mostly focused on 
single countries, our research indicated that this negative association is generally applicable 
to a wide range of European countries; overall people who experienced financial hardship 
or were unemployed showed to be less satisfied with their family life. Our study also 
included individual and partner’s unemployment, since the employment of both partners 
is of importance for couples’ well-being (see also chapter 3). The unemployment of 
individuals and their partners demonstrated to have an additional negative effect on 
family satisfaction even when financial hardship was taken into account. This may be 
explained by a potential reduction of people’s social contacts, sense of purpose, and 
status when becoming unemployed (Paul & Moser, 2009). 
 This study is among the first to study both current and expected economic hardship 
and their consequences for people’s satisfaction with their family life. We showed that 
– aside from current economic hardship – people who expect a financial decline or job 
loss were less satisfied with their family life. Therefore, this research provides clues that 
people’s expectations about their future financial and employment situations are 
meaningful in understanding evaluations of family life. Insecurities about future finances 
or potential job loss, however, did not seem to amplify the negative consequences for 
families in current economic hardship. In sum, we conclude that people’s expectations of 
their financial and employment future shape people’s family life satisfaction over and 
above their current experiences.
 We further investigated whether economic difficulties were more harmful for family 
life when children lived in the household or when national unemployment rates had risen 
sharply during the recent European economic crises. Remarkably, this study showed that 
having children or living in a country with high unemployment risks did not condition the 
relationship between economic hardship and family life satisfaction. It must be noted that 
for having children some results supported the idea that hardship had more detrimental 
consequences for satisfaction in large families. These results however were not very consistent 
or robust. Possibly, we did not find economic difficulties affecting parents’ and non-parents’ 
satisfaction differently because conflicting mechanisms counterbalanced each other. 
On the one hand, parents have more financial responsibilities, which may strengthen the 
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importance of their economic situation when assessing their family life satisfaction. 
On the other hand, a household’s economic situation may be less important for parents’ 
satisfaction with family life, because their satisfaction with family life is primarily 
constructed around their parental status, in contrast to people without children. This may 
serve as a protective factor against the influence of economic problems on their family 
life. In sum, our study indicated that economic difficulties had a relatively universal effect 
on people’s satisfaction with family life, for associations were largely independent of 
family composition, macro-economic circumstances, and gender.
 This study is, to our knowledge, the first study to investigate the consequences of 
economic hardship on people’s satisfaction with family life across a wide range of 
countries. Additionally, our findings indicated that financial hardship affected people’s 
family life differently across European countries; in some countries financial problems 
affected the family more than in others. A country’s economic situation, however, did not 
appear to explain these cross-national differences. We encourage other researchers to 
investigate how other contextual circumstances affect how a person’s economic situation 
influence people’s family life, such as a family culture and the welfare state (Boss et al., 
2017). Although this study benefitted from using cross-national data, using such data 
comes with some drawbacks. The measurement of satisfaction with family life proved 
highly skewed and was measured with a single item. Future research therefore could 
benefit from using more comprehensive scales, such as the Satisfaction With Family Life 
scale (Zabriskie & Ward, 2013). Furthermore, macro-economic conditions were measured 
on the country-level. Possibly regional economic conditions, job sector-specific conditions, 
or the economic conditions of the extended social network would more strongly reflect 
people’s perception of their economic circumstances, which could influence how people 
perceive their personal economic hardship and its consequences. 
 Aside from the factors studied in this paper, other precarious labor market conditions 
may be important for the quality of family relationships. Future researcher could investigate 
the influence of other precarious labor market conditions such as underemployment 
and flexible contracts. In addition, we encourage future studies to investigate whether 
resources, for instance (social) support, may diminish the negative consequences of 
economic difficulties for families. Negative economic events potentially do not strike 
every family to the same degree. Some families are better able to handle negative 
economic events than others due to their resources, such as their social support system 
(Boss et al., 2017). 
 Finally, we encourage future research to investigate specific mechanisms for the 
relationship between expected economic circumstances and satisfaction with family life, 
as theorized by the family stress model (Conger et al., 2010). Other studies have investigated 
the proposed mechanisms with respect to current economic circumstances and found 
confirmation for these (e.g. Conger et al., 2002; Mistry et al., 2008; Williams et al., 2015). 
However, the specific mechanisms how expected economic problems affect family 
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relationships are relatively unknown. Relatedly, in this study we were unable to explore 
reverse causation since we used cross-sectional data. Although previous longitudinal 
studies had similar conclusions regarding current economic hardship and family 
functioning (e.g. Neppl et al., 2016; Shim et al., 2017), further longitudinal examination is 
needed on expected economic circumstances and family functioning.
 This study started by noting that people in Europe experienced more economic 
hardship as a result of recent economic crises in Europe (Eurofound, 2015). Our research 
showed that negative consequences of economic difficulties spill over to people’s family 
life. In addition, not only people who actually experience a decline of income or job loss 
seem affected by the economic crisis; also people who expect to face income or job loss 
in the near future feel less satisfied with their family life. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the negative consequences of economic crises for families are far more widespread 
than merely the individuals who lose income or employment.
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5.1  Introduction and research question
In current labor markets, many people feel insecure about whether their job will continue 
to exist (Balz, 2017). Subjective job insecurity almost doubled in just five years’ time, from 
18 percent in 2008 to 34 percent in 2013 in the Netherlands, the country under investigation 
(Statistics Netherlands, 2017). It dropped again after the financial crisis, but not to the 
pre-crisis level: 27 percent of Dutch employees still felt insecure about their job in 2015. 
Financial crises, but also more gradual developments of flexibilization and globalization 
are often held responsible for the increased levels of job insecurity (Balz, 2017; Lübke & 
Erlinghagen, 2014). Consequences of subjective job insecurity are not restricted to a 
person’s working life; they may spill over to the family life and harm the quality of family 
relationships (Mauno et al., 2017). Work experiences spill over to the family because the 
stress from work often does not end when leaving for home, but continues and is brought 
into the home and the partner relationship (Repetti & Wang, 2017). Therefore, men and 
women who feel more insecure about their job generally experience more tension with 
their partner (Hughes & Galinsky, 1994) and are less satisfied with their relationship (Cheng, 
Mauno, & Lee, 2014b; Mauno & Kinnunen, 1999). Partner relationship quality is a prime 
factor for personal and child well-being and provides a buffer for dealing with adversities 
(e.g. Amato & Sobolewski, 2001; Proulx et al., 2007). Studies like ours that bridge the work 
domain and family life domain are necessary to understand the wider impact of 
employment conditions. In this study, we investigate to what extent one’s individual job 
insecurity and the partner’s job insecurity affect the quality of the partner relationship.
 People feel insecure in their job due to a wide range of factors, varying from job 
 characteristics (e.g. contract type or expected lay-off), characteristics of the employer 
(e.g. organizational performance or reorganization), macro-economic conditions (e.g. 
unemployment or lack of employment protection policies) to personality (e.g. self-esteem) 
(Balz, 2017; Lübke & Erlinghagen, 2014; Muñoz de Bustillo & de Pedraza, 2010). These factors 
raise people’s concerns about their job continuation (known as cognitive job insecurity), 
which leads to emotional reactions towards this perceived threat such as anxiety (known 
as affective job insecurity) (Jiang & Lavaysse, 2018). Previous studies on spillover effects 
have convincingly shown that people in insecure employment generally report lower 
quality relationships with their partner (Cheng et al., 2014b; Hughes & Galinsky, 1994; 
Hughes et al., 1992; Larson et al., 1994; Mauno et al., 2017; Mauno & Kinnunen, 1999, see 
also Chapter 4). What is not well-known is whether job insecurity of the partner affects 
one’s personal perception of the relationship quality, a mechanism labelled crossover 
effects. Crossover effects are argued for because partners share a household implying 
that the job security of both partners provide financial well-being to the couple and 
protect the couple from financial hardship (Brülle, 2016). Recently, research showed that 
also partners’ temporary employment negatively affects individuals’ well-being (Inanc, 
2018). However, regarding relationship outcomes, only Mauno and Kinnunen (1999) 
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investigated whether the partner’s job insecurity makes people less satisfied with their 
partner relationship. They found no crossover effect of job insecurity, but their study 
unfortunately had to rely on cross-sectional data with a small sample size and sample 
selection (Mauno & Kinnunen, 1999). Thus, information on the influence of the crossover 
of job insecurity to the quality of the partner relationship is largely lacking. We try to fill this 
gap by this study.
 The spillover and crossover of job insecurity to the partner relationship may be 
different for women than for men. Even though women are increasingly more involved in 
the labor market, both men and women still regard employment as primarily men’s role, 
while women’s primary role is caring and mothering (Johnston & Swanson, 2006; Thijs et 
al., 2017; Townsend, 2002). These traditional gender roles are reflected in Dutch labor 
market behavior. In general, men continue to provide most of the household income 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2017), and although women are relatively often employed, they often 
work part-time, whereas men are mostly full-time employed (European Commission, 
2016). Since families more often rely on men’s than on women’s income and attach more 
value to men’s employment, men’s job insecurity may be more detrimental for couple 
relationships. Research on this issue is rare and inconsistent (Mauno et al., 2017). However, 
recent related work shows that partners’ temporary employment has mostly similar 
influence on men’s and women’s well-being, as long as women do not have more stable 
employment than the male partner (Inanc, 2018). In order to increase our knowledge on 
this unresolved issue, we will study whether satisfaction with the partner relationship is 
differently affected by job insecurity of the male and female partner.
 We also study differential effects by level of education. Education is a crucial stratifying 
social category in contemporary societies. It has been shown that job insecurity is more 
likely among the lower educated than the higher educated (Lübke & Erlinghagen, 2014; 
Muñoz de Bustillo & de Pedraza, 2010). If job insecurity is also more detrimental to the 
relationship quality of people with a lower education, that group would be doubly hit by 
job insecurity. It may be likely that job insecurity raises stronger negative affect among 
lower educated, as they are generally less likely to be reemployed and hence may perceive 
job loss as more strongly related to an outlook of long-term insecurity and unemployment 
(Berglund & Wallinder, 2015; Wolbers, 2000). Additionally, people with a lower education 
possess fewer financial resources, which gives them fewer possibilities to handle financial 
consequences of job loss (Eurofound, 2017). Because of these reasons there may be 
socioeconomic inequality in the transmission of job insecurity to the partner relationship. 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous research has investigated this educational 
gradient in the effects of job insecurities on the partner relationship.
 The Netherlands provides an interesting case to study the consequences of job 
insecurity for couples. Similar to many other Europeans, many Dutch employees feel 
insecure in whether their job will continue to exist (Balz, 2017). The Netherlands has a high 
share of employees with temporary contracts compared to other European countries 
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(Eichhorst, Marx, & Wehner, 2017, see also Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1), and temporary 
employment is an important, though not the single, reason for job insecurity. Employees 
with temporary contracts typically enjoy lower levels of employment protection than 
their counterparts with a permanent contract. Many comparable European countries face 
such segmented labor markets (Eichhorst et al., 2017). By studying one of the European 
countries with a relative high share of employees with temporary contracts and high 
number of employees feeling insecure regarding their job continuation, our findings may 
be applicable to countries facing similar circumstances.
 We build upon previous research in several ways. First, by studying both the spillover 
and crossover of job insecurity on one’s relationship satisfaction. Second, by investigating 
whether the spillover and crossover effects are different for men and women. Third, by 
investigating whether the spillover and crossover effects are different for higher and lower 
educated people. Fourth, by using a dyadic longitudinal panel model in which we 
investigate differences between individuals (random effects) as well as changes over time 
within individuals (fixed effects). Examination of within-individual change may be 
interpreted as a stricter test of our expectations, and has to our knowledge not been done 
by previous studies. In this study, we pose the following research question: To what extent 
are people less satisfied with their partner relationship when they and/or their partner have less 
secure jobs, and to what extent does this influence differ by gender and a person’s educational 
attainment? These questions will be answered using dyadic longitudinal data from the 
Dutch Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences (LISS) panel, comprising of 
13,486 observations of 4,185 individuals in 2,114 couples.
5.2  Theoretical framework and hypotheses
Several theoretical notions guide our expectations. Our main hypotheses about the 
impact of job insecurity on the partner relationship are primarily based on the spill-
over-crossover model (Bakker & Demerouti, 2013). Whether job insecurity of the male or 
the female partner has the largest impact is derived from ideas of gender role attitudes 
and relative income perspectives (Johnston & Swanson, 2006; Townsend, 2002), and 
whether job insecurity is more influential for people with lower versus higher education is 
investigated from a financial resource and employability perspective (Green, 2011; Silla, de 
Cuyper, Gracia, Peiró, & De Witte, 2009). Figure 5.1 depicts our conceptual theoretical 
model.
5.2.1  Spillover-crossover model 
The spillover-crossover model posits that work experiences spill over to the home domain 
(Bakker & Demerouti, 2013). Especially high (emotional) demands at work deplete people’s 
resources such as energy and emotional resources (Bakker & Demerouti, 2013). This lack of 
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resources may make that people feel more exhausted, and induce concentration and 
psychosomatic problems (Bakker & Demerouti, 2013). Therefore, depletion of resources 
leads to problems combining work and family life, to less psychological availability and 
support, and to more irritability (Danner-Vlaardingerbroek et al., 2013; Repetti & Wang, 
2017). Similarly, when people are uncertain about their future economic situation and 
foresee economic pressure, they may become more distressed and anxious (Cheng, 
Mauno, & Lee, 2014a; Mantler et al., 2005). People’s perceptions of job insecurity lead to 
emotional responses such as anxiety (Jiang & Lavaysse, 2018). Previous studies have shown 
that people who are insecure in their job have less energy and vigor, are less supportive of 
their partner, and are more negative in general (Cheng et al., 2014a; Jiang & Lavaysse, 2018; 
Larson et al., 1994; Mantler et al., 2005; Mauno & Kinnunen, 1999). These negative emotional 
states from the work sphere likely spillover to the family domain (known as spillover or 
intra-individual cross-domain transmission), and hence influence people’s evaluation of 
the quality of the partner relationship (Cheng et al., 2014b; Mauno et al., 2017). Thus, we 
hypothesize: (Hypothesis 1) The more insecure people feel about their job, the less satisfied 
they are with their partner relationship.
 The transmission of emotional states between the work and family sphere is not 
limited to individual transmission; one is also influenced by the experiences of one’s 
partner (known as crossover or inter-individual cross-domain transmission). First, as noted 
before, job insecurity diminishes people’s energy, vigor, and psychologically availability 
(Cheng et al., 2014a, 2014b; Danner-Vlaardingerbroek et al., 2013; Jiang & Lavaysse, 2018; 
Larson et al., 1994). If this happens to the partner, it likely has negative consequences for 
the relationship quality as assessed by the respondent due to lower-quality communication 
and lack of emotional availability of the partner. Second, a partner’s job conditions may 
influence one’s emotional state through empathic processes: The respondent feels distressed 
because the partner feels distressed (Bakker & Demerouti, 2013). Note that a negative 
spillover from job insecurity to a partner’s satisfaction with the relationship, may also 
directly affect the relationship satisfaction of a respondent via that lower relationship 
satisfaction of the partner; one may become less satisfied with the partner relationship if 
the partner is also negative about it. We hypothesize that spillover and crossover of job 
insecurity on relationship satisfaction would occur when comparing different individuals 
as well as when assessing over-time change within individuals, resulting in our hypothesis: 
(Hypothesis 2) The more insecure a partner feels about his or her job, the less satisfied people 
are with the partner relationship.
5.2.2  Gender differences: gender role attitudes and income contribution
The spillover and crossover of job insecurity to the partner relationship may differ between 
men and women, due to persisting traditional gender role attitudes and men’s higher 
relative contribution to household finances. Employment and the provider role have 
traditionally been strongly associated with men, whereas women were responsible for 
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care and domestic work (Johnston & Swanson, 2006; Townsend, 2002). This has led people 
to generally believe that men need to be able to financially provide for the family in order 
to be considered a good partner (Parker & Stepler, 2017) and that being a financial provider 
is important for men’s identity and status (Townsend, 2002). These factors may influence 
how job insecurity affects the quality of the partner relationship. Indeed, De Witte (1999) 
showed that job insecurity led to lower mental well-being among men, but not among 
women (although not found by Cheng & Chan, 2008). This result suggests gendered 
spillover from job insecurity (albeit for mental well-being rather than relationship quality). 
There may also be gendered crossover of job insecurity; women may be disappointed in 
their male partner’s inability to contribute to the household or inability to provide a secure 
income. Additionally, women may also become less satisfied with the relationship when 
job-insecure men are relatively more distressed. In contrast, women’s job insecurity affects 
their well-being to a lesser extent (De Witte, 1999) and does not violate the male breadwinner 
ideal, possibly making her job insecurity less consequential for men’s and women’s relationship 
satisfaction.
 Besides a cultural element, a financial element predicts a gendered response to job 
insecurity (albeit stemming in cultural aspects as well). Men continue to be employed 
more often than women in the Netherlands and for more hours (European Commission, 
2016). In combination with other factors, men continue to contribute most to the household 
income in many Dutch couples (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2017). Therefore, in general the job 
of the male partner is more important for the financial position of the household than 
the job of the female partner. As a consequence, the potential loss of men’s job may be 
perceived as more stressful than women’s job insecurity. Because of these two reasons, 
we hypothesize: (Hypothesis 3a) Individual job insecurity is more harmful for men’s relationship 
satisfaction than women’s. (Hypothesis 3b) Partner’s job insecurity is more harmful for women’s 
relationship satisfaction than men’s.
5.2.3  Educational differences: employability and resources
Education is an important social stratifier, as higher educated people typically have, 
among others, better employment positions, incomes, social resources and health. 
We argue that these advantages bring the higher educated better buffers that protect 
them from the negative consequences of job insecurity compared to the lower educated. 
The same level of objective job insecurity likely translates in less stress among high- 
educated people compared to low-educated people. Otherwise stated, the transmission 
of cognitive job insecurity may lead less strongly to affective job insecurity among the 
high-educated as opposed to low-educated people and hence to weaker repercussions 
for their relationship quality. More specifically, job insecurity is perceived as more stressful 
for lower educated people because they generally perceive themselves as less employable, 
and hence as having lower reemployment chances, than higher educated (Berglund & 
Wallinder, 2015). This perception is realistic since people with a lower education indeed 
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have a higher chance to become unemployed and their prospects to be reemployed are 
smaller compared to the higher educated (Wolbers, 2000). People who are more 
employable are found to be less influenced by job insecurity in their well-being (Green, 
2011; Silla et al., 2009). In parallel, we expect that the higher educated will be less negatively 
influenced by job insecurity in their partner relationship.
 Aside from perceived reemployment chances, actual financial resources likely affect 
how people react on job insecurity. People with a lower education generally experience 
more difficulties making ends meet and have fewer savings (Eurofound, 2017), leaving 
them more vulnerable to income shocks. Adjusting the household expenditure after a 
loss of income may therefore be especially problematic for lower educated couples. 
Financial problems may lead to lower quality relationships due to stress, hostility, and 
emotional withdrawal (Conger et al., 2010), and the prospect of economic hardship likely 
leads to similar reactions (Mantler et al., 2005). So, because the lower educated are 
more financially vulnerable to job loss, expecting job loss may be especially detrimental 
for relationship quality of the lower educated. In sum, we hypothesize: (Hypothesis 4) 
(a) Individual and (b) partner’s job insecurity is more harmful for relationship satisfaction of the 
lower educated than the higher educated.
5.3  Data and method
5.3.1  Data
To answer our questions we used the Dutch Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social 
sciences (LISS) panel (Scherpenzeel, 2009, see also www.lissdata.nl) which started in late 
2007. This online panel was based on a probability sample of households drawn for the 
Dutch population register and consisted of approximately 7,000 individuals in 4,500 
household. Households were provided with a computer and Internet if they did not 
possess it and members received financial compensation for participation. Panel attrition 
was higher among younger and lower educated individuals (Lugtig, 2014), but the panel 
Figure 5.1  Conceptual theoretical model
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remained largely representative12. The survey consisted of rotating modules: each month 
panel members completed a different module, with core modules appearing about once 
a year. We used the Family and Household module and the Work and Schooling module, 
which were conducted every year from 2008 to 2015 (waves 1 to 8). 
 We selected people with a cohabiting different-sex partner, who were of working 
age (25 to 60), who were either employed, unemployed or unable to work due to health 
or illness, or were a homemaker. Furthermore, we selected people whose partner fitted 
the same criteria. We included both people with and without employment to not limit our 
study, and our conclusions, to dual-earner couples; 69.1 percent of the couples in our data 
were dual-earner couples, 28.4 percent were single-earner couples, and in 2.5 percent of 
the couples both partners were not employed. Some respondents separated from their 
partner during the panel’s timeframe and had a new partner in a later wave. To ensure that 
changes over time were due to changes in job insecurity and not to having another 
partner, we dropped observations with the second relationship from our sample, resulting 
in a loss of 60 observations in total. Lastly, we selected people who had no missing value 
on our dependent variable, relationship satisfaction, leading to another loss of 210 
observations. Our final sample consisted of 13,486 observations (6,753 male; 6,733 female) 
of 4,185 people (2,091 men; 2,094 women) in 2,114 relationships, and an average of 3.2 
observation per person. Due to non-response on the dependent variable, the number of 
people in our sample was not exactly twice the number of couples, and the number of 
men was not exactly equal to the number of women. We used multiple imputation 
techniques to deal with missing values of independent variables, because listwise deletion 
would strongly reduce the sample size: 15.3 percent of the observations had one or more 
missing values. We applied truncated, logistic, and ordered logistic multiple imputation 
methods (5 datasets) using gender, contract type, gender role attitudes, share of 
household income, and all other variables in our model in a long format where we 
imputed missing values, but not whole-wave missing data (see also Young & Johnson, 
2015). In total, 1.8 percent of the values were imputed. Table 5.1 shows descriptive 
information on all variables and the number of imputed values per variable.
5.3.2  Measurements
Relationship satisfaction was measured as ‘how satisfied are you with your current 
relationship?’ The answer categories ranged from zero (‘entirely dissatisfied’) to ten 
(‘entirely satisfied’). Questions about satisfaction are more stable and have a specific 
object (here the partner relationship) and are less transient and diffuse than moods (for 
instance happiness with the relationship) (Ilies et al., 2009), and are widely used to 
investigate the quality of the partner relationship (e.g. Hardie et al., 2014). The correlation 
between the partner’s relationship satisfaction is 0.496. Similar to many well-being 
12 see https://www.lissdata.nl/about-panel/composition-and-response.
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measurements (Inanc, 2018), the scale was skewed with means of 8.3 (men) and 8.2 
(women). Note that we may fail to observe some dissatisfied individuals, if relationship 
dissatisfaction is related to a depressed mood, which reduces the willingness to participate 
in surveys. We considered this question to be linear as do many studies (e.g. Hardie et al., 
2014). Alternatively, other transformations and analyses may be considered such as 
dichotomizing and ordered logistic regressions, but these have many drawbacks (e.g. 
Table 5.1  Descriptive statistics of individual, partner, and relationship characteristics
 Men Women
(N = 6,753) (N = 6,733)
Nr. of values 
Imputed
Range Mean/% SD Mean/% SD
Relationship satisfaction 0 0-10 8.31 1.34 8.23 1.37
Individual’s job position 1196
   Job is secure 0-1 18.13 14.71
   Job is bit secure 0-1 48.09 35.99
   Job is insecure 0-1 27.24 22.51
   Unemployed or unable to work 0-1 6.55 7.09
   Homemaker 0-1 na 19.71
Partner’s job position 1191
   Job is secure 0-1 14.62 18.20
   Job is bit secure 0-1 35.97 47.96
   Job is insecure 0-1 22.61 27.22
   Unemployed or unable to work 0-1 7.06 6.62
   Homemaker 0-1 19.74 na
Individual’s education (years) 0 4-16.5 11.28 3.10 10.92 2.97
Partner’s education (years) 0 4-16.5 10.93 2.97 11.26 3.10
Age 0 25-60 45.29 8.98 43.20 9.11
Relationship duration 16 0-42 18.61 10.27 18.60 10.24
Marital Status 0
   Cohabiting 0-1 18.66 18.31
   Married 0-1 81.34 81.69
Division of household labor 3
   Equal or man does more 0-1 37.04 25.95
   Wife does more 0-1 62.96 74.05
Number of children 0
   None 0-1 33.23 33.11
   1 or 2 children 0-1 53.47 54.02
   3 or more children   0-1 13.30  12.88  
Source. LISS panel 2008-2015, 6,753 observations of 2,091 men, 6,733 observations of 2,094 women. Statistics are 
before mean centering. na = not applicable
121
Couples’ job insecurity and relationship satisfaction in the Netherlands
having a random cut-off point) (Inanc, 2018). In robustness tests, we (1) transformed 
relationship satisfaction to the second degree and (2) applied ordered logistic regression 
to deal with this skewedness (see robustness analyses section). This exercise led to largely 
similar conclusions.
 People’s job insecurity was derived from two questions, combining information on 
employment situation and – if employed – on job insecurity. The first question was what 
the main daily activity of a person was, and we distinguished three groups: employed, 
unemployed or unable to work due to illness, and homemakers. People who were 
employed were further divided by the level of job insecurity based on their answer to the 
question ‘It is uncertain whether my job will continue to exist’, for which the answer 
categories ranged from one (‘disagree entirely’) to four (‘agree entirely’). This measurement 
referred to cognitive job insecurity; the affective aspects of job insecurity were therefore 
only theoretically assumed. The two categories with the most job insecurity were 
combined because of limited number of cases in the group with highest job insecurity. 
This resulted in a variable job insecurity with five categories: (1) employed, job is secure, (2) 
employed, job is bit secure, (3) employed, job is insecure, (4) unemployed or unable to 
work, (5) homemaker. For men, we combined the categories homemaker and unemployed 
or unable to work because of the limited number of male homemakers.
 Individual and partner’s educational attainment were measured using the numbers of 
years needed for an educational degree in the Dutch educational system13. Use of a single 
linear variable was advantageous for reasons of parsimony for our interaction-coefficients. 
We used the highest obtained education during the study period, therefore this variable 
is not time-varying. 
 We controlled for several individual, partner, and relationship variables. The quality of 
the partner relationship is primarily influenced by factors in the private sphere, such as the 
presence of children, relationship duration, and marital status, but also by the division of 
employment and household labor between partners (Fincham & Beach, 2010). We controlled 
for an individual’s age, the division of household labor between partners (about equal 
versus the woman does more)14, whether the couple was married or cohabited, the duration 
of the relationship (also squared), and the number of children living in the household under 
25 years of age (none, one or two, or three or more). These factors are important predictors 
13  Not finished primary education is 4 years, finished primary education is 6 years, intermediate secondary 
education (VMBO) is 7.25 years, intermediate vocational education (MBO) is 10.5 years, higher secondary 
education/preparatory university education (HAVO/VWO) is 11 years, higher vocational education (HBO) is 
14 years, university is 16.5 years.
14  Asked with the question “How is the household work divided between you and your partner?” for four 
aspects of household labor: preparing food, laundry and ironing, house cleaning, and grocery shopping. 
The answer categories ranged from 1 (I do a lot more than my partner) to 5 (my partner does a lot more 
than I) . The question proved to make a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha .857) but was non-linearly related to 
relationship satisfaction for women. Therefore we included it as a dummy whether the division was about 
equal or the man did more, versus if the woman did more.
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of relationship satisfaction, and possibly of job insecurity. The linear independent variables 
were mean-centered.
5.3.3  Analytical strategy
We used random and fixed effects models in Stata with the xtreg command to test our 
hypotheses, using robust standard errors. We tested random effects models to investigate 
between-person variation, whereas fixed effects models were included to investigate 
within-person variation. Put differently, random effects models estimated whether people 
with job insecurity suffer from lower relationship quality than people without job insecurity; 
fixed effects models estimated whether a change from no job insecurity to insecurity is 
related to a change in relationship quality for that same individual. The advantage of 
fixed effects models is that they do not suffer from unobserved heterogeneity of stable 
characteristics, which strengthens causality claims. However, a disadvantage of fixed 
effects models compared to random effects models is the reduction of statistical power 
because changes within individuals are typically less common than differences between 
persons, possibly leading to falsely reject the hypotheses. Our analyses were run separately 
for men and women. We formally tested gender differences in the coefficients of interest 
on a pooled sample with interactions between gender and all variables. All significant 
differences (p<0.1) between men and women are indicated by bold coefficients in Tables 5.2 
and 5.3. Because job insecurity often accumulates within couples (De Lange, Wolbers, & 
Ultee, 2013; Grotti & Scherer, 2014), we simultaneously included the job insecurity of the 
respondent and their partner. 
 In Table 5.2 (for men) and 5.3 (for women), we studied the effects of individual’s and 
partner’s job insecurity on their relationship satisfaction in random (Models 1a to 3a) and 
fixed effects models (Models 1b to 3b). Models 1 included the main effects of individual’s 
and partner’s job insecurity next to the control variables. In Models 2 we investigated 
whether the spillover effect of individual’s job insecurity on relationship satisfaction 
differed by educational level of the respondent, and in Models 3 we studied whether the 
crossover effect of partner’s job insecurity on relationship satisfaction differed by 
educational level of the partner. 
5.4  Results
5.4.1  Relationship satisfaction and job insecurity
Model 1a in Table 5.2 shows our results on job insecurity and men’s relationship satisfaction 
in the random effects model. These analyses showed that men were less satisfied with 
their relationship when they experienced job insecurity, but not when their partners felt 
insecure in their jobs, suggesting the presence of spillover and the absence of crossover 
effects. Compared to men who felt secure, men who were just a bit secure or who felt 
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insecure in their job, were significantly less satisfied with their partner relationship (b = 
-0.148 and b = -0.251 respectively). These effect sizes may seem relatively small, but the 
standard deviation of relationship satisfaction is relatively small as well. The sizes of the 
coefficients were about 11 (job is a bit secure) and 18 (job is insecure) percent of the 
standard deviation of relationship satisfaction. Men were also less satisfied when they 
were unemployed or unable to work (b = -0.222) compared to men who felt secure in 
their job. Partner’s job insecurity did not affect men’s relationship satisfaction. However, 
partner’s unemployment or inability to work was associated with lower levels of 
relationship satisfaction among men (b = -0.165). These results were similar in the relatively 
strict fixed effects model (Model 1b), which examined within individuals whether changes 
in job insecurity coincided with changes in relationship quality. Men who became less 
secure about their job continuation, became less satisfied with their relationship 
(b = -0.086 and -0.148). Men did not experience a decline in relationship satisfaction when 
they or their partners became unemployed or unable to work,.
 Women appeared sensitive to their own as well as their partner’s job insecurity 
when assessing their relationship satisfaction, providing evidence for spillover as well as 
crossover effects. In Table 5.3, our results from the random effects model (Model 1a) 
showed that women were less satisfied when they were a bit secure (b = -0.080) or 
insecure (b = -0.134) in their job compared to women who felt secure (which is about 6 
and 10 percent of the standard deviation of relationship satisfaction). Women who were 
unemployed or unable to work were less satisfied with their relationship than women in 
secure job positions (b = -0.179) and female homemakers were similarly satisfied to women 
with secure jobs. In contrast to men, women appeared to be affected by their partners’ 
job insecurity; women whose partner felt a bit secure (b = -0.082) or insecure (b = -0.164) 
rather than secure in his job were less satisfied with their relationship (6 and 12 percent of 
the standard deviation of relationship satisfaction). In assessing relationship quality, 
insecurity about husbands’ job seems about equally important as insecurity about 
women’s own job. Women were also less satisfied with the relationship if their male 
partner was unable to work or unemployed, compared to women whose partner had a 
secure job (b = -0.459). When we tested within-person variation in the relatively strict fixed 
effects model for women (Model 1b), evidence for the spillover effect weakened, whereas 
evidence for the crossover effect remained. Changes in women’s job insecurity were not 
significantly related to changes in women’s relationship satisfaction. However, similarly to 
our findings in the random effects model, women became less satisfied with their 
relationship when their husbands became insecure in their job (b = -0.111). A relatively 
slight reduction in male job security (from secure to a bit secure) was not associated with 
a change in relationship satisfaction. Lastly, women whose partner became unemployed 
or unable to work experienced a decline in relationship satisfaction (b = -0.291).
 We also tested whether the coefficients discussed above differed between men and 
women (p<0.1). Gender differences in the influence of job insecurity on relationship 
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satisfaction where not significant; although some associations between job insecurity 
and relationship satisfaction were significant for men but not for women and vice versa, 
the gender difference were mostly not significant. The only significant difference we 
found was that the partner’s unemployment or inability to work was more negatively 
related to lower relationship satisfaction among women than men (Model 1a and 1b).
 Overall, we found confirmation for negative spillover of job insecurity on people’s 
relationship satisfaction, when we compared individuals with different degrees of job 
insecurity (random effects models). When we tested our hypothesis by looking at changes 
within individuals (fixed effects models), we observed that men who became insecure in 
their employment became less satisfied with their relationship, but women did not. 
Hence, Hypothesis 1 about spillover effects was supported for men, and only partly 
supported for women. In our second hypothesis, we expected that the partner’s job 
insecurity would affect relationship satisfaction as well. For men, this was not the case. 
For women however, the crossover effect of job insecurity existed; when men were more 
insecure, women were less satisfied with their partner relationship. Therefore, we found 
confirmation for Hypothesis 2 regarding crossover effects for women, but not for men. 
We assumed gender differences in the spillover and crossover of job insecurity in 
Hypothesis 3. Although we found some indication that individual’s job insecurity was 
more negatively related to men’s satisfaction, and the partner’s job insecurity was more 
negative for women’s relationship satisfaction, the null-hypothesis (no gender difference) 
cannot be rejected.
 We also briefly discuss the associations between the control variables and relationship 
satisfaction in the random effects models (Model 1a in Table 5.2 and 5.3). People who 
cohabited, who were older, or had (young) children, were less satisfied with their relationship. 
Relationship duration had a curvilinear association with relationship satisfaction and women 
who did the majority of the household labor were less satisfied with the relationship. 
People who were higher educated were less satisfied with the relationship and men were 
less satisfied when their partner was higher educated, whereas women were more 
satisfied when their partner was higher educated.
 Models 2a and 2b in Table 5.2 (for men) and Table 5.3 (for women) showed whether 
one’s individual job insecurity was differently associated with relationship satisfaction for 
people with different levels of educational attainment. Among men, the results showed that 
the higher men were educated, the less men were negatively affected by their job insecurity, 
supporting the idea of buffering aspects that come with educational attainment. Having an 
insecure job was more negatively associated with relationship satisfaction among lower 
educated men than among the higher educated men (both in Model 2a with random 
effects and in Model 2b with fixed effects). Feeling that the job was a bit secure rather than 
secure was also (marginally) more detrimental for lower educated men’s relationship 
satisfaction than for higher educated men in Model 2b, but not in Model 2a. A graphical 
presentation of the interaction effects is provided in Figure 5.2. For reasons of presentation, 
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the association between job insecurity and relationship satisfaction was depicted for men 
with the lowest and highest level of education in our sample. Higher and lower educated 
women were similarly affected by their personal job insecurity: almost none of the interac-
tion-coefficients were significant (Model 2a and Model 2b). The exception was that change 
from being secure to a bit secure about one’s job reduced the relationship quality (marginally) 
less strongly for higher educated women than for lower educated women (Model 2b). 
Figure 5.3 shows this results in a graphical fashion.
 Model 3a and 3b in Table 5.2 and 5.3 show that the partner’s job insecurity was 
similarly influential on one’s relationship satisfaction irrespective of the partner’s educational 
level: none of the interaction coefficients were significant.
 In sum, we found confirmation for Hypothesis 3a for men, but not for women; the 
negative spillover from men’s job insecurity to their relationship was stronger for lower 
educated men. We did not find confirmation for Hypothesis 3b where we expected that 
the negative crossover from the partner’s job insecurity to one’s relationship satisfaction 
was more apparent when the partner was lower educated.
5.4.2  Robustness analyses
The dependent variable was highly skewed and therefore, as mentioned before, other transfor-
mations and analyses may be considered. Here we (1) squared relationship satisfaction and (2) 
applied ordered logistic regression to deal with this skewedness (see Appendix 5 Tables A5.1, 
A5.2, and A5.3). These analyses led to similar conclusions, although some interaction- coefficients 
were no longer significant. The interaction between women’s job insecurity and educational 
level for women’s relationship satisfaction was not robust, as was the interaction between 
men feeling a bit secure, their educational level, and men’s relationship satisfaction.
 Furthermore, how people react towards job insecurity may depend on whether they 
are in a single- or dual-earner couple. The partner’s employment may provide a buffer 
against poverty in case of job loss (Brülle, 2016; Oppenheimer, 1997), hence the spillover 
and crossover of job insecurity could be especially stressful when a couple was dependent 
on a single income. However, additional analyses (see Appendix 5 Table A5.4), suggested 
that the spillover of job insecurity to one’s relationship satisfaction was rather similar for 
dual-earner and single-earner couples. One exception was that the negative crossover of 
men’s job insecurity to women’s relationship satisfaction seemed more salient for women in 
male single-earner households than for women in dual-earner households, but strong 
conclusions should be avoided because of the limited sample size in these analyses.
 Additionally, partners are often similar in terms of job insecurity (De Lange et al., 2013; 
Grotti & Scherer, 2014)15. This accumulation of job insecurity could affect couples in 
different ways. On the one hand, the combined risk of job insecurity may be especially 
15  In our data job insecurity also seems to accumulates within couples; Chi2 = 188.26 in the male sample and 
213.34 in the female sample.
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Table 5.2   Men’s relationship satisfaction and individual’s and partner’s job insecurity,  
random (differences between people) and fixed (changes within people over time)  
effects models
Men Random effect models Fixed effect models
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE
Individual’s job insecurity ( ref.=job is secure)
   Job is bit secure -0.146 *** 0.043 -0.154 *** 0.044 -0.146 *** 0.043 -0.086 # 0.046 -0.096 * 0.048 -0.085 # 0.046
   Job is insecure -0.246 *** 0.051 -0.256 *** 0.053 -0.246 *** 0.051 -0.148 ** 0.054 -0.160 ** 0.055 -0.148 ** 0.054
   Unemployed or unable to work -0.222 ** 0.080 -0.224 ** 0.080 -0.224 ** 0.081 -0.036 0.093 -0.037 0.094 -0.032 0.094
Partner’s job insecurity (ref.=job is secure)
   Job is bit secure -0.015 0.039 -0.014 0.039 -0.016 0.039 0.018 0.043 0.019 0.043 0.018 0.043
   Job is insecure -0.081 0.050 -0.080 0.050 -0.083 0.051 -0.021 0.054 -0.020 0.054 -0.020 0.055
   Unemployed or unable to work -0.165 * 0.080 -0.163 * 0.080 -0.167 * 0.080 -0.010 0.095 -0.006 0.095 0.008 0.095
   Homemaker -0.057 0.062 -0.056 0.062 -0.063 0.065 -0.132 0.083 -0.133 0.083 -0.128 0.083
Individual’s education -0.016 # 0.010 -0.032 * 0.012 -0.016 # 0.010
Partner’s education -0.030 ** 0.010 -0.030 ** 0.010 -0.036 * 0.015
Age -0.020 *** 0.005 -0.020 *** 0.005 -0.020 *** 0.005 -0.086 ** 0.030 -0.089 ** 0.031 -0.087 ** 0.030
Relationship duration -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 0.022 0.031 0.024 0.031 0.022 0.031
Relationship duration squared 0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 # 0.000 0.001 # 0.000 0.001 # 0.000
Married (ref.=cohabitation) 0.321 *** 0.064 0.323 *** 0.064 0.321 *** 0.064 0.107 0.122 0.108 0.123 0.110 0.121
Household labor (ref.=equal or men does more) 
   Wife does more 0.059 0.040 0.058 0.040 0.059 0.040 0.064 0.047 0.061 0.047 0.065 0.047
Number of children (ref.=none)
   1 or 2 children -0.085 # 0.050 -0.087 # 0.050 -0.086 # 0.050 -0.039 0.068 -0.041 0.068 -0.040 0.068
   3 or more children -0.178 * 0.078 -0.183 * 0.078 -0.180 * 0.078 -0.224 * 0.107 -0.231 * 0.107 -0.220 * 0.107
Interactions
Individual’s job insecurity * Own educ.
   Job is bit secure * Education 0.012 0.011 0.021 # 0.013
   Job is insecure * Education 0.032 * 0.014 0.040 * 0.016
   Unempl. or unable to work * Educ. 0.026 0.024 0.041 0.030
Partner’s job insecurity * Partner’s educ.
   Job is bit secure * Education 0.006 0.014 0.019 0.015
   Job is insecure * Education 0.014 0.018 0.018 0.021
   Unempl. or unable to work * Educ. 0.004 0.031 0.061 0.037
   Homemaker * Education 0.001 0.021 0.029 0.032
Constant 8.210 *** 0.091 8.218 *** 0.091 8.211 *** 0.091 8.351 *** 0.145 8.363 *** 0.146 8.351 *** 0.144
Sigma u 1.060 1.061 1.056 1.377 1.390 1.391
Sigma e 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.844
Source. LISS panel 2008-2015, 6,753 observations of 2,091 men. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
Bold is significant (p<0.1) difference between men and women
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Table 5.2   Men’s relationship satisfaction and individual’s and partner’s job insecurity,  
random (differences between people) and fixed (changes within people over time)  
effects models
Men Random effect models Fixed effect models
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE
Individual’s job insecurity ( ref.=job is secure)
   Job is bit secure -0.146 *** 0.043 -0.154 *** 0.044 -0.146 *** 0.043 -0.086 # 0.046 -0.096 * 0.048 -0.085 # 0.046
   Job is insecure -0.246 *** 0.051 -0.256 *** 0.053 -0.246 *** 0.051 -0.148 ** 0.054 -0.160 ** 0.055 -0.148 ** 0.054
   Unemployed or unable to work -0.222 ** 0.080 -0.224 ** 0.080 -0.224 ** 0.081 -0.036 0.093 -0.037 0.094 -0.032 0.094
Partner’s job insecurity (ref.=job is secure)
   Job is bit secure -0.015 0.039 -0.014 0.039 -0.016 0.039 0.018 0.043 0.019 0.043 0.018 0.043
   Job is insecure -0.081 0.050 -0.080 0.050 -0.083 0.051 -0.021 0.054 -0.020 0.054 -0.020 0.055
   Unemployed or unable to work -0.165 * 0.080 -0.163 * 0.080 -0.167 * 0.080 -0.010 0.095 -0.006 0.095 0.008 0.095
   Homemaker -0.057 0.062 -0.056 0.062 -0.063 0.065 -0.132 0.083 -0.133 0.083 -0.128 0.083
Individual’s education -0.016 # 0.010 -0.032 * 0.012 -0.016 # 0.010
Partner’s education -0.030 ** 0.010 -0.030 ** 0.010 -0.036 * 0.015
Age -0.020 *** 0.005 -0.020 *** 0.005 -0.020 *** 0.005 -0.086 ** 0.030 -0.089 ** 0.031 -0.087 ** 0.030
Relationship duration -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 0.022 0.031 0.024 0.031 0.022 0.031
Relationship duration squared 0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 # 0.000 0.001 # 0.000 0.001 # 0.000
Married (ref.=cohabitation) 0.321 *** 0.064 0.323 *** 0.064 0.321 *** 0.064 0.107 0.122 0.108 0.123 0.110 0.121
Household labor (ref.=equal or men does more) 
   Wife does more 0.059 0.040 0.058 0.040 0.059 0.040 0.064 0.047 0.061 0.047 0.065 0.047
Number of children (ref.=none)
   1 or 2 children -0.085 # 0.050 -0.087 # 0.050 -0.086 # 0.050 -0.039 0.068 -0.041 0.068 -0.040 0.068
   3 or more children -0.178 * 0.078 -0.183 * 0.078 -0.180 * 0.078 -0.224 * 0.107 -0.231 * 0.107 -0.220 * 0.107
Interactions
Individual’s job insecurity * Own educ.
   Job is bit secure * Education 0.012 0.011 0.021 # 0.013
   Job is insecure * Education 0.032 * 0.014 0.040 * 0.016
   Unempl. or unable to work * Educ. 0.026 0.024 0.041 0.030
Partner’s job insecurity * Partner’s educ.
   Job is bit secure * Education 0.006 0.014 0.019 0.015
   Job is insecure * Education 0.014 0.018 0.018 0.021
   Unempl. or unable to work * Educ. 0.004 0.031 0.061 0.037
   Homemaker * Education 0.001 0.021 0.029 0.032
Constant 8.210 *** 0.091 8.218 *** 0.091 8.211 *** 0.091 8.351 *** 0.145 8.363 *** 0.146 8.351 *** 0.144
Sigma u 1.060 1.061 1.056 1.377 1.390 1.391
Sigma e 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.844
Source. LISS panel 2008-2015, 6,753 observations of 2,091 men. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
Bold is significant (p<0.1) difference between men and women
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Table 5.3   Women’s relationship satisfaction and individual’s and partner’s job position,  
random (differences between people) and fixed (changes within people over time)  
effects models
Women Random effect models Fixed effect models
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE
Individual’s job insecurity (ref.=secure)
   Job is bit secure -0.080 * 0.041 -0.084 * 0.041 -0.079 # 0.041 -0.021  0.044 -0.025  0.044 -0.020  0.044
   Job is insecure -0.134 * 0.056 -0.138 * 0.056 -0.134 * 0.056 -0.035  0.059 -0.039  0.059 -0.035  0.059
   Unemployed or unable to work -0.179 * 0.085 -0.195 * 0.090 -0.180 * 0.085 0.031  0.095 0.026  0.099 0.028  0.095
   Homemaker -0.073  0.069 -0.065  0.071 -0.073  0.069 0.033  0.104 0.001  0.103 0.030  0.104
Partner’s job insecurity (ref.=secure)
   Job is bit secure -0.082 * 0.037 -0.082 * 0.037 -0.078 * 0.037 -0.059  0.039 -0.059  0.039 -0.056  0.040
   Job is insecure -0.164 *** 0.046 -0.165 *** 0.046 -0.162 *** 0.047 -0.111 * 0.051 -0.111 * 0.051 -0.108 * 0.052
   Unemployed or unable to work -0.459 *** 0.082 -0.458 *** 0.081 -0.441 *** 0.081 -0.291 ** 0.096 -0.292 ** 0.096 -0.268 ** 0.100
Individual’s education -0.037 *** 0.011 -0.056 *** 0.016 -0.037 *** 0.011
Partner’s education 0.018 # 0.010 0.018 # 0.010 0.022 # 0.013
Age -0.017 *** 0.005 -0.017 *** 0.005 -0.017 *** 0.005 -0.015  0.021 -0.016  0.021 -0.015  0.021
Relationship duration -0.005  0.005 -0.004  0.005 -0.004  0.005 -0.041 # 0.023 -0.041 # 0.022 -0.041 # 0.023
Relationship duration SQ 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000
Married (ref.=cohabitation) 0.328 *** 0.065 0.324 *** 0.065 0.328 *** 0.065 0.138  0.113 0.127  0.113 0.142  0.113
Household labor (ref.=equal or men does more)                  
   Wife does more -0.110 ** 0.038 -0.110 ** 0.039 -0.110 ** 0.038 -0.096 * 0.045 -0.097 * 0.045 -0.096 * 0.045
Number of children (ref.=none)
   1 or 2 children -0.265 *** 0.047 -0.266 *** 0.047 -0.266 *** 0.047 -0.159 * 0.062 -0.159 * 0.062 -0.159 * 0.062
   3 or more children -0.208 ** 0.080 -0.210 ** 0.080 -0.209 ** 0.080 -0.152  0.108 -0.156  0.109 -0.154  0.109
Interactions
Individual’s job insecurity * Own education
   Job is bit secure * Education 0.023  0.015 0.030 # 0.016
   Job is insecure * Education 0.027  0.018 0.027  0.020
   Unemp. or unable to work*Education -0.002  0.034 -0.001  0.039
   Homemaker * Education 0.027  0.023 -0.020  0.031
Partner’s job insecurity *Partner’s educ.
   Job is bit secure * Education -0.010  0.011   -0.012  0.012
   Job is insecure * Education 0.002  0.015 0.000  0.016
   Unemp. or unable to work*Education 0.012  0.025 0.019  0.030
Constant 8.257 *** 0.095 8.265 *** 0.095 8.255 *** 0.095 8.239 *** 0.142 8.250 *** 0.143 8.234 *** 0.142
Sigma u 1.117 1.117 1.118 1.390 1.401 1.389
Sigma e 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833
Source. LISS panel 2008-2015, 6,733 observations of 2,094 women. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Bold is significant (p<0.1) difference between men and women
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Table 5.3   Women’s relationship satisfaction and individual’s and partner’s job position,  
random (differences between people) and fixed (changes within people over time)  
effects models
Women Random effect models Fixed effect models
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE
Individual’s job insecurity (ref.=secure)
   Job is bit secure -0.080 * 0.041 -0.084 * 0.041 -0.079 # 0.041 -0.021  0.044 -0.025  0.044 -0.020  0.044
   Job is insecure -0.134 * 0.056 -0.138 * 0.056 -0.134 * 0.056 -0.035  0.059 -0.039  0.059 -0.035  0.059
   Unemployed or unable to work -0.179 * 0.085 -0.195 * 0.090 -0.180 * 0.085 0.031  0.095 0.026  0.099 0.028  0.095
   Homemaker -0.073  0.069 -0.065  0.071 -0.073  0.069 0.033  0.104 0.001  0.103 0.030  0.104
Partner’s job insecurity (ref.=secure)
   Job is bit secure -0.082 * 0.037 -0.082 * 0.037 -0.078 * 0.037 -0.059  0.039 -0.059  0.039 -0.056  0.040
   Job is insecure -0.164 *** 0.046 -0.165 *** 0.046 -0.162 *** 0.047 -0.111 * 0.051 -0.111 * 0.051 -0.108 * 0.052
   Unemployed or unable to work -0.459 *** 0.082 -0.458 *** 0.081 -0.441 *** 0.081 -0.291 ** 0.096 -0.292 ** 0.096 -0.268 ** 0.100
Individual’s education -0.037 *** 0.011 -0.056 *** 0.016 -0.037 *** 0.011
Partner’s education 0.018 # 0.010 0.018 # 0.010 0.022 # 0.013
Age -0.017 *** 0.005 -0.017 *** 0.005 -0.017 *** 0.005 -0.015  0.021 -0.016  0.021 -0.015  0.021
Relationship duration -0.005  0.005 -0.004  0.005 -0.004  0.005 -0.041 # 0.023 -0.041 # 0.022 -0.041 # 0.023
Relationship duration SQ 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000
Married (ref.=cohabitation) 0.328 *** 0.065 0.324 *** 0.065 0.328 *** 0.065 0.138  0.113 0.127  0.113 0.142  0.113
Household labor (ref.=equal or men does more)                  
   Wife does more -0.110 ** 0.038 -0.110 ** 0.039 -0.110 ** 0.038 -0.096 * 0.045 -0.097 * 0.045 -0.096 * 0.045
Number of children (ref.=none)
   1 or 2 children -0.265 *** 0.047 -0.266 *** 0.047 -0.266 *** 0.047 -0.159 * 0.062 -0.159 * 0.062 -0.159 * 0.062
   3 or more children -0.208 ** 0.080 -0.210 ** 0.080 -0.209 ** 0.080 -0.152  0.108 -0.156  0.109 -0.154  0.109
Interactions
Individual’s job insecurity * Own education
   Job is bit secure * Education 0.023  0.015 0.030 # 0.016
   Job is insecure * Education 0.027  0.018 0.027  0.020
   Unemp. or unable to work*Education -0.002  0.034 -0.001  0.039
   Homemaker * Education 0.027  0.023 -0.020  0.031
Partner’s job insecurity *Partner’s educ.
   Job is bit secure * Education -0.010  0.011   -0.012  0.012
   Job is insecure * Education 0.002  0.015 0.000  0.016
   Unemp. or unable to work*Education 0.012  0.025 0.019  0.030
Constant 8.257 *** 0.095 8.265 *** 0.095 8.255 *** 0.095 8.239 *** 0.142 8.250 *** 0.143 8.234 *** 0.142
Sigma u 1.117 1.117 1.118 1.390 1.401 1.389
Sigma e 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833
Source. LISS panel 2008-2015, 6,733 observations of 2,094 women. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Bold is significant (p<0.1) difference between men and women
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16  Numbers calculated based on the coefficients in Models 2a and 2b in Table 2 (which were the models with 
significant interactions between job insecurity and education for men).
Figure 5.2   The relationship between own job insecurity and men’s relationship 
satisfaction calculated for men with the lowest and highest level of education.
* = main effect differs significantly from job is secure. † = interaction-effect with own educational attainment is 
significant16
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stressful for the relationship due to the possibility of losing all household earnings. On the 
other hand, according to the role collaboration perspective similar experiences may lead 
to greater understanding (Rogers, 2004). Therefore, due to more understanding and 
emotional support between partners, job insecurity could be less consequential for the 
relationship when both partners experienced job insecurity. We found support for neither 
explanation in additional analyses (Appendix 5 Table A5.5); the job insecurity of a person 
did not affect the partner relationship differently when the partner also felt insecure in his/
her job.
17  Numbers calculated based on the coefficients in Models 2b in Table 3 (which was the only model with 
significant interactions between job insecurity and education for women).
Figure 5.3   The relationship between own job insecurity and women’s relationship 
satisfaction calculated for women with the lowest and highest level of education. 
* = main effect differs significantly from job is secure. † = interaction-effect with own educational attainment is 
significant17
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5.5  Conclusion and discussion
Labor market development such as the flexibilization and globalization make people feel 
insecure about the continuation of their job (Balz, 2017; Lübke & Erlinghagen, 2014). This 
study focused on possible consequences of job insecurity for a couple. We argued, first, 
that feelings of insecurity in the work domain have negative spillover effects to the family 
domain, most notably the partner relationship. Second, we argued that a household 
perspective is needed because people are also sensitive to job insecurity of their partner 
(crossover effects). Third, we argued that the negative consequences of job insecurity for 
relationship satisfaction may be gender-dependent and stronger for people with fewer 
resources (moderations with gender and educational attainment).
 Applying random effects analyses, this study showed that people were less satisfied 
with their partner relationship when they felt insecure about their job continuation. 
This confirmation of the negative spillover effect corroborated previous research using 
cross-sectional designs (Cheng et al., 2014b; Hughes & Galinsky, 1994; Hughes et al., 1992; 
Larson et al., 1994; Mauno et al., 2017; Mauno & Kinnunen, 1999, see also Chapter 4). Our 
relatively strict within-person analyses also showed that negative spillover only held for 
men. Men became less satisfied with their relationship when their jobs became more 
insecure; for women this was not the case. Possibly other factors, such as personality char-
acteristics, lead to both feelings of job insecurity and lower relationship satisfaction. The 
non-significant within-person findings for women could be due to statistical power issues 
as well. Overall, our results indicated that men and women were less satisfied with their 
relationship when they felt insecure in their job, although this finding was more strongly 
supported for men than for women.
 Building on previous research, our results showed that the partner’s job insecurity 
also affected women’s relationship satisfaction, but not men’s. Women became less 
satisfied with their relationship when their male partner felt more insecure about his job 
continuation. This important crossover-effect highlights the dyadic system of partner 
relationships; relationships are not only affected by individual circumstances, but by the 
partner’s circumstances as well. It also emphasizes the gender differences in Dutch 
couples. Couples in the Netherlands often primary rely on men’s earnings, while women 
predominantly work part-time (European Commission, 2016). This traditional behavioral 
pattern in combination with a still widespread traditional gender ideology (Thijs et al., 
2017), may explain why women’s perception with the partner relationship is influenced by 
their male partners’ job insecurity, but not vice versa. Possibly job insecurity has an even 
more gendered influence on relationships in counties with a lower female labor 
participation or gender traditionalism, however this remains a topic for future investigation.
 Not every person appeared to be equally affected by job insecurity. Especially lower 
educated men became less satisfied with their relationship satisfaction when they felt 
insecure about their jobs. Since the lower educated generally also experience more job 
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insecurity than the higher educated (Muñoz de Bustillo & de Pedraza, 2010), our finding 
suggests they are doubly hit by job insecurity. Macro-economic processes which induce 
feelings of job insecurity may especially harm the partner relationships of the lower 
educated, while people with a higher education are not or hardly affected. Here, education 
is used as a broad indicator for various mechanisms including employability and financial 
resources and future studies may want to aim to differentiate these specific mechanisms.
 While this research extended previous knowledge on the partner relationship and 
job insecurity by simultaneously testing the spillover and crossover of job insecurity in 
couples, by investigating inequality in the impact of job insecurity, and by using 
longitudinal data, some points for improvement remain. Foremost, our indicators of job 
insecurity and relationship satisfaction would benefit from more precise measurement 
instruments. Possibly, our limited findings of crossover effects for men and spillover effects 
for women stem from these less sensitive instruments. Notably, we used a measurement 
of cognitive job insecurity, but a measurement of affective job insecurity may also be 
suited to investigate spillover and crossover of job insecurity (Jiang & Lavaysse, 2018). We 
would also have appreciated a stronger instrument for relationship quality, especially an 
instrument with a less skewed distribution. Nevertheless, our confidence in our results 
was strengthened by robustness tests with alternative transformations. Lastly, while we 
tested whether relationship satisfaction of higher and lower educated was differently 
affected by their job insecurity, other studies may want to consider specific aspects of this 
mechanism such as income, the household division of earnings, gender role attitudes, or 
employability to explain these differences (such as been done for well-being by Green, 
2011; Silla et al., 2009). Finally, our data did not allow for investigating the influence of the 
duration of job insecurity on relationship satisfaction, which could be a promising 
direction for future research.
 All in all, our results indicated that the developments on the labor market which have 
led to widespread feelings of job insecurity, such as the flexibilization and economic 
crises, negatively influenced couples’ relationships. People were less satisfied with their 
partner relationship when they were insecure about their job continuation and women’s 
satisfaction was negatively affected by their partners’ job insecurity. Importantly, especially 
lower educated men seemed vulnerable to these macro-economic developments. They 
are not only in more precarious, insecure labor market positions, lowering their relationship 
quality, but appeared also to be more strongly negatively affected by these insecure labor 
market positions in terms of relationship satisfaction. 
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Appendix Chapter 1
Table A1.1  Partner’s non-response depending on respondent’s relationship satisfaction
 
 
Respondent’s Relationship satisfaction
Mean SD
Partner’s relationship 
satisfaction
Valid answer 8.27 1.36
Missing 8.12 1.52
Source: LISS data 2008-2015 (see also Chapter 5). Only people who indicated they were in a (cohabiting or married) 
partner relationship and were aged 25 to 60 were included. Difference in means is significant at p<0.001
Appendix Chapter 2
Table A2.1  Model statistics of models presented in Table 2.2 and 2.3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Variance intercept men 72112.676 1252.510 78846.113 1459.646 78801.191 1458.676
Variance inter. women 81153.062 1411.392 87580.210 1604.998 87568.762 1604.938
Covariance intercepts 0.175 0.012 0.115 0.012 0.115 0.012
Covariance relationship-wave 44230.756 2277.794 14128.774 1156.344 14126.930 1156.201
-2 Log Likelihood 310472.277 306368.882 306362.370
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Variance intercept men 78741.325 1458.025 78869.576 1460.836 78833.914 1459.787
Variance intercept women 87558.822 1604.776 87575.887 1605.319 87533.120 1604.066
Covariance intercepts 0.115 0.012 0.116 0.012 0.115 0.012
Covariance relationship-wave 14112.472 1156.060 14097.773 1156.208 14106.190 1156.256
-2 Log Likelihood 306359.128 306363.674 306362.915
Source: BHPS
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Table A2.4   Influence of specialization and equity on relationship satisfaction,  
only for people in couples where both are employed or homemaker
Men
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Specialization -19.859  13.936 -3.223  12.730 -9.141  13.013 1.172  12.823 -29.537  19.941 -0.683  12.844
Equity 2.579  16.166 3.734  18.207 0.445  18.264 11.546  18.411 -0.371  18.320 22.051  23.452
Children in house. (ref.=none)                
Youngest child 0-4 -52.238 *** 11.215 -52.812 *** 11.215 -53.110 *** 11.214 -49.826 *** 11.326 -50.575 *** 11.297
Youngest child 5-11 -32.864 ** 10.650 -32.837 ** 10.648 -33.134 ** 10.646 -31.529 ** 10.727 -30.398 ** 10.748
Youngest child 12-18 -48.054 *** 11.497 -47.834 *** 11.494 -48.104 *** 11.491 -46.982 *** 11.595 -48.089 *** 11.621
Egalitarian gender role attitudes 0.043  4.060 -0.152  4.060 -1.291 4.085 0.447  4.068 0.297  4.067
Interactions    
Specialization * EGRA -24.390 * 11.197
Equity * EGRA    35.329 * 12.620
Specialization * Youngest child 0-4 35.936  28.388
Specialization * Youngest child 5-11 64.354 * 28.730
Specialization * Youngest child 12-18 -5.120  36.082
Equity * Youngest child 0-4 -27.758  32.707
Equity * Youngest child 5-11 -57.397  30.598
Equity * Youngest child 12-18 13.397  35.170
Women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Specialization -18.958  14.644 -3.067  12.987 -3.383  13.007 -0.519  13.107 -22.460  20.302 -1.049  13.105
Equity -4.907  16.950 -29.618  18.403 -30.285  18.484 -29.773  18.401 -31.816  18.523 -9.721  23.779
Children in house. (ref.=none)                
Youngest child 0-4 -37.054 ** 11.550 -37.215 ** 11.558 -37.613 ** 11.556 -34.805 ** 11.675 -35.661 ** 11.635
Youngest child 5-11 -29.970 ** 10.972 -30.033 ** 10.974 -30.322 ** 10.974 -28.610 ** 11.058 -27.488 * 11.070
Youngest child 12-18 -45.301 *** 11.901 -45.301 *** 11.901 -45.418 *** 11.900 -43.393 *** 12.001 -43.208 *** 12.021
Egalitarian gender role attitudes 2.069  3.932 2.020  3.934 1.346  3.955 2.246  3.945 2.103  3.938
Interactions    
Specialization * EGRA -4.731  11.088
Equity * EGRA 19.234  12.376
Specialization * Youngest child 0-4 20.572  29.029
Specialization * Youngest child 5-11 35.512  29.368
Specialization * Youngest child 12-18 38.627  36.985
Equity * Youngest child 0-4 11.401  33.376
Equity * Youngest child 5-11 -67.131 * 31.188
Equity * Youngest child 12-18 -41.433  36.008
Source: BHPS. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Results based on two intercept model. Models 2 to 6 are controlled 
for all other variables listed in Table 2.2
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Interactions    
Specialization * EGRA -24.390 * 11.197
Equity * EGRA    35.329 * 12.620
Specialization * Youngest child 0-4 35.936  28.388
Specialization * Youngest child 5-11 64.354 * 28.730
Specialization * Youngest child 12-18 -5.120  36.082
Equity * Youngest child 0-4 -27.758  32.707
Equity * Youngest child 5-11 -57.397  30.598
Equity * Youngest child 12-18 13.397  35.170
Women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Specialization -18.958  14.644 -3.067  12.987 -3.383  13.007 -0.519  13.107 -22.460  20.302 -1.049  13.105
Equity -4.907  16.950 -29.618  18.403 -30.285  18.484 -29.773  18.401 -31.816  18.523 -9.721  23.779
Children in house. (ref.=none)                
Youngest child 0-4 -37.054 ** 11.550 -37.215 ** 11.558 -37.613 ** 11.556 -34.805 ** 11.675 -35.661 ** 11.635
Youngest child 5-11 -29.970 ** 10.972 -30.033 ** 10.974 -30.322 ** 10.974 -28.610 ** 11.058 -27.488 * 11.070
Youngest child 12-18 -45.301 *** 11.901 -45.301 *** 11.901 -45.418 *** 11.900 -43.393 *** 12.001 -43.208 *** 12.021
Egalitarian gender role attitudes 2.069  3.932 2.020  3.934 1.346  3.955 2.246  3.945 2.103  3.938
Interactions    
Specialization * EGRA -4.731  11.088
Equity * EGRA 19.234  12.376
Specialization * Youngest child 0-4 20.572  29.029
Specialization * Youngest child 5-11 35.512  29.368
Specialization * Youngest child 12-18 38.627  36.985
Equity * Youngest child 0-4 11.401  33.376
Equity * Youngest child 5-11 -67.131 * 31.188
Equity * Youngest child 12-18 -41.433  36.008
Source: BHPS. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Results based on two intercept model. Models 2 to 6 are controlled 
for all other variables listed in Table 2.2
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Table A2.5   Influence of specialization and equity on relationship satisfaction,  
only for people in couples where both partners combined were employed  
for at least 35 hours per week
 Men
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Specialization -3.670  16.351 24.907  15.952 21.956  16.010 26.588  15.965 11.327  21.036 24.943  15.969
Equity 16.963  21.404 18.589  21.006 15.412  21.056 19.907  21.008 16.211  21.118 12.209  25.812
Children in house. (ref.=none)                
Youngest child 0-4 -64.695 *** 11.677 -65.933 *** 11.689 -65.390 *** 11.678 -63.135 *** 11.797 -68.524 *** 12.197
Youngest child 5-11 -47.025 *** 10.981 -47.483 *** 10.979 -47.348 *** 10.978 -48.268 *** 11.055 -47.329 *** 11.562
Youngest child 12-18 -46.956 *** 11.929 -47.024 *** 11.925 -47.032 *** 11.925 -46.488 *** 11.941 -44.948 *** 12.763
Egalitarian gender role atti. 2.551  4.225 3.254  4.238 -0.482  4.438 2.745  4.242 2.386  4.229
Interactions    
Specialization * EGRA -23.976 * 11.516
Equity * EGRA 34.326 * 15.363
Sp. * Youngest child 0-4 9.748  29.430
Sp. * Youngest child 5-11 44.024  29.149
Sp. * Youngest child 12-18 6.113  36.785
Equity * Youngest child 0-4 46.313  41.320
Equity * Youngest child 5-11 3.585  38.467
Equity * Youngest child 12-18 -16.924  44.000
 Women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Specialization -2.422  17.174 27.120  16.401 27.205  16.416 28.048  16.413 18.551  21.619 28.328  16.419
Equity 0.261  22.495 -9.088  21.471 -8.834  21.543 -13.913  21.714 -9.808  21.586 2.650  26.456
Children in house. (ref.=none)                
Youngest child 0-4 -39.984 *** 12.089 -39.913 *** 12.120 -40.850 *** 12.103 -40.243 *** 12.213 -43.277 *** 12.639
Youngest child 5-11 -43.471 *** 11.365 -43.416 *** 11.371 -43.835 *** 11.367 -42.276 *** 11.447 -39.501 *** 11.950
Youngest child 12-18 -46.304 *** 12.406 -46.257 *** 12.407 -46.299 *** 12.405 -45.958 *** 12.420 -39.382 ** 13.233
Egalitarian gender role atti. 2.974  4.086 2.976  4.102 1.075  4.279 3.147  4.108 2.810  4.095
Interactions             
Specialization * EGRA 0.215  11.366
Equity * EGRA 22.717  15.118
Sp. * Youngest child 0-4 18.870  30.304
Sp. * Youngest child 5-11 -0.684  30.008
Sp. * Youngest child 12-18 38.929  37.992
Equity * Youngest child 0-4 40.018  42.596
Equity * Youngest child 5-11 -45.619  39.526
Equity * Youngest child 12-18 -67.989  45.348
Source: BHPS. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Results based on two intercept model. Models 2 to 6 are controlled 
for all other variables listed in Table 2.2
157
Appendices
Table A2.5   Influence of specialization and equity on relationship satisfaction,  
only for people in couples where both partners combined were employed  
for at least 35 hours per week
 Men
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Specialization -3.670  16.351 24.907  15.952 21.956  16.010 26.588  15.965 11.327  21.036 24.943  15.969
Equity 16.963  21.404 18.589  21.006 15.412  21.056 19.907  21.008 16.211  21.118 12.209  25.812
Children in house. (ref.=none)                
Youngest child 0-4 -64.695 *** 11.677 -65.933 *** 11.689 -65.390 *** 11.678 -63.135 *** 11.797 -68.524 *** 12.197
Youngest child 5-11 -47.025 *** 10.981 -47.483 *** 10.979 -47.348 *** 10.978 -48.268 *** 11.055 -47.329 *** 11.562
Youngest child 12-18 -46.956 *** 11.929 -47.024 *** 11.925 -47.032 *** 11.925 -46.488 *** 11.941 -44.948 *** 12.763
Egalitarian gender role atti. 2.551  4.225 3.254  4.238 -0.482  4.438 2.745  4.242 2.386  4.229
Interactions    
Specialization * EGRA -23.976 * 11.516
Equity * EGRA 34.326 * 15.363
Sp. * Youngest child 0-4 9.748  29.430
Sp. * Youngest child 5-11 44.024  29.149
Sp. * Youngest child 12-18 6.113  36.785
Equity * Youngest child 0-4 46.313  41.320
Equity * Youngest child 5-11 3.585  38.467
Equity * Youngest child 12-18 -16.924  44.000
 Women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Specialization -2.422  17.174 27.120  16.401 27.205  16.416 28.048  16.413 18.551  21.619 28.328  16.419
Equity 0.261  22.495 -9.088  21.471 -8.834  21.543 -13.913  21.714 -9.808  21.586 2.650  26.456
Children in house. (ref.=none)                
Youngest child 0-4 -39.984 *** 12.089 -39.913 *** 12.120 -40.850 *** 12.103 -40.243 *** 12.213 -43.277 *** 12.639
Youngest child 5-11 -43.471 *** 11.365 -43.416 *** 11.371 -43.835 *** 11.367 -42.276 *** 11.447 -39.501 *** 11.950
Youngest child 12-18 -46.304 *** 12.406 -46.257 *** 12.407 -46.299 *** 12.405 -45.958 *** 12.420 -39.382 ** 13.233
Egalitarian gender role atti. 2.974  4.086 2.976  4.102 1.075  4.279 3.147  4.108 2.810  4.095
Interactions             
Specialization * EGRA 0.215  11.366
Equity * EGRA 22.717  15.118
Sp. * Youngest child 0-4 18.870  30.304
Sp. * Youngest child 5-11 -0.684  30.008
Sp. * Youngest child 12-18 38.929  37.992
Equity * Youngest child 0-4 40.018  42.596
Equity * Youngest child 5-11 -45.619  39.526
Equity * Youngest child 12-18 -67.989  45.348
Source: BHPS. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Results based on two intercept model. Models 2 to 6 are controlled 
for all other variables listed in Table 2.2
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Table A2.6   the influence of specialization on relationship satisfaction, dependent on if it 
is traditional or non-traditional specialization
Men Women
B  SE B  SE
Specialization (degree) -3.398 11.592 -0.620 11.856
Non-traditional Specialization (ref.=traditional 
specialization)
-12.571 8.811 -15.267 9.056
Specialization * Non-traditional Specialization -13.285 25.341 -6.735 25.966
Source: BHPS. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Results based on two intercept model. Models are controlled for 
all other variables listed in Table 2.2. Non-traditional specialization is defined as couples where women are more 
specialized in employment than men ((EM/ (EM + HM)) < (EW/ (EW + HW)). Couples where both partners are exactly 
equally specialized could not be categorized as traditional or non-traditional specialization and are therefore not 
included in the analyses. 
Table A2.7   the influence of equity on relationship satisfaction, dependent on if 
someone is under or over benefiting
Men Women
B  SE B  SE
Equity (degree) -6.824 17.799 -25.616 26.343
Under-benefiting (ref.= over-
benefiting)
-1.896 7.644 -9.157 7.796
Equity * Under-benefiting 29.169 26.322 -3.632 26.895
Source: BHPS. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Results based on two intercept model. Models are controlled for 
all other variables listed in Table 2.2. Under-benefiting was defined as contributing more hours to the household 
needs than the partner. Observation where couples hours-equity was exactly 1 were omitted from the analyses, 
since the dummy for under-benefiting could not be made.
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Table A2.8   Relationship satisfaction as binomial variable. Influence of specialization  
and equity on relationship satisfaction, dependent on gender role attitudes  
and the presence of children
Men
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Specialization -0.010  0.110 -0.092  0.113 0.054  0.112 -0.093  0.175 -0.013  0.111
Equity 0.059  0.160 0.018  0.160 0.168  0.161 0.053  0.160 0.050  0.214
Egalitarian gender role attitudes 0.032  0.039 0.039  0.039 0.043  0.039 0.033  0.039 0.031  0.039
Children in household (ref.=none)
  Youngest child 0-4 -0.460 *** 0.113 -0.472 *** 0.113 -0.481 *** 0.113 -0.454 *** 0.113 -0.457 *** 0.113
  Youngest child 5-11 -0.455 *** 0.102 -0.461 *** 0.102 -0.465 *** 0.102 -0.454 *** 0.102 -0.456 *** 0.102
  Youngest child 12-18 -0.475 *** 0.110 -0.481 *** 0.110 -0.482 *** 0.110 -0.472 *** 0.110 -0.478 *** 0.110
Interactions
Specialization*Egalitarian gender role 
attitudes
-0.340 ** 0.105
Equity*Egalitarian gender role attitudes 0.462 *** 0.116
Specialization * Youngest child 0-4 0.071  0.264
Specialization * Youngest child 5-11 0.138  0.260
Specialization * Youngest child 12-18 0.215  0.317
Equity * Youngest child 0-4 0.127 0.304
Equity * Youngest child 5-11 0.008 0.278
Equity * Youngest child 12-18 -0.126 0.318
Women
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Specialization -0.025  0.104 -0.028  0.104 -0.006  0.106 0.112  0.162 -0.030  0.105
Equity -0.165  0.150 -0.173  0.150 -0.162  0.150 -0.148  0.150 -0.196  0.198
Egalitarian gender role attitudes -0.014  0.035 -0.013  0.035 -0.011  0.035 -0.016  0.035 -0.015  0.035
Children in household (ref.=none)
  Youngest child 0-4 -0.466 *** 0.110 -0.468 *** 0.110 -0.469 *** 0.110 -0.476 *** 0.110 -0.462 *** 0.110
  Youngest child 5-11 -0.422 *** 0.099 -0.423 *** 0.099 -0.425 *** 0.099 -0.419 *** 0.099 -0.425 *** 0.099
  Youngest child 12-18 -0.576 *** 0.103 -0.576 *** 0.103 -0.576 *** 0.103 -0.577 *** 0.104 -0.578 *** 0.104
Interactions
Specialization*Egalitarian gender role 
attitudes
-0.068  0.095
Equity*Egalitarian gender role attitudes 0.138  0.106
Specialization * Youngest child 0-4 -0.140  0.251
Specialization * Youngest child 5-11 -0.431  0.245
Specialization * Youngest child 12-18 0.043  0.296
Equity * Youngest child 0-4 0.294  0.290
Equity * Youngest child 5-11 0.009  0.265
Equity * Youngest child 12-18 -0.191  0.296
Source: BHPS. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Results based on two intercept model. Models 2 to 6 are controlled  
for all other variables listed in Table 2.2. Analyses are on non-imputed data. Relationship satisfaction is coded as  
1 to 5 = not satisfied (0), 6 and 7 = satisfied (1)
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Table A2.8   Relationship satisfaction as binomial variable. Influence of specialization  
and equity on relationship satisfaction, dependent on gender role attitudes  
and the presence of children
Men
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Specialization -0.010  0.110 -0.092  0.113 0.054  0.112 -0.093  0.175 -0.013  0.111
Equity 0.059  0.160 0.018  0.160 0.168  0.161 0.053  0.160 0.050  0.214
Egalitarian gender role attitudes 0.032  0.039 0.039  0.039 0.043  0.039 0.033  0.039 0.031  0.039
Children in household (ref.=none)
  Youngest child 0-4 -0.460 *** 0.113 -0.472 *** 0.113 -0.481 *** 0.113 -0.454 *** 0.113 -0.457 *** 0.113
  Youngest child 5-11 -0.455 *** 0.102 -0.461 *** 0.102 -0.465 *** 0.102 -0.454 *** 0.102 -0.456 *** 0.102
  Youngest child 12-18 -0.475 *** 0.110 -0.481 *** 0.110 -0.482 *** 0.110 -0.472 *** 0.110 -0.478 *** 0.110
Interactions
Specialization*Egalitarian gender role 
attitudes
-0.340 ** 0.105
Equity*Egalitarian gender role attitudes 0.462 *** 0.116
Specialization * Youngest child 0-4 0.071  0.264
Specialization * Youngest child 5-11 0.138  0.260
Specialization * Youngest child 12-18 0.215  0.317
Equity * Youngest child 0-4 0.127 0.304
Equity * Youngest child 5-11 0.008 0.278
Equity * Youngest child 12-18 -0.126 0.318
Women
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Specialization -0.025  0.104 -0.028  0.104 -0.006  0.106 0.112  0.162 -0.030  0.105
Equity -0.165  0.150 -0.173  0.150 -0.162  0.150 -0.148  0.150 -0.196  0.198
Egalitarian gender role attitudes -0.014  0.035 -0.013  0.035 -0.011  0.035 -0.016  0.035 -0.015  0.035
Children in household (ref.=none)
  Youngest child 0-4 -0.466 *** 0.110 -0.468 *** 0.110 -0.469 *** 0.110 -0.476 *** 0.110 -0.462 *** 0.110
  Youngest child 5-11 -0.422 *** 0.099 -0.423 *** 0.099 -0.425 *** 0.099 -0.419 *** 0.099 -0.425 *** 0.099
  Youngest child 12-18 -0.576 *** 0.103 -0.576 *** 0.103 -0.576 *** 0.103 -0.577 *** 0.104 -0.578 *** 0.104
Interactions
Specialization*Egalitarian gender role 
attitudes
-0.068  0.095
Equity*Egalitarian gender role attitudes 0.138  0.106
Specialization * Youngest child 0-4 -0.140  0.251
Specialization * Youngest child 5-11 -0.431  0.245
Specialization * Youngest child 12-18 0.043  0.296
Equity * Youngest child 0-4 0.294  0.290
Equity * Youngest child 5-11 0.009  0.265
Equity * Youngest child 12-18 -0.191  0.296
Source: BHPS. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Results based on two intercept model. Models 2 to 6 are controlled  
for all other variables listed in Table 2.2. Analyses are on non-imputed data. Relationship satisfaction is coded as  
1 to 5 = not satisfied (0), 6 and 7 = satisfied (1)
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Table A2.9   Difference in specialization and equity between couples who do and who 
don’t break-up during the panel observation period
 Couple 
doesn’t break-up
Couple  
breaks up
Difference
Mean SD Mean SD T-value
Equity 0.662 0.314 0.644 0.323 1.951
Specialization 0.414 0.344 0.429 0.359 -1.422
Source: BHPS.
Table A2.10   Influence of specialization and equity on relationship satisfaction, dependent 
on whether the couple breaks-up during the panel observation period
Men Women
Model 2 Model 2
B  SE B  SE
Break up -137.197 *** 16.523 -160.591 *** 16.536
Equity -5.575  15.949 -22.380  16.181
Specialization -12.476  11.043 -8.379  11.255
Equity * Break up -72.532  50.475 -43.717  51.134
Specialization * Break up 4.761  45.440 14.483  46.037
Source: BHPS. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Results based on two intercept model. Models 2 to 6 are 
controlled for all other variables listed in Table 2.2
163
Appendices
Appendix Chapter 3
Table A3.1   The number of changes in relationships satisfaction and breadwinner 
arrangements
Overall Between Within
Relationship Satisfaction N % N % %
0 268 0.40 215 1.81 27.78
1 399 0.59 286 2.41 28.36
2 742 1.10 543 4.57 26.11
3 1016 1.50 746 6.27 25.08
4 1065 1.58 810 6.81 23.99
5 2414 3.58 1600 13.46 28.23
6 2951 4.37 1965 16.53 26.38
7 7402 10.96 3761 31.63 32.18
8 14320 21.21 5849 49.19 40.58
9 17134 25.38 6433 54.10 44.21
10 19804 29.33 6325 53.20 60.53
Total 67515 100 28533 239.97 41.67
Overall Between Within
Breadwinner N % N % %
Equal earner
  Equal earnings, both empl. 20508 30.38 6277 52.79 56.88
  Both not employed 2155 3.19 985 8.28 58.76
Male breadwinner
  Both employed, man earned more 23980 35.52 6760 56.85 57.35
  Man empl. woman unable to work 2360 3.50 1575 13.25 30.31
  Man empl. woman homemaker 11186 16.57 3893 32.74 50.70
Female breadwinner
  Both empl. woman earned more 5361 7.94 2541 21.37 38.53
  Woman empl. man unable to work 1510 2.24 970 8.16 35.92
  Woman empl. man homemaker 455 0.67 223 1.88 38.36
Total 67515 100 23224 195.32 51.2
Source: HILDA 2001-2015
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Table A3.2   Fixed effects regressions analysis of men and women’s relationship 
satisfaction and women’s relative earnings, not including employment 
differences between partners
Men
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner status
Women earned more  Ref.   Ref.   Ref.  
Earned about the same 0.070 * 0.036 0.083 * 0.035 0.084 * 0.035
Man earned more 0.026  0.040 0.059  0.039 0.060  0.039
Interactions      
Earned about the same * EGRA   0.051  0.062
Man earned more * EGRA 0.031  0.069
Women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner status
Women earned more  Ref.   Ref.   Ref.  
Earned about the same 0.094 * 0.038 0.122 ** 0.038 0.129 ** 0.039
Man earned more 0.010  0.041 0.082 * 0.041 0.098 * 0.042
Interactions    
Earned about the same * EGRA -0.042  0.063
Man earned more * EGRA -0.122 # 0.067
Note: EGRA = Egalitarian gender role attitudes. Model 2 and 3 are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 
and 3.3. Egalitarian gender role attitudes, Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household 
labor, financial prosperity, household income, number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, and 
partner’s self-rated health were centered at their mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is significant 
(p<.1) differences between men and women.
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Table A3.3   Fixed effects regressions analysis of men and women’s relationship  
satisfaction and employment differences between partners, not including  
partners’ relative earnings
 
 
 
Men
Model 1a Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b
(ref: both fulltime employed) (Ref: man fulltime employed, woman part-time)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner in employment hours         
Equals     
Both fulltime employed Ref. Ref. 0.074 * 0.029 0.027  0.032
Both part-time employed -0.140 * 0.062 -0.079  0.070 -0.067  0.061 -0.052  0.062
Both not working -0.040  0.098 0.072  0.115 0.034  0.096 0.099  0.106
Male Breadwinner       
Man full time, woman part-time -0.074 * 0.029 -0.027  0.032 Ref. Ref.
Man empl., woman unable to work -0.109 # 0.059 -0.065  0.064 -0.036  0.056 -0.038  0.056
Man empl., women homemaker 0.063  0.040 0.087 # 0.051 0.136 *** 0.034 0.114 ** 0.038
Female Breadwinner             
Woman full time, man part-time 0.049  0.060 0.085  0.060 0.123 * 0.062 0.112 # 0.061
Woman empl., man unable to work -0.242 ** 0.082 -0.110  0.091 -0.168 * 0.082 -0.083  0.085
Woman empl., man homemaker -0.076  0.173 0.081  0.177 -0.002  0.172 0.108  0.175
Women
Model 1a Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b
(ref: both fulltime employed) (ref: man fulltime employed, woman part-time)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner in employment hours         
Equals     
Both fulltime employed Ref. Ref. 0.143 *** 0.032 0.087 * 0.036
Both part-time employed -0.171 ** 0.065 -0.150 * 0.074 -0.028  0.063 -0.063  0.065
Both not working -0.281 ** 0.109 -0.246 # 0.133 -0.137  0.107 -0.160  0.121
Male Breadwinner       
Man full time, woman part-time -0.143 *** 0.032 -0.087 * 0.036 Ref. Ref.
Man empl., woman unable to work -0.155 * 0.067 -0.109  0.077 -0.011  0.063 -0.022  0.066
Man empl., women homemaker 0.044  0.045 0.066  0.059 0.187 *** 0.037 0.153 *** 0.042
Female Breadwinner             
Woman full time, man part-time -0.137 * 0.069 -0.145 * 0.069 0.007  0.072 -0.058  0.069
Woman empl., man unable to work -0.375 *** 0.089 -0.341 *** 0.100 -0.232 ** 0.088 -0.254 ** 0.092
Woman empl., man homemaker -0.083  0.167 -0.006  0.165 0.061  0.166 0.080  0.161
Note: Interactions between female breadwinning in employment hours and gender role attitudes were not 
significant, and therefore not presented. Model 2a and 2b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 
and 3.3. Egalitarian gender role attitudes, Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household 
labor, financial prosperity, household income, number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, 
and partner’s self-rated health were centered at their mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is 
significant (p<.1) differences between men and women.
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Table A3.3   Fixed effects regressions analysis of men and women’s relationship  
satisfaction and employment differences between partners, not including  
partners’ relative earnings
 
 
 
Men
Model 1a Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b
(ref: both fulltime employed) (Ref: man fulltime employed, woman part-time)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner in employment hours         
Equals     
Both fulltime employed Ref. Ref. 0.074 * 0.029 0.027  0.032
Both part-time employed -0.140 * 0.062 -0.079  0.070 -0.067  0.061 -0.052  0.062
Both not working -0.040  0.098 0.072  0.115 0.034  0.096 0.099  0.106
Male Breadwinner       
Man full time, woman part-time -0.074 * 0.029 -0.027  0.032 Ref. Ref.
Man empl., woman unable to work -0.109 # 0.059 -0.065  0.064 -0.036  0.056 -0.038  0.056
Man empl., women homemaker 0.063  0.040 0.087 # 0.051 0.136 *** 0.034 0.114 ** 0.038
Female Breadwinner             
Woman full time, man part-time 0.049  0.060 0.085  0.060 0.123 * 0.062 0.112 # 0.061
Woman empl., man unable to work -0.242 ** 0.082 -0.110  0.091 -0.168 * 0.082 -0.083  0.085
Woman empl., man homemaker -0.076  0.173 0.081  0.177 -0.002  0.172 0.108  0.175
Women
Model 1a Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b
(ref: both fulltime employed) (ref: man fulltime employed, woman part-time)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner in employment hours         
Equals     
Both fulltime employed Ref. Ref. 0.143 *** 0.032 0.087 * 0.036
Both part-time employed -0.171 ** 0.065 -0.150 * 0.074 -0.028  0.063 -0.063  0.065
Both not working -0.281 ** 0.109 -0.246 # 0.133 -0.137  0.107 -0.160  0.121
Male Breadwinner       
Man full time, woman part-time -0.143 *** 0.032 -0.087 * 0.036 Ref. Ref.
Man empl., woman unable to work -0.155 * 0.067 -0.109  0.077 -0.011  0.063 -0.022  0.066
Man empl., women homemaker 0.044  0.045 0.066  0.059 0.187 *** 0.037 0.153 *** 0.042
Female Breadwinner             
Woman full time, man part-time -0.137 * 0.069 -0.145 * 0.069 0.007  0.072 -0.058  0.069
Woman empl., man unable to work -0.375 *** 0.089 -0.341 *** 0.100 -0.232 ** 0.088 -0.254 ** 0.092
Woman empl., man homemaker -0.083  0.167 -0.006  0.165 0.061  0.166 0.080  0.161
Note: Interactions between female breadwinning in employment hours and gender role attitudes were not 
significant, and therefore not presented. Model 2a and 2b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 
and 3.3. Egalitarian gender role attitudes, Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household 
labor, financial prosperity, household income, number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, 
and partner’s self-rated health were centered at their mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is 
significant (p<.1) differences between men and women.
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Table A3.4   Fixed effects regressions analysis of men’s relationship satisfaction dependent  
on breadwinnership and gender role  attitudes, defining female breadwinners  
as earning more than 50 percent of the household income
Men
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
(ref: equal earner) (ref: male earns more)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner             
Equal earner             
  Equal earnings, both employed Ref. Ref. Ref. 0.028  0.027 0.003  0.026 0.004  0.026
  Both not employed -0.016  0.097 0.107  0.105 0.092  0.113 0.012  0.096 0.110  0.103 0.095  0.112
Male breadwinner          
  Both employed, man earned more -0.028  0.027 -0.003  0.026 -0.004  0.026 Ref. Ref. Ref.
  Man employed woman unable to work -0.087  0.060 -0.044  0.060 -0.064  0.062 -0.058  0.056 -0.041  0.056 -0.061  0.058
  Man employed woman homemaker 0.089 * 0.039 0.112 ** 0.042 0.112 ** 0.042 0.118 *** 0.034 0.115 ** 0.036 0.116 ** 0.036
Female breadwinner                   
  Both employed woman earned more -0.041  0.029 -0.052 # 0.029 -0.053 # 0.029 -0.012  0.032 -0.049  0.032 -0.049  0.031
  Woman employed man unable to work -0.230 ** 0.082 -0.102  0.084 -0.101  0.083 -0.202 * 0.081 -0.099  0.083 -0.098  0.082
  Woman employed man homemaker -0.073  0.171 0.075  0.172 0.095  0.189 -0.044  0.170 0.078  0.172 0.098  0.189
Interactions: 
Breadwinner * Gender role attitudes
Equal earnings, both employed * EGRA Ref. 0.024  0.050
Both not employed * EGRA -0.115  0.169 -0.090  0.169
Both empl., man earned more * EGRA -0.024  0.050 Ref.
Man employed, woman unable * EGRA -0.187 # 0.100 -0.162 # 0.094
Man employed, woman home. * EGRA    -0.031  0.079    -0.007  0.073
Both empl., woman earn. more * EGRA -0.003  0.053 0.021  0.059
Woman employed, man unable * EGRA 0.021  0.176 0.045  0.180
Woman empl., man homemaker * EGRA -0.101  0.358 -0.076  0.359
Source: HILDA 2001-2015. Interactions between female breadwinning and gender role attitudes were not significant. 
Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 and 3.3. Egalitarian gender role attitudes, 
Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household labor, financial prosperity, household income, 
number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, and partner’s self-rated health were centered at their 
mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<.1) differences between men and women.
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Table A3.4   Fixed effects regressions analysis of men’s relationship satisfaction dependent  
on breadwinnership and gender role  attitudes, defining female breadwinners  
as earning more than 50 percent of the household income
Men
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
(ref: equal earner) (ref: male earns more)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner             
Equal earner             
  Equal earnings, both employed Ref. Ref. Ref. 0.028  0.027 0.003  0.026 0.004  0.026
  Both not employed -0.016  0.097 0.107  0.105 0.092  0.113 0.012  0.096 0.110  0.103 0.095  0.112
Male breadwinner          
  Both employed, man earned more -0.028  0.027 -0.003  0.026 -0.004  0.026 Ref. Ref. Ref.
  Man employed woman unable to work -0.087  0.060 -0.044  0.060 -0.064  0.062 -0.058  0.056 -0.041  0.056 -0.061  0.058
  Man employed woman homemaker 0.089 * 0.039 0.112 ** 0.042 0.112 ** 0.042 0.118 *** 0.034 0.115 ** 0.036 0.116 ** 0.036
Female breadwinner                   
  Both employed woman earned more -0.041  0.029 -0.052 # 0.029 -0.053 # 0.029 -0.012  0.032 -0.049  0.032 -0.049  0.031
  Woman employed man unable to work -0.230 ** 0.082 -0.102  0.084 -0.101  0.083 -0.202 * 0.081 -0.099  0.083 -0.098  0.082
  Woman employed man homemaker -0.073  0.171 0.075  0.172 0.095  0.189 -0.044  0.170 0.078  0.172 0.098  0.189
Interactions: 
Breadwinner * Gender role attitudes
Equal earnings, both employed * EGRA Ref. 0.024  0.050
Both not employed * EGRA -0.115  0.169 -0.090  0.169
Both empl., man earned more * EGRA -0.024  0.050 Ref.
Man employed, woman unable * EGRA -0.187 # 0.100 -0.162 # 0.094
Man employed, woman home. * EGRA    -0.031  0.079    -0.007  0.073
Both empl., woman earn. more * EGRA -0.003  0.053 0.021  0.059
Woman employed, man unable * EGRA 0.021  0.176 0.045  0.180
Woman empl., man homemaker * EGRA -0.101  0.358 -0.076  0.359
Source: HILDA 2001-2015. Interactions between female breadwinning and gender role attitudes were not significant. 
Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 and 3.3. Egalitarian gender role attitudes, 
Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household labor, financial prosperity, household income, 
number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, and partner’s self-rated health were centered at their 
mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<.1) differences between men and women.
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Table A3.5   Fixed effects regressions analysis of women’s relationship satisfaction dependent  
on breadwinnership and gender role attitudes, defining female breadwinners as  
earning more than 50 percent of the household income
Women
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
(ref: equal earner) (ref: male earns more)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner             
Equal earner             
  Equal earnings, both employed Ref. Ref. Ref. 0.092 ** 0.029 0.048 # 0.028 0.042  0.029
  Both not employed -0.238 * 0.109 -0.120  0.118 -0.112  0.115 -0.146  0.107 -0.073  0.115 -0.069  0.111
Male breadwinner          
  Both employed, man earned more -0.092 ** 0.029 -0.048 # 0.028 -0.042  0.029 Ref. Ref. Ref.
  Man employed, woman unable to work -0.126 # 0.068 -0.047  0.071 -0.049  0.071 -0.034  0.063 0.000  0.066 -0.007  0.066
  Man employed, woman homemaker 0.079 # 0.044 0.131 ** 0.047 0.134 ** 0.048 0.171 *** 0.037 0.178 *** 0.040 0.177 *** 0.040
Female breadwinner                   
  Both employed woman earned more -0.029  0.031 -0.050 # 0.030 -0.050  0.032 0.063 # 0.033 -0.002  0.032 -0.008  0.033
  Woman employed man unable to work -0.336 *** 0.089 -0.253 ** 0.092 -0.270 ** 0.094 -0.244 ** 0.088 -0.205 * 0.090 -0.227 * 0.092
  Woman employed man homemaker -0.041  0.166 0.076  0.160 0.115  0.186 0.052  0.165 0.123  0.160 0.157  0.185
Interactions
Equal earnings, both employed * EGRA Ref. 0.048  0.050
Both not employed * EGRA 0.048  0.174 0.096  0.172
Both employed, man earned more * EGRA -0.048  0.050 Ref.
Man employed, woman unable * EGRA -0.179 # 0.100 -0.131  0.093
Man employed, woman home. * EGRA    -0.003  0.072    0.045  0.064
Both employed, woman earn. more * EGRA 0.003  0.053 0.051  0.056
Woman employed, man unable * EGRA 0.179  0.169 0.226  0.168
Woman employed, man homemaker * EGRA -0.084  0.265 -0.036  0.265
Source: HILDA 2001-2015. Interactions between female breadwinning and gender role attitudes were not significant. 
Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 and 3.3. Egalitarian gender role attitudes, 
Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household labor, financial prosperity, household income, 
number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, and partner’s self-rated health were centered at their 
mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<.1) differences between men and women.
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Table A3.5   Fixed effects regressions analysis of women’s relationship satisfaction dependent  
on breadwinnership and gender role attitudes, defining female breadwinners as  
earning more than 50 percent of the household income
Women
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
(ref: equal earner) (ref: male earns more)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner             
Equal earner             
  Equal earnings, both employed Ref. Ref. Ref. 0.092 ** 0.029 0.048 # 0.028 0.042  0.029
  Both not employed -0.238 * 0.109 -0.120  0.118 -0.112  0.115 -0.146  0.107 -0.073  0.115 -0.069  0.111
Male breadwinner          
  Both employed, man earned more -0.092 ** 0.029 -0.048 # 0.028 -0.042  0.029 Ref. Ref. Ref.
  Man employed, woman unable to work -0.126 # 0.068 -0.047  0.071 -0.049  0.071 -0.034  0.063 0.000  0.066 -0.007  0.066
  Man employed, woman homemaker 0.079 # 0.044 0.131 ** 0.047 0.134 ** 0.048 0.171 *** 0.037 0.178 *** 0.040 0.177 *** 0.040
Female breadwinner                   
  Both employed woman earned more -0.029  0.031 -0.050 # 0.030 -0.050  0.032 0.063 # 0.033 -0.002  0.032 -0.008  0.033
  Woman employed man unable to work -0.336 *** 0.089 -0.253 ** 0.092 -0.270 ** 0.094 -0.244 ** 0.088 -0.205 * 0.090 -0.227 * 0.092
  Woman employed man homemaker -0.041  0.166 0.076  0.160 0.115  0.186 0.052  0.165 0.123  0.160 0.157  0.185
Interactions
Equal earnings, both employed * EGRA Ref. 0.048  0.050
Both not employed * EGRA 0.048  0.174 0.096  0.172
Both employed, man earned more * EGRA -0.048  0.050 Ref.
Man employed, woman unable * EGRA -0.179 # 0.100 -0.131  0.093
Man employed, woman home. * EGRA    -0.003  0.072    0.045  0.064
Both employed, woman earn. more * EGRA 0.003  0.053 0.051  0.056
Woman employed, man unable * EGRA 0.179  0.169 0.226  0.168
Woman employed, man homemaker * EGRA -0.084  0.265 -0.036  0.265
Source: HILDA 2001-2015. Interactions between female breadwinning and gender role attitudes were not significant. 
Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 and 3.3. Egalitarian gender role attitudes, 
Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household labor, financial prosperity, household income, 
number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, and partner’s self-rated health were centered at their 
mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<.1) differences between men and women.
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Table A3.6   Fixed effects regressions analysis of men’s relationship satisfaction  
dependent on breadwinnership and gender role attitudes, defining relative  
earnings by hourly wage
Men
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
(ref: equal earner) (ref: male earns more)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner             
Equal earner       
  Equal earnings, both employed Ref. Ref. Ref. -0.015  0.024 -0.014  0.023 -0.014  0.023
  Both not employed 0.005  0.098 0.089  0.104 0.076  0.112 -0.010  0.097 0.075  0.104 0.062  0.112
Male breadwinner          
  Both employed, man earned more 0.015  0.024 0.014  0.023 0.014  0.023 Ref. Ref. Ref.
  Man employed, woman unable to work -0.076  0.058 -0.058  0.058 -0.078  0.060 -0.091  0.057 -0.073  0.057 -0.092  0.059
  Man employed, woman homemaker 0.112 ** 0.036 0.109 ** 0.039 0.111 ** 0.039 0.097 ** 0.035 0.095 * 0.038 0.096 * 0.038
Female breadwinner                   
  Both employed woman earned more -0.075 * 0.031 -0.064 * 0.030 -0.063 * 0.030 -0.090 ** 0.033 -0.078 * 0.032 -0.078 * 0.032
  Woman employed man unable to work -0.182 * 0.089 -0.069  0.093 -0.064  0.093 -0.196 * 0.089 -0.083  0.093 -0.079  0.093
  Woman employed man homemaker 0.170  0.160 0.257  0.157 0.301 * 0.138 0.155  0.161 0.243  0.157 0.287 * 0.139
Interactions
Equal earnings, both employed * EGRA Ref. 0.023  0.047
Both not employed * EGRA -0.099  0.172 -0.076  0.173
Both empl., man earned more * EGRA -0.023  0.047 Ref.
Man employed, woman unable * EGRA -0.186 * 0.093 -0.164 # 0.096
Man employed, woman home. * EGRA    -0.019  0.072    0.004  0.078
Both empl., woman earn. more * EGRA -0.010  0.054 0.012  0.063
Woman empl., man unable * EGRA 0.082  0.246 0.105  0.246
Woman empl., man home. * EGRA -0.149  0.298 -0.126  0.300
Source: HILDA 2001-2015. Interactions between female breadwinning and gender role attitudes were not significant. 
Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 and 3.3. Egalitarian gender role 
attitudes, Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household labor, financial prosperity, 
household income, number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, and partner’s self-rated 
health were centered at their mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<.1) differences 
between men and women.
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Table A3.6   Fixed effects regressions analysis of men’s relationship satisfaction  
dependent on breadwinnership and gender role attitudes, defining relative  
earnings by hourly wage
Men
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
(ref: equal earner) (ref: male earns more)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner             
Equal earner       
  Equal earnings, both employed Ref. Ref. Ref. -0.015  0.024 -0.014  0.023 -0.014  0.023
  Both not employed 0.005  0.098 0.089  0.104 0.076  0.112 -0.010  0.097 0.075  0.104 0.062  0.112
Male breadwinner          
  Both employed, man earned more 0.015  0.024 0.014  0.023 0.014  0.023 Ref. Ref. Ref.
  Man employed, woman unable to work -0.076  0.058 -0.058  0.058 -0.078  0.060 -0.091  0.057 -0.073  0.057 -0.092  0.059
  Man employed, woman homemaker 0.112 ** 0.036 0.109 ** 0.039 0.111 ** 0.039 0.097 ** 0.035 0.095 * 0.038 0.096 * 0.038
Female breadwinner                   
  Both employed woman earned more -0.075 * 0.031 -0.064 * 0.030 -0.063 * 0.030 -0.090 ** 0.033 -0.078 * 0.032 -0.078 * 0.032
  Woman employed man unable to work -0.182 * 0.089 -0.069  0.093 -0.064  0.093 -0.196 * 0.089 -0.083  0.093 -0.079  0.093
  Woman employed man homemaker 0.170  0.160 0.257  0.157 0.301 * 0.138 0.155  0.161 0.243  0.157 0.287 * 0.139
Interactions
Equal earnings, both employed * EGRA Ref. 0.023  0.047
Both not employed * EGRA -0.099  0.172 -0.076  0.173
Both empl., man earned more * EGRA -0.023  0.047 Ref.
Man employed, woman unable * EGRA -0.186 * 0.093 -0.164 # 0.096
Man employed, woman home. * EGRA    -0.019  0.072    0.004  0.078
Both empl., woman earn. more * EGRA -0.010  0.054 0.012  0.063
Woman empl., man unable * EGRA 0.082  0.246 0.105  0.246
Woman empl., man home. * EGRA -0.149  0.298 -0.126  0.300
Source: HILDA 2001-2015. Interactions between female breadwinning and gender role attitudes were not significant. 
Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 and 3.3. Egalitarian gender role 
attitudes, Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household labor, financial prosperity, 
household income, number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, and partner’s self-rated 
health were centered at their mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<.1) differences 
between men and women.
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Table A3.6   Fixed effects regressions analysis of men’s relationship satisfaction  
dependent on breadwinnership and gender role attitudes, defining relative  
earnings by hourly wage
Men
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
(ref: equal earner) (ref: male earns more)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner             
Equal earner       
  Equal earnings, both employed Ref. Ref. Ref. -0.015  0.024 -0.014  0.023 -0.014  0.023
  Both not employed 0.005  0.098 0.089  0.104 0.076  0.112 -0.010  0.097 0.075  0.104 0.062  0.112
Male breadwinner          
  Both employed, man earned more 0.015  0.024 0.014  0.023 0.014  0.023 Ref. Ref. Ref.
  Man employed, woman unable to work -0.076  0.058 -0.058  0.058 -0.078  0.060 -0.091  0.057 -0.073  0.057 -0.092  0.059
  Man employed, woman homemaker 0.112 ** 0.036 0.109 ** 0.039 0.111 ** 0.039 0.097 ** 0.035 0.095 * 0.038 0.096 * 0.038
Female breadwinner                   
  Both employed woman earned more -0.075 * 0.031 -0.064 * 0.030 -0.063 * 0.030 -0.090 ** 0.033 -0.078 * 0.032 -0.078 * 0.032
  Woman employed man unable to work -0.182 * 0.089 -0.069  0.093 -0.064  0.093 -0.196 * 0.089 -0.083  0.093 -0.079  0.093
  Woman employed man homemaker 0.170  0.160 0.257  0.157 0.301 * 0.138 0.155  0.161 0.243  0.157 0.287 * 0.139
Interactions
Equal earnings, both employed * EGRA Ref. 0.023  0.047
Both not employed * EGRA -0.099  0.172 -0.076  0.173
Both empl., man earned more * EGRA -0.023  0.047 Ref.
Man employed, woman unable * EGRA -0.186 * 0.093 -0.164 # 0.096
Man employed, woman home. * EGRA    -0.019  0.072    0.004  0.078
Both empl., woman earn. more * EGRA -0.010  0.054 0.012  0.063
Woman empl., man unable * EGRA 0.082  0.246 0.105  0.246
Woman empl., man home. * EGRA -0.149  0.298 -0.126  0.300
Source: HILDA 2001-2015. Interactions between female breadwinning and gender role attitudes were not significant. 
Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 and 3.3. Egalitarian gender role 
attitudes, Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household labor, financial prosperity, 
household income, number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, and partner’s self-rated 
health were centered at their mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<.1) differences 
between men and women.
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Table A3.6   Fixed effects regressions analysis of men’s relationship satisfaction  
dependent on breadwinnership and gender role attitudes, defining relative  
earnings by hourly wage
Men
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
(ref: equal earner) (ref: male earns more)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner             
Equal earner       
  Equal earnings, both employed Ref. Ref. Ref. -0.015  0.024 -0.014  0.023 -0.014  0.023
  Both not employed 0.005  0.098 0.089  0.104 0.076  0.112 -0.010  0.097 0.075  0.104 0.062  0.112
Male breadwinner          
  Both employed, man earned more 0.015  0.024 0.014  0.023 0.014  0.023 Ref. Ref. Ref.
  Man employed, woman unable to work -0.076  0.058 -0.058  0.058 -0.078  0.060 -0.091  0.057 -0.073  0.057 -0.092  0.059
  Man employed, woman homemaker 0.112 ** 0.036 0.109 ** 0.039 0.111 ** 0.039 0.097 ** 0.035 0.095 * 0.038 0.096 * 0.038
Female breadwinner                   
  Both employed woman earned more -0.075 * 0.031 -0.064 * 0.030 -0.063 * 0.030 -0.090 ** 0.033 -0.078 * 0.032 -0.078 * 0.032
  Woman employed man unable to work -0.182 * 0.089 -0.069  0.093 -0.064  0.093 -0.196 * 0.089 -0.083  0.093 -0.079  0.093
  Woman employed man homemaker 0.170  0.160 0.257  0.157 0.301 * 0.138 0.155  0.161 0.243  0.157 0.287 * 0.139
Interactions
Equal earnings, both employed * EGRA Ref. 0.023  0.047
Both not employed * EGRA -0.099  0.172 -0.076  0.173
Both empl., man earned more * EGRA -0.023  0.047 Ref.
Man employed, woman unable * EGRA -0.186 * 0.093 -0.164 # 0.096
Man employed, woman home. * EGRA    -0.019  0.072    0.004  0.078
Both empl., woman earn. more * EGRA -0.010  0.054 0.012  0.063
Woman empl., man unable * EGRA 0.082  0.246 0.105  0.246
Woman empl., man home. * EGRA -0.149  0.298 -0.126  0.300
Source: HILDA 2001-2015. Interactions between female breadwinning and gender role attitudes were not significant. 
Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 and 3.3. Egalitarian gender role 
attitudes, Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household labor, financial prosperity, 
household income, number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, and partner’s self-rated 
health were centered at their mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<.1) differences 
between men and women.
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Table A3.7   Fixed effects regressions analysis of women’s relationship satisfaction  
dependent on breadwinnership and gender role attitudes, defining relative  
earnings by hourly wage
Women
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
(ref: equal earner) (ref: male earns more)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner             
Equal earner             
  Equal earnings, both employed Ref. Ref. Ref. 0.059 * 0.027 0.030  0.025 0.025  0.026
  Both not employed -0.381 * 0.190 -0.289  0.193 -0.281  0.193 -0.322 # 0.190 -0.259  0.192 -0.257  0.191
Male breadwinner          
  Both employed, man earned more -0.059 * 0.027 -0.030  0.025 -0.025  0.026 Ref. Ref. Ref.
  Man employed, woman unable to work 0.020  0.072 0.063  0.074 0.075  0.075 0.079  0.071 0.093  0.073 0.099  0.074
  Man employed, woman homemaker 0.163 *** 0.045 0.178 *** 0.045 0.179 *** 0.047 0.222 *** 0.043 0.208 *** 0.043 0.204 *** 0.044
Female breadwinner                   
  Both employed woman earned more -0.019  0.029 -0.041  0.028 -0.035  0.029 0.040  0.034 -0.010  0.033 -0.010  0.033
  Woman employed man unable to work -0.337 *** 0.094 -0.265 ** 0.094 -0.291 ** 0.097 -0.278 ** 0.095 -0.235 * 0.095 -0.267 ** 0.097
  Woman employed man homemaker -0.032  0.175 0.075  0.166 0.088  0.193 0.027  0.174 0.105  0.166 0.113  0.193
Interactions
Equal earnings, both employed * EGRA Ref. 0.068  0.048
Both not employed * EGRA 0.364  0.261 0.431 # 0.259
Both empl., man earned more * EGRA -0.068  0.048 Ref.
Man employed, woman unable * EGRA -0.132  0.127 -0.065  0.125
Man employed, woman home. * EGRA    0.048  0.090    0.116  0.084
Both empl., woman earn. more * EGRA -0.031  0.052 0.037  0.058
Woman empl., man unable * EGRA 0.332 # 0.180 0.400 * 0.180
Woman empl., man home. * EGRA 0.030  0.288 0.098  0.288
Source: HILDA 2001-2015. Interactions between female breadwinning and gender role attitudes were not 
significant. Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 and 3.3. Egalitarian 
gender role attitudes, Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household labor, financial 
prosperity, household income, number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, and partner’s 
self-rated health were centered at their mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<.1) 
differences between men and women.
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Table A3.7   Fixed effects regressions analysis of women’s relationship satisfaction  
dependent on breadwinnership and gender role attitudes, defining relative  
earnings by hourly wage
Women
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
(ref: equal earner) (ref: male earns more)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner             
Equal earner             
  Equal earnings, both employed Ref. Ref. Ref. 0.059 * 0.027 0.030  0.025 0.025  0.026
  Both not employed -0.381 * 0.190 -0.289  0.193 -0.281  0.193 -0.322 # 0.190 -0.259  0.192 -0.257  0.191
Male breadwinner          
  Both employed, man earned more -0.059 * 0.027 -0.030  0.025 -0.025  0.026 Ref. Ref. Ref.
  Man employed, woman unable to work 0.020  0.072 0.063  0.074 0.075  0.075 0.079  0.071 0.093  0.073 0.099  0.074
  Man employed, woman homemaker 0.163 *** 0.045 0.178 *** 0.045 0.179 *** 0.047 0.222 *** 0.043 0.208 *** 0.043 0.204 *** 0.044
Female breadwinner                   
  Both employed woman earned more -0.019  0.029 -0.041  0.028 -0.035  0.029 0.040  0.034 -0.010  0.033 -0.010  0.033
  Woman employed man unable to work -0.337 *** 0.094 -0.265 ** 0.094 -0.291 ** 0.097 -0.278 ** 0.095 -0.235 * 0.095 -0.267 ** 0.097
  Woman employed man homemaker -0.032  0.175 0.075  0.166 0.088  0.193 0.027  0.174 0.105  0.166 0.113  0.193
Interactions
Equal earnings, both employed * EGRA Ref. 0.068  0.048
Both not employed * EGRA 0.364  0.261 0.431 # 0.259
Both empl., man earned more * EGRA -0.068  0.048 Ref.
Man employed, woman unable * EGRA -0.132  0.127 -0.065  0.125
Man employed, woman home. * EGRA    0.048  0.090    0.116  0.084
Both empl., woman earn. more * EGRA -0.031  0.052 0.037  0.058
Woman empl., man unable * EGRA 0.332 # 0.180 0.400 * 0.180
Woman empl., man home. * EGRA 0.030  0.288 0.098  0.288
Source: HILDA 2001-2015. Interactions between female breadwinning and gender role attitudes were not 
significant. Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 and 3.3. Egalitarian 
gender role attitudes, Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household labor, financial 
prosperity, household income, number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, and partner’s 
self-rated health were centered at their mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<.1) 
differences between men and women.
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Table A3.8   Fixed effects regressions analysis of men’s relationship satisfaction dependent  
on breadwinnership and gender role attitudes, separating the unable to work  
into unemployed or unable to work due to sickness or disability
Men
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
(ref: equal earner) (ref: male earns more)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner             
Equal earners
Equal earnings, both employed Ref. Ref. Ref. 0.022  0.025 -0.005  0.025 -0.005  0.025
Both not employed -0.015  0.096 0.114  0.104 0.100  0.112 0.007  0.095 0.110  0.102 0.095  0.111
Male breadwinner
Both employed, men earned more -0.022  0.025 0.005  0.025 0.005  0.025 Ref. Ref. Ref.
Man employed, woman unemployed -0.060  0.064 -0.035  0.064 -0.054  0.065 -0.038  0.060 -0.040  0.060 -0.058  0.061
Man employed, woman sick -0.157  0.121 -0.044  0.119 -0.067  0.133 -0.135  0.121 -0.048  0.119 -0.072  0.133
Man employed, woman homemaker 0.095 * 0.038 0.119 ** 0.042 0.120 ** 0.041 0.118 *** 0.034 0.115 ** 0.036 0.116 ** 0.036
Female breadwinner                   
Both employed, women earned more -0.064 # 0.038 -0.079 * 0.038 -0.081 * 0.038 -0.041  0.042 -0.083 * 0.042 -0.085 * 0.042
Woman employed, man unemployed -0.214 * 0.088 -0.102  0.091 -0.105  0.091 -0.191 * 0.088 -0.107  0.090 -0.110  0.090
Woman employed., man sick -0.256 # 0.150 -0.081  0.149 -0.065  0.146 -0.234  0.150 -0.086  0.149 -0.070  0.146
Woman employed, man homemaker -0.070  0.170 0.077  0.172 0.096  0.189 -0.047  0.170 0.072  0.172 0.091  0.189
Interactions
Equal earnings, both employed * EGRA Ref. 0.037  0.048
Both not employed * EGRA -0.127  0.163 -0.090  0.165
Both empl., men earned more * EGRA -0.037  0.048 Ref.
Man empl., woman unempl. * EGRA -0.207 # 0.106 -0.170 # 0.102
Man employed, woman sick * EGRA -0.180  0.196 -0.143  0.196
Man empl., woman homemaker * EGRA -0.045  0.076    -0.008  0.073
Both empl., women earn. more * EGRA    -0.081  0.066 -0.044  0.073
Woman empl., man unempl. * EGRA -0.034  0.172 0.003  0.174
Woman employed., man sick * EGRA 0.071  0.376 0.108  0.380
Woman empl., man homemaker* EGRA -0.136  0.358 -0.099  0.359
Source: HILDA 2001-2015. Interactions between female breadwinning and gender role attitudes were not significant. 
Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 and 3.3. Egalitarian gender role 
attitudes, Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household labor, financial prosperity, 
household income, number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, and partner’s self-rated health 
were centered at their mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<.1) differences between 
men and women.
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Table A3.8   Fixed effects regressions analysis of men’s relationship satisfaction dependent  
on breadwinnership and gender role attitudes, separating the unable to work  
into unemployed or unable to work due to sickness or disability
Men
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
(ref: equal earner) (ref: male earns more)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner             
Equal earners
Equal earnings, both employed Ref. Ref. Ref. 0.022  0.025 -0.005  0.025 -0.005  0.025
Both not employed -0.015  0.096 0.114  0.104 0.100  0.112 0.007  0.095 0.110  0.102 0.095  0.111
Male breadwinner
Both employed, men earned more -0.022  0.025 0.005  0.025 0.005  0.025 Ref. Ref. Ref.
Man employed, woman unemployed -0.060  0.064 -0.035  0.064 -0.054  0.065 -0.038  0.060 -0.040  0.060 -0.058  0.061
Man employed, woman sick -0.157  0.121 -0.044  0.119 -0.067  0.133 -0.135  0.121 -0.048  0.119 -0.072  0.133
Man employed, woman homemaker 0.095 * 0.038 0.119 ** 0.042 0.120 ** 0.041 0.118 *** 0.034 0.115 ** 0.036 0.116 ** 0.036
Female breadwinner                   
Both employed, women earned more -0.064 # 0.038 -0.079 * 0.038 -0.081 * 0.038 -0.041  0.042 -0.083 * 0.042 -0.085 * 0.042
Woman employed, man unemployed -0.214 * 0.088 -0.102  0.091 -0.105  0.091 -0.191 * 0.088 -0.107  0.090 -0.110  0.090
Woman employed., man sick -0.256 # 0.150 -0.081  0.149 -0.065  0.146 -0.234  0.150 -0.086  0.149 -0.070  0.146
Woman employed, man homemaker -0.070  0.170 0.077  0.172 0.096  0.189 -0.047  0.170 0.072  0.172 0.091  0.189
Interactions
Equal earnings, both employed * EGRA Ref. 0.037  0.048
Both not employed * EGRA -0.127  0.163 -0.090  0.165
Both empl., men earned more * EGRA -0.037  0.048 Ref.
Man empl., woman unempl. * EGRA -0.207 # 0.106 -0.170 # 0.102
Man employed, woman sick * EGRA -0.180  0.196 -0.143  0.196
Man empl., woman homemaker * EGRA -0.045  0.076    -0.008  0.073
Both empl., women earn. more * EGRA    -0.081  0.066 -0.044  0.073
Woman empl., man unempl. * EGRA -0.034  0.172 0.003  0.174
Woman employed., man sick * EGRA 0.071  0.376 0.108  0.380
Woman empl., man homemaker* EGRA -0.136  0.358 -0.099  0.359
Source: HILDA 2001-2015. Interactions between female breadwinning and gender role attitudes were not significant. 
Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 and 3.3. Egalitarian gender role 
attitudes, Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household labor, financial prosperity, 
household income, number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, and partner’s self-rated health 
were centered at their mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<.1) differences between 
men and women.
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Table A3.9   Fixed effects regressions analysis of women’s relationship satisfaction dependent  
on breadwinnership and gender role attitudes, separating the unable to work into  
unemployed or unable to work due to sickness or disability
Women
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
(ref: equal earner) (ref: male earns more)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner
Equal earners
Equal earnings, both employed Ref. Ref. Ref. 0.092 *** 0.028 0.045 # 0.027 0.040  0.027
Both not employed -0.262 * 0.108 -0.138  0.117 -0.129  0.114 -0.170  0.107 -0.094  0.115 -0.089  0.112
Male breadwinner
Both employed, men earned more -0.092 *** 0.028 -0.045 # 0.027 -0.040  0.027 Ref. Ref. Ref.
Man employed, woman unemployed -0.123 # 0.068 -0.070  0.071 -0.072  0.071 -0.031  0.064 -0.025  0.066 -0.032  0.066
Man employed, woman sick -0.150  0.161 0.035  0.161 0.033  0.160 -0.058  0.161 0.080  0.160 0.073  0.159
Man employed, woman homemaker 0.077 # 0.043 0.131 ** 0.046 0.134 ** 0.046 0.169 *** 0.037 0.175 *** 0.040 0.174 *** 0.040
Female breadwinner
Both employed, women earned more -0.072 # 0.039 -0.100 ** 0.039 -0.105 ** 0.040 0.020  0.042 -0.055  0.042 -0.065  0.043
Woman employed, man unemployed -0.225 * 0.099 -0.153  0.102 -0.184 # 0.107 -0.132  0.099 -0.108  0.101 -0.143  0.105
Woman employed, man sick -0.625 *** 0.153 -0.507 *** 0.152 -0.509 *** 0.152 -0.533 *** 0.153 -0.462 ** 0.152 -0.469 ** 0.152
Woman employed, man homemaker -0.045  0.166 0.072  0.160 0.108  0.186 0.047  0.166 0.117  0.160 0.148  0.186
Interactions 
Equal earnings, both empl. * EGRA   Ref.   0.045  0.047
Both not employed * EGRA  0.041  0.168  0.085  0.168
Both empl., men earn. more * EGRA  -0.045  0.047  Ref.
Man empl., woman unempl. * EGRA    -0.176 # 0.102    -0.132  0.097
Man employed, woman sick * EGRA    -0.013  0.309 0.032  0.308
Man employed, woman home. * EGRA 0.000  0.070    0.045  0.064
Both empl., women earn. more * EGRA 0.033  0.064 0.077  0.070
Woman empl., man unempl. * EGRA 0.224  0.188 0.269  0.187
Woman employed, man sick * EGRA -0.167  0.234 -0.123  0.233
Woman employed, man home. * EGRA -0.070  0.264 -0.025  0.265
Source: HILDA 2001-2015. Interactions between female breadwinning and gender role attitudes were not 
significant. Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 and 3.3. Egalitarian gender 
role attitudes, Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household labor, financial prosperity, 
household income, number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, and partner’s self-rated health 
were centered at their mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<.1) differences between 
men and women.
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Table A3.9   Fixed effects regressions analysis of women’s relationship satisfaction dependent  
on breadwinnership and gender role attitudes, separating the unable to work into  
unemployed or unable to work due to sickness or disability
Women
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
(ref: equal earner) (ref: male earns more)
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Breadwinner
Equal earners
Equal earnings, both employed Ref. Ref. Ref. 0.092 *** 0.028 0.045 # 0.027 0.040  0.027
Both not employed -0.262 * 0.108 -0.138  0.117 -0.129  0.114 -0.170  0.107 -0.094  0.115 -0.089  0.112
Male breadwinner
Both employed, men earned more -0.092 *** 0.028 -0.045 # 0.027 -0.040  0.027 Ref. Ref. Ref.
Man employed, woman unemployed -0.123 # 0.068 -0.070  0.071 -0.072  0.071 -0.031  0.064 -0.025  0.066 -0.032  0.066
Man employed, woman sick -0.150  0.161 0.035  0.161 0.033  0.160 -0.058  0.161 0.080  0.160 0.073  0.159
Man employed, woman homemaker 0.077 # 0.043 0.131 ** 0.046 0.134 ** 0.046 0.169 *** 0.037 0.175 *** 0.040 0.174 *** 0.040
Female breadwinner
Both employed, women earned more -0.072 # 0.039 -0.100 ** 0.039 -0.105 ** 0.040 0.020  0.042 -0.055  0.042 -0.065  0.043
Woman employed, man unemployed -0.225 * 0.099 -0.153  0.102 -0.184 # 0.107 -0.132  0.099 -0.108  0.101 -0.143  0.105
Woman employed, man sick -0.625 *** 0.153 -0.507 *** 0.152 -0.509 *** 0.152 -0.533 *** 0.153 -0.462 ** 0.152 -0.469 ** 0.152
Woman employed, man homemaker -0.045  0.166 0.072  0.160 0.108  0.186 0.047  0.166 0.117  0.160 0.148  0.186
Interactions 
Equal earnings, both empl. * EGRA   Ref.   0.045  0.047
Both not employed * EGRA  0.041  0.168  0.085  0.168
Both empl., men earn. more * EGRA  -0.045  0.047  Ref.
Man empl., woman unempl. * EGRA    -0.176 # 0.102    -0.132  0.097
Man employed, woman sick * EGRA    -0.013  0.309 0.032  0.308
Man employed, woman home. * EGRA 0.000  0.070    0.045  0.064
Both empl., women earn. more * EGRA 0.033  0.064 0.077  0.070
Woman empl., man unempl. * EGRA 0.224  0.188 0.269  0.187
Woman employed, man sick * EGRA -0.167  0.234 -0.123  0.233
Woman employed, man home. * EGRA -0.070  0.264 -0.025  0.265
Source: HILDA 2001-2015. Interactions between female breadwinning and gender role attitudes were not 
significant. Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are controlled for all other variables listed in Table 3.2 and 3.3. Egalitarian gender 
role attitudes, Couple’s work hours, Household labor hours , men’s share of household labor, financial prosperity, 
household income, number of children in the different age groups, self-rated health, and partner’s self-rated health 
were centered at their mean. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<.1) differences between 
men and women.
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Appendix Chapter 4
Table A4.1   Descriptive statistics of satisfaction with family life and country 
characteristics per country 
 Mean 
Satisfaction 
with family life 
Change 
Unemployment % 
2008-2011 
Social 
Protection 
Expenditure
GDP
 per 
capita
N Total
Sample 
N 
Employed 
sample 
Austria 8.57 0.5 28.2 51.12 384 350
Belgium 8.23 0.1 28.4 47.70 313 267
Bulgaria 8.05 5.6 16.1 7.75 278 232
Croatia 8.75 5.1 20.0 14.54 302 220
Cyprus 9.18 4.1 20.5 31.84 432 270
Czech republic 8.08 2.2 19.5 21.66 408 367
Denmark 9.00 4.0 31.2 61.30 361 333
Estonia 8.35 7.0 15.5 17.45 237 201
Finland 8.80 1.5 28.0 50.79 325 309
France 8.49 1.8 30.7 43.81 792 686
Germany 8.47 -1.7 27.3 45.94 890 704
Greece 8.33 10.1 29.1 25.87 320 219
Hungary 8.50 3.3 21.5 14.03 274 238
Iceland 9.02 4.2 23.7 45.97 481 450
Ireland 8.73 8.3 21.9 52.83 398 271
Italy 8.12 1.7 27.3 38.36 841 613
Latvia 8.26 8.5 14.9 13.78 261 203
Lithuania 8.61 9.7 16.2 14.37 292 236
Luxembourg 8.68 -0.1 21.9 113.24 405 337
Malta 8.64 0.7 18.0 22.35 373 256
Netherlands 8.10 2.0 28.2 53.54 377 326
Poland 7.98 2.5 18.1 13.89 686 532
Portugal 8.42 5.1 24.2 23.19 298 226
Romania 8.95 1.6 16.2 9.20 379 290
Slovakia 8.31 4.0 17.4 18.14 324 295
Slovenia 8.54 3.9 24.1 24.98 289 250
Spain 8.49 10.3 24.9 31.83 538 337
Sweden 8.85 1.8 27.7 59.59 308 291
Turkey 8.13 -0.8 12.9 10.58 781 293
UK 8.46 2.2 28.3 41.02 686 575
Sources: EQLS 2012, Eurostat. Mean Satisfaction with family is mean satisfaction in the total sample.
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Table A4.3   Negative biomial models, relationship satisfaction is reversed. The influence of  
economic hardship on satisfaction with family life
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Full sample Only employed Full sample Only employed
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Intercept 0.428 *** 0.048 0.358 *** 0.052 0.429 *** 0.048 0.363 0.000 0.052
Current economic hardship
Financial hardship 0.117 *** 0.009 0.115 *** 0.011 0.122 *** 0.013 0.134 *** 0.013
Unemployed (ref.=not) 0.095 ** 0.036 0.095 ** 0.036
Partner unemployed (ref.=not) 0.055  0.041 0.032  0.053 0.056  0.041 0.034  0.053
Expected economic hardship
Expected financial situation (ref.=same)
Better -0.096 *** 0.028 -0.087 ** 0.032 -0.097 *** 0.028 -0.086 ** 0.032
Worse 0.132 *** 0.024 0.102 *** 0.028 0.125 *** 0.025 0.104 *** 0.028
Expected job loss (ref.=unlikely)
Neither likely nor unlikely 0.182 *** 0.031 0.198 *** 0.032
Likely 0.082 * 0.034 0.084 * 0.036
Male (ref.=female) -0.073 *** 0.020 -0.075 *** 0.023 -0.074 *** 0.020 -0.076 *** 0.023
Age 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001
Education (ref.=less than upper secondary)
Upper secondary -0.019  0.027 0.000  0.033 -0.018  0.027 0.000  0.033
Tertiary -0.059 * 0.030 -0.039  0.035 -0.058  0.030 -0.038  0.035
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two -0.054 * 0.022 -0.040  0.024 -0.055 * 0.022 -0.041  0.024
Three or more -0.075 * 0.035 -0.096 * 0.042 -0.075 * 0.035 -0.098 * 0.042
Support -0.353 *** 0.075 -0.285 ** 0.093 -0.350 *** 0.075 -0.299 ** 0.093
Macro-level indicators
Change in Unemployment % -0.015  0.013 -0.010  0.013 -0.015  0.013 -0.010  0.013
GDP -0.001  0.002 0.000  0.002 -0.001  0.002 0.000  0.002
Social protection expenditure 0.002  0.009 0.005  0.009 0.002  0.009 0.005  0.009
Interaction coefficients
Financial hardship * Better financial future -0.029  0.022
Financial hardship * Worse financial future 0.004  0.019
Financial hardship * Expected job loss, neither -0.089 ** 0.028
Financial hardship * Expected job loss, likely -0.031  0.026
Source: EQLS 2012. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
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Table A4.3   Negative biomial models, relationship satisfaction is reversed. The influence of  
economic hardship on satisfaction with family life
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Full sample Only employed Full sample Only employed
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Intercept 0.428 *** 0.048 0.358 *** 0.052 0.429 *** 0.048 0.363 0.000 0.052
Current economic hardship
Financial hardship 0.117 *** 0.009 0.115 *** 0.011 0.122 *** 0.013 0.134 *** 0.013
Unemployed (ref.=not) 0.095 ** 0.036 0.095 ** 0.036
Partner unemployed (ref.=not) 0.055  0.041 0.032  0.053 0.056  0.041 0.034  0.053
Expected economic hardship
Expected financial situation (ref.=same)
Better -0.096 *** 0.028 -0.087 ** 0.032 -0.097 *** 0.028 -0.086 ** 0.032
Worse 0.132 *** 0.024 0.102 *** 0.028 0.125 *** 0.025 0.104 *** 0.028
Expected job loss (ref.=unlikely)
Neither likely nor unlikely 0.182 *** 0.031 0.198 *** 0.032
Likely 0.082 * 0.034 0.084 * 0.036
Male (ref.=female) -0.073 *** 0.020 -0.075 *** 0.023 -0.074 *** 0.020 -0.076 *** 0.023
Age 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001
Education (ref.=less than upper secondary)
Upper secondary -0.019  0.027 0.000  0.033 -0.018  0.027 0.000  0.033
Tertiary -0.059 * 0.030 -0.039  0.035 -0.058  0.030 -0.038  0.035
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two -0.054 * 0.022 -0.040  0.024 -0.055 * 0.022 -0.041  0.024
Three or more -0.075 * 0.035 -0.096 * 0.042 -0.075 * 0.035 -0.098 * 0.042
Support -0.353 *** 0.075 -0.285 ** 0.093 -0.350 *** 0.075 -0.299 ** 0.093
Macro-level indicators
Change in Unemployment % -0.015  0.013 -0.010  0.013 -0.015  0.013 -0.010  0.013
GDP -0.001  0.002 0.000  0.002 -0.001  0.002 0.000  0.002
Social protection expenditure 0.002  0.009 0.005  0.009 0.002  0.009 0.005  0.009
Interaction coefficients
Financial hardship * Better financial future -0.029  0.022
Financial hardship * Worse financial future 0.004  0.019
Financial hardship * Expected job loss, neither -0.089 ** 0.028
Financial hardship * Expected job loss, likely -0.031  0.026
Source: EQLS 2012. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
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Table A4.4   Negative biomial models, relationship satisfaction is reversed. Current 
and expected economic hardship and dissatisfaction with family life, and 
the dependency on the presence of children and change in macro-level 
unemployment
Model 5 Model 10
Financial hardship (full sample) B  SE B  SE
Financial hardship 0.118 *** 0.014 0.124 *** 0.016
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two children -0.053 * 0.022
Three or more children -0.086 * 0.036
Financial hardship * One or two children -0.010 0.017
Financial hardship * Three or more children 0.030 0.026
% Change Unemployment -0.014 0.013
Financial hardship * % Change Unemployment    0.000  0.005
Model 6 Model 11
Respondent’s unemployment (full sample) B  SE B  SE
Unemployed (ref.=not) 0.125 * 0.055 0.103 ** 0.037
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two children -0.050 * 0.023
Three or more children -0.065 0.037
Unemployment * One or two children -0.037 0.072
Unemployment * Three or more children -0.108 0.117
% Change Unemployment -0.014 0.013
Unemployment * % Change Unemployment    -0.011  0.010
Model 7 Model 12
Partner unemployment (full sample) B  SE B  SE
Partner Unemployed (ref.=not) 0.030 0.064 0.060 0.047
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two children -0.054 * 0.022
Three or more children -0.091 * 0.022
Partner unemployment * One or two children -0.006 0.084
Partner unemployment * Three or more children 0.023 0.129
% Change Unemployment -0.014 0.013
Partner unemployment *  
% Change Unemployment
   -0.010  0.013
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Table A4.4   Continued
Model 8 Model 13
Future financial situation (full sample) B  SE B  SE
Expected financial situation (ref.=same)
Better financial future -0.093 * 0.047 -0.106 ** 0.035
Worse financial future 0.117 * 0.038 0.126 *** 0.026
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two children -0.044 0.030
Three or more children -0.173 *** 0.051
Better financial future * One or two children -0.034 0.059
Better financial future * Three or more children 0.143 0.090
Worse financial future * One or two children -0.012 0.048
Worse financial future * Three or more children 0.198 ** 0.077
% Change Unemployment -0.012 0.013
Better financial future * % Change 
Unemployment
-0.002 0.011
Worse financial future * % Change 
Unemployment
   -0.005  0.008
Model 9 Model 14
Expected job loss (only employed sample) B  SE B  SE
Expected job loss (ref.=unlikely)
Job loss, neither likely nor unlikely 0.286 *** 0.048 0.179 *** 0.031
Job loss, likely 0.084 0.055 0.082 0.034
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two children -0.002 0.030
Three or more children -0.092 0.050
Job loss, neither * One or two children -0.187 ** 0.063
Job loss, neither * Three or more children -0.092 0.118
Job loss, likely * One or two children -0.021 0.070
Job loss, likely * Three or more children 0.084 0.113
% Change Unemployment -0.006 0.013
Job loss, neither * % Change Unemployment -0.007 0.010
Job loss, likely * % Change Unemployment    -0.012  0.010
Source: EQLS 2012. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  Results based on multilevel negative biomial models. Controlled 
for all other variables included in Table 4.2.
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Table A4.6   Current and expected economic hardship and satisfaction with family life, 
and the dependency on the presence of children and change in macro-level 
unemployment, only including people aged 25 to 55
Model 5 Model 10
Financial hardship (full sample) B  SE B  SE
Financial hardship -0.160 *** 0.025 -0.171 *** 0.023
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two children 0.122 *** 0.035
Three or more children 0.159 ** 0.053
Financial hardship * One or two children 0.005 0.028
Financial hardship * Three or more children -0.071 0.040
% Change Unemployment 0.030 0.017
Financial hardship * % Change Unemployment    0.001 0.007
Model 6 Model 11
Respondent’s unemployment (full sample) B  SE B  SE
Unemployed (ref.=not) -0.175 * 0.103 -0.158 * 0.062
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two children 0.123 *** 0.037
Three or more children 0.126 * 0.055
Unemployment * One or two children 0.009 0.127
Unemployment * Three or more children 0.248 0.183
% Change Unemployment 0.031  0.017
Unemployment * % Change Unemployment    0.025  0.017
Model 7 Model 12
Partner unemployment (full sample) B  SE B  SE
Partner Unemployed (ref.=not) -0.123 0.112 -0.179 0.092
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two children 0.123 *** 0.036
Three or more children 0.173 *** 0.054
Partner unemployment * One or two children 0.025 0.140
Partner unemployment * Three or more children -0.416 * 0.208
% Change Unemployment 0.030 0.017
Partner unemployment * % Change 
Unemployment
   0.021 0.026
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Table A4.6   Continued
Model 8 Model 13
Future financial situation (full sample) B  SE B  SE
Expected financial situation (ref.=same)
Better financial future 0.092 0.077 0.138 ** 0.050
Worse financial future -0.288 *** 0.069 -0.240 *** 0.049
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two children 0.082 0.049
Three or more children 0.231 *** 0.077
Better financial future * One or two children 0.076 0.094
Better financial future * Three or more children -0.104 0.136
Worse financial future * One or two children 0.094 0.083
Worse financial future * Three or more children -0.197 0.125
% Change Unemployment 0.025 0.018
Better financial future * % Change Unemployment 0.013 0.016
Worse financial future * % Change 
Unemployment
   0.016 0.015
Model 9 Model 14
Expected job loss (only employed sample) B  SE B  SE
Expected job loss (ref.=unlikely)
Job loss, neither likely nor unlikely -0.346 *** 0.082 -0.208 *** 0.051
Job loss, likely -0.119 0.089 -0.132 * 0.053
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two children 0.068 0.045
Three or more children 0.202 ** 0.071
Job loss, neither * One or two children 0.224 * 0.102
Job loss, neither * Three or more children 0.037 0.172
Job loss, likely * One or two children -0.008 0.107
Job loss, likely * Three or more children -0.157 0.163
% Change Unemployment 0.015 0.017
Job loss, neither * % Change Unemployment 0.021 0.015
Job loss, likely * % Change Unemployment    0.015 0.076
Source: EQLS 2012. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Results based on multilevel models. Controlled for all other 
variables included in Table 4.2.
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Table A4.8   Current and expected economic hardship and dissatisfaction with family 
life, and the dependency on the presence of children. Differentiating people 
without children below and above age 40
Model 5
Financial hardship (full sample) B  SE
Financial hardship -0.160 *** 0.035
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two children 0.267 *** 0.050
Three or more children 0.277 *** 0.063
No children 40+ 0.316 *** 0.066
Financial hardship * One or two children 0.002 0.038
Financial hardship * Three or more children -0.062 0.047
Financial hardship * no children 40+ -0.025 0.042
Model 6
Respondent’s unemployment (full sample) B  SE
Unemployed (ref.=not) -0.331 * 0.140
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two children 0.254 *** 0.051
Three or more children 0.237 *** 0.065
No children 40+ 0.311 *** 0.067
Unemployment * One or two children 0.179 0.157
Unemployment * Three or more children 0.358 0.204
Unemployment * No children 40+ 0.111 0.172
Model 7
Partner unemployment (full sample) B  SE
Partner Unemployed (ref.=not) 0.054 0.161
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two children 0.280 *** 0.051
Three or more children 0.308 *** 0.064
No children 40+ 0.340 *** 0.066
Partner unemployment * One or two children -0.138 0.180
Partner unemployment * Three or more children -0.605 ** 0.235
Partner unemployment * No children 40+ -0.271 0.196
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Table A4.8   Continued
Model 8
Future financial situation (full sample) B  SE
Better financial future 0.160 0.099
Worse financial future -0.327 ** 0.105
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two children 0.236 *** 0.067
Three or more children 0.361 *** 0.088
No children 40+ 0.292 *** 0.082
Better financial future * One or two children 0.002 0.112
Better financial future * Three or more children -0.178 0.146
Better financial future * No children 40+ -0.002 0.136
Worse financial future * One or two children 0.142 0.112
Worse financial future * Three or more children -0.143 0.148
Worse financial future * No children 40+ 0.129 0.122
Model 9
Expected job loss (only employed sample) B  SE
Job loss, neither likely nor unlikely -0.405 *** 0.116
Job loss, likely -0.341 ** 0.123
Children under 25 (ref.=none)
One or two children 0.151 * 0.063
Three or more children 0.257 ** 0.082
No children 40+ 0.267 *** 0.079
Job loss, neither * One or two children 0.268 * 0.129
Job loss, neither * Three or more children 0.105 0.193
Job loss, neither * No children 40+ -0.047 0.145
Job loss, likely * One or two children 0.229 0.137
Job loss, likely * Three or more children 0.096 0.180
Job loss, likely * No children 40+ 0.346 * 0.155
Source: EQLS 2012. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  Results based on multilevel models. Controlled for all other 
variables included in Table 4.2.
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Appendix Chapter 5
Table A5.1   Relationship satisfaction squared. Men’s relationship satisfaction and  
individual’s and partner’s job insecurity, random (differences between people)  
and fixed (changes within people over time) effects models
Random effect models Fixed effect models
Men Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Individual’s job insecurity 
(ref.=secure)
   Job is bit secure -2.321 *** 0.660 -2.476 *** 0.681 -2.328 *** 0.662 -1.350 # 0.706 -1.533 * 0.731 -1.335 # 0.708
   Job is insecure -3.861 *** 0.798 -4.041 *** 0.822 -3.869 *** 0.799 -2.376 ** 0.841 -2.568 ** 0.866 -2.371 ** 0.840
   Unempl. or UtW -3.499 ** 1.238 -3.602 ** 1.231 -3.519 ** 1.243 -0.821  1.440 -0.881  1.457 -0.754  1.450
Partner’s job insecurity 
(ref.=secure)
      
   Job is bit secure -0.243  0.596 -0.230  0.595 -0.268  0.601 0.217  0.656 0.236  0.656 0.204  0.657
   Job is insecure -1.291 # 0.746 -1.273 # 0.741 -1.325 # 0.751 -0.375  0.798 -0.350  0.793 -0.367  0.798
   Unempl. or UtW -2.463 * 1.209 -2.424 * 1.209 -2.502 * 1.209 -0.119  1.425 -0.042  1.421 0.141  1.417
   Homemaker -0.915  0.947 -0.904  0.945 -1.022  0.985 -2.008  1.271 -2.011  1.266 -1.980  1.308
Individual’s education -0.314 * 0.146 -0.598 ** 0.199 -0.314 * 0.146
Partner’s education -0.470 ** 0.158 -0.468 ** 0.158 -0.618 * 0.240
Individual’s JI*Own educ.
   Job is bit secure * Educ. 0.249  0.185 0.393 # 0.204
   Job is insecure * Educ. 0.534 * 0.232 0.638 * 0.262
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ. 0.391  0.380 0.638  0.471
Partner’s JI.*Partner’s educ.
   Job is bit secure * Educ. 0.160  0.223 0.352  0.247
   Job is insecure * Educ. 0.306  0.270 0.383  0.319
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ. 0.109  0.463 0.932 # 0.554
   Homemaker * Education 0.074  0.328 0.453  0.476
Constant 69.092 *** 1.402 69.259 *** 1.406 69.133 *** 1.401 71.067 *** 2.195 71.288 *** 2.209 71.117 *** 2.175
Sigma u 16.350 16.357 16.293 21.445 21.685 21.706  
Sigma e 12.539 12.532 12.538 12.539 12.532 12.538
Source. LISS panel 2008-2015, 6,753 observations of 2,091 men. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is 
significant (p<0.1) difference between men and women. Models are controlled for all variables listed in Table 5.2. 
JI = job insecurity, UtW = unable to work
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Table A5.1   Relationship satisfaction squared. Men’s relationship satisfaction and  
individual’s and partner’s job insecurity, random (differences between people)  
and fixed (changes within people over time) effects models
Random effect models Fixed effect models
Men Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Individual’s job insecurity 
(ref.=secure)
   Job is bit secure -2.321 *** 0.660 -2.476 *** 0.681 -2.328 *** 0.662 -1.350 # 0.706 -1.533 * 0.731 -1.335 # 0.708
   Job is insecure -3.861 *** 0.798 -4.041 *** 0.822 -3.869 *** 0.799 -2.376 ** 0.841 -2.568 ** 0.866 -2.371 ** 0.840
   Unempl. or UtW -3.499 ** 1.238 -3.602 ** 1.231 -3.519 ** 1.243 -0.821  1.440 -0.881  1.457 -0.754  1.450
Partner’s job insecurity 
(ref.=secure)
      
   Job is bit secure -0.243  0.596 -0.230  0.595 -0.268  0.601 0.217  0.656 0.236  0.656 0.204  0.657
   Job is insecure -1.291 # 0.746 -1.273 # 0.741 -1.325 # 0.751 -0.375  0.798 -0.350  0.793 -0.367  0.798
   Unempl. or UtW -2.463 * 1.209 -2.424 * 1.209 -2.502 * 1.209 -0.119  1.425 -0.042  1.421 0.141  1.417
   Homemaker -0.915  0.947 -0.904  0.945 -1.022  0.985 -2.008  1.271 -2.011  1.266 -1.980  1.308
Individual’s education -0.314 * 0.146 -0.598 ** 0.199 -0.314 * 0.146
Partner’s education -0.470 ** 0.158 -0.468 ** 0.158 -0.618 * 0.240
Individual’s JI*Own educ.
   Job is bit secure * Educ. 0.249  0.185 0.393 # 0.204
   Job is insecure * Educ. 0.534 * 0.232 0.638 * 0.262
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ. 0.391  0.380 0.638  0.471
Partner’s JI.*Partner’s educ.
   Job is bit secure * Educ. 0.160  0.223 0.352  0.247
   Job is insecure * Educ. 0.306  0.270 0.383  0.319
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ. 0.109  0.463 0.932 # 0.554
   Homemaker * Education 0.074  0.328 0.453  0.476
Constant 69.092 *** 1.402 69.259 *** 1.406 69.133 *** 1.401 71.067 *** 2.195 71.288 *** 2.209 71.117 *** 2.175
Sigma u 16.350 16.357 16.293 21.445 21.685 21.706  
Sigma e 12.539 12.532 12.538 12.539 12.532 12.538
Source. LISS panel 2008-2015, 6,753 observations of 2,091 men. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is 
significant (p<0.1) difference between men and women. Models are controlled for all variables listed in Table 5.2. 
JI = job insecurity, UtW = unable to work
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Table A5.2   Relationship satisfaction squared. Women’s relationship satisfaction and  
individual’s and partner’s job insecurity, random (differences between people)  
and fixed (changes within people over time) effects models
Random effect models Fixed effect models
 Women Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
 B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE
Individual’s job insecurity 
(ref.=secure)
   Job is bit secure -1.267 * 0.617 -1.325 * 0.615 -1.256 * 0.617 -0.356  0.669 -0.410  0.666 -0.344  0.668
   Job is insecure -2.041 * 0.807 -2.094 * 0.807 -2.034 * 0.806 -0.536  0.849 -0.586  0.844 -0.534  0.848
   Unempl. or UtW -2.391 # 1.271 -2.533 # 1.322 -2.399 # 1.271 0.762  1.458 0.740  1.491 0.722  1.457
   Homemaker -1.047  1.029 -0.970  1.047 -1.051  1.029 0.340  1.476 -0.153  1.480 0.308  1.476
Partner’s job insecurity 
(ref.=secure)
   Job is bit secure -1.365 * 0.566 -1.370 * 0.567 -1.331 * 0.576 -0.918  0.601 -0.914  0.601 -0.886  0.612
   Job is insecure -2.446 *** 0.685 -2.459 *** 0.686 -2.425 *** 0.695 -1.581 * 0.753 -1.580 * 0.754 -1.557 * 0.763
   Unempl. or UtW -7.032 *** 1.242 -7.016 *** 1.241 -6.894 *** 1.241 -4.661 ** 1.500 -4.685 ** 1.495 -4.381 ** 1.519
Individual’s education -0.614 *** 0.158 -0.871 *** 0.248 -0.614 *** 0.158
Partner’s education 0.262 # 0.152 0.263 # 0.152 0.296  0.203
Interactions
Individual’s JI*Own educ.
   Job is bit secure * Educ. 0.299  0.234 0.379  0.250
   Job is insecure * Educ. 0.355  0.260 0.302  0.296
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ. 0.087  0.490 0.059  0.560
   Homemaker * Education 0.342  0.355 -0.371  0.489   
Partner’s JI*Partner’s educ.
   Job is bit secure * Educ. -0.117  0.173 -0.129  0.190
   Job is insecure * Educ. 0.057  0.228 0.041  0.245
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ. 0.079  0.386 0.262  0.468
Constant 70.148 *** 1.459 70.246 *** 1.463 70.119 *** 1.462 70.136 *** 2.229 70.246 *** 2.238 70.085 *** 2.228
Sigma u 16.637 16.624 16.645 21.061 21.205 21.052
Sigma e 12.254 12.252 12.256 12.254 12.252 12.256
Source. LISS panel 2008-2015, 6,753 observations of 2,091 men. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Bold is significant (p<0.1) difference between men and women. Models are controlled for all variables listed 
in Table 5.2. JI = job insecurity, UtW = unable to work
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Table A5.2   Relationship satisfaction squared. Women’s relationship satisfaction and  
individual’s and partner’s job insecurity, random (differences between people)  
and fixed (changes within people over time) effects models
Random effect models Fixed effect models
 Women Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
 B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE
Individual’s job insecurity 
(ref.=secure)
   Job is bit secure -1.267 * 0.617 -1.325 * 0.615 -1.256 * 0.617 -0.356  0.669 -0.410  0.666 -0.344  0.668
   Job is insecure -2.041 * 0.807 -2.094 * 0.807 -2.034 * 0.806 -0.536  0.849 -0.586  0.844 -0.534  0.848
   Unempl. or UtW -2.391 # 1.271 -2.533 # 1.322 -2.399 # 1.271 0.762  1.458 0.740  1.491 0.722  1.457
   Homemaker -1.047  1.029 -0.970  1.047 -1.051  1.029 0.340  1.476 -0.153  1.480 0.308  1.476
Partner’s job insecurity 
(ref.=secure)
   Job is bit secure -1.365 * 0.566 -1.370 * 0.567 -1.331 * 0.576 -0.918  0.601 -0.914  0.601 -0.886  0.612
   Job is insecure -2.446 *** 0.685 -2.459 *** 0.686 -2.425 *** 0.695 -1.581 * 0.753 -1.580 * 0.754 -1.557 * 0.763
   Unempl. or UtW -7.032 *** 1.242 -7.016 *** 1.241 -6.894 *** 1.241 -4.661 ** 1.500 -4.685 ** 1.495 -4.381 ** 1.519
Individual’s education -0.614 *** 0.158 -0.871 *** 0.248 -0.614 *** 0.158
Partner’s education 0.262 # 0.152 0.263 # 0.152 0.296  0.203
Interactions
Individual’s JI*Own educ.
   Job is bit secure * Educ. 0.299  0.234 0.379  0.250
   Job is insecure * Educ. 0.355  0.260 0.302  0.296
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ. 0.087  0.490 0.059  0.560
   Homemaker * Education 0.342  0.355 -0.371  0.489   
Partner’s JI*Partner’s educ.
   Job is bit secure * Educ. -0.117  0.173 -0.129  0.190
   Job is insecure * Educ. 0.057  0.228 0.041  0.245
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ. 0.079  0.386 0.262  0.468
Constant 70.148 *** 1.459 70.246 *** 1.463 70.119 *** 1.462 70.136 *** 2.229 70.246 *** 2.238 70.085 *** 2.228
Sigma u 16.637 16.624 16.645 21.061 21.205 21.052
Sigma e 12.254 12.252 12.256 12.254 12.252 12.256
Source. LISS panel 2008-2015, 6,753 observations of 2,091 men. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Bold is significant (p<0.1) difference between men and women. Models are controlled for all variables listed 
in Table 5.2. JI = job insecurity, UtW = unable to work
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Table A5.3   Ordered Logit models. Men’s and women’s relationship satisfaction and  
individual’s and partner’s job insecurity, random (differences between people)  
and fixed (changes within people over time) effects models 
Men 
Ordered Logit Model
Women 
Ordered Logit Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Individual’s job insecurity (ref.=job is secure)             
   Job is bit secure -0.419 *** 0.102 -0.437 *** 0.107 -0.420 *** 0.102 -0.296 ** 0.113 -0.299 ** 0.114 -0.295 ** 0.113
   Job is insecure -0.692 *** 0.119 -0.718 *** 0.123 -0.694 *** 0.119 -0.409 ** 0.136 -0.412 ** 0.136 -0.406 ** 0.136
   Unemployed or UtW -0.629 ** 0.212 -0.662 ** 0.214 -0.629 ** 0.212 -0.481 * 0.215 -0.512 * 0.221 -0.482 * 0.215
   Homemaker -0.208  0.181 -0.190  0.181 -0.209  0.181
Partner’s job insecurity (ref.=job is secure)
   Job is bit secure -0.065  0.109 -0.064  0.109 -0.066  0.110 -0.262 ** 0.101 -0.265 ** 0.101 -0.260 * 0.103
   Job is insecure -0.195  0.127 -0.191  0.126 -0.197  0.127 -0.488 *** 0.122 -0.491 *** 0.122 -0.489 *** 0.124
   Unemployed or UtW -0.503 * 0.206 -0.503 * 0.207 -0.508 * 0.204 -1.333 *** 0.226 -1.335 *** 0.226 -1.347 *** 0.230
   Homemaker -0.166  0.166 -0.167  0.165 -0.154  0.171
Individual’s education -0.067 * 0.027 -0.103 ** 0.038 -0.067 * 0.027 -0.116 *** 0.029 -0.136 ** 0.047 -0.116 *** 0.029
Partner’s education -0.076 ** 0.029 -0.076 ** 0.029 -0.102 * 0.042 0.046 # 0.027 0.046 # 0.027 0.045  0.037
Interactions     
Individual’s JI*Own educ.
   Job is bit secure * Educ. 0.021  0.034 0.023  0.041
   Job is insecure * Educ. 0.091 * 0.040 0.037  0.049
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ. 0.033  0.068 -0.029  0.084
   Homemaker * Education   0.033  0.066   
Partner’s JI*Partner’s educ.           
   Job is bit secure * Educ.   0.019  0.038    -0.011  0.031
   Job is insecure * Educ.   0.050  0.044    0.027  0.039
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ.   0.016  0.079    -0.010  0.072
   Homemaker * Education   0.035  0.056      
Cut 1 -4.519  0.275 -4.540  0.276 -4.526  0.275 -4.931  0.281 -4.941  0.281 -4.931  0.281
Cut 2 -2.433  0.261 -2.452  0.262 -2.440  0.261 -2.862  0.272 -2.871  0.272 -2.861  0.272
Cut 3 0.602  0.258 0.585  0.259 0.595  0.258 0.321  0.268 0.311  0.269 0.322  0.268
Cut 4 2.951  0.268 2.936  0.269 2.944  0.268 2.609  0.279 2.598  0.280 2.611  0.279
sigma2 u 7.651  0.531 7.656  0.531 7.644  0.532 7.441  0.538 7.424  0.538 7.444  0.538
Source: LISS panel 2008-2015, Male sample: 5,723 observations of 1,827 men. Female sample: 5,709 observations 
of 1,823 women. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<0.1) difference between men 
and women. Models are controlled for all variables listed in Table 5.2. JI = job insecurity, UtW = unable to work. 
Note. Analyses are on not imputed data sample because ordered logit models were not compatible with multiple 
imputed datasets
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Table A5.3   Ordered Logit models. Men’s and women’s relationship satisfaction and  
individual’s and partner’s job insecurity, random (differences between people)  
and fixed (changes within people over time) effects models 
Men 
Ordered Logit Model
Women 
Ordered Logit Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Individual’s job insecurity (ref.=job is secure)             
   Job is bit secure -0.419 *** 0.102 -0.437 *** 0.107 -0.420 *** 0.102 -0.296 ** 0.113 -0.299 ** 0.114 -0.295 ** 0.113
   Job is insecure -0.692 *** 0.119 -0.718 *** 0.123 -0.694 *** 0.119 -0.409 ** 0.136 -0.412 ** 0.136 -0.406 ** 0.136
   Unemployed or UtW -0.629 ** 0.212 -0.662 ** 0.214 -0.629 ** 0.212 -0.481 * 0.215 -0.512 * 0.221 -0.482 * 0.215
   Homemaker -0.208  0.181 -0.190  0.181 -0.209  0.181
Partner’s job insecurity (ref.=job is secure)
   Job is bit secure -0.065  0.109 -0.064  0.109 -0.066  0.110 -0.262 ** 0.101 -0.265 ** 0.101 -0.260 * 0.103
   Job is insecure -0.195  0.127 -0.191  0.126 -0.197  0.127 -0.488 *** 0.122 -0.491 *** 0.122 -0.489 *** 0.124
   Unemployed or UtW -0.503 * 0.206 -0.503 * 0.207 -0.508 * 0.204 -1.333 *** 0.226 -1.335 *** 0.226 -1.347 *** 0.230
   Homemaker -0.166  0.166 -0.167  0.165 -0.154  0.171
Individual’s education -0.067 * 0.027 -0.103 ** 0.038 -0.067 * 0.027 -0.116 *** 0.029 -0.136 ** 0.047 -0.116 *** 0.029
Partner’s education -0.076 ** 0.029 -0.076 ** 0.029 -0.102 * 0.042 0.046 # 0.027 0.046 # 0.027 0.045  0.037
Interactions     
Individual’s JI*Own educ.
   Job is bit secure * Educ. 0.021  0.034 0.023  0.041
   Job is insecure * Educ. 0.091 * 0.040 0.037  0.049
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ. 0.033  0.068 -0.029  0.084
   Homemaker * Education   0.033  0.066   
Partner’s JI*Partner’s educ.           
   Job is bit secure * Educ.   0.019  0.038    -0.011  0.031
   Job is insecure * Educ.   0.050  0.044    0.027  0.039
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ.   0.016  0.079    -0.010  0.072
   Homemaker * Education   0.035  0.056      
Cut 1 -4.519  0.275 -4.540  0.276 -4.526  0.275 -4.931  0.281 -4.941  0.281 -4.931  0.281
Cut 2 -2.433  0.261 -2.452  0.262 -2.440  0.261 -2.862  0.272 -2.871  0.272 -2.861  0.272
Cut 3 0.602  0.258 0.585  0.259 0.595  0.258 0.321  0.268 0.311  0.269 0.322  0.268
Cut 4 2.951  0.268 2.936  0.269 2.944  0.268 2.609  0.279 2.598  0.280 2.611  0.279
sigma2 u 7.651  0.531 7.656  0.531 7.644  0.532 7.441  0.538 7.424  0.538 7.444  0.538
Source: LISS panel 2008-2015, Male sample: 5,723 observations of 1,827 men. Female sample: 5,709 observations 
of 1,823 women. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<0.1) difference between men 
and women. Models are controlled for all variables listed in Table 5.2. JI = job insecurity, UtW = unable to work. 
Note. Analyses are on not imputed data sample because ordered logit models were not compatible with multiple 
imputed datasets
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Table A5.3   Ordered Logit models. Men’s and women’s relationship satisfaction and  
individual’s and partner’s job insecurity, random (differences between people)  
and fixed (changes within people over time) effects models 
Men 
Ordered Logit Model
Women 
Ordered Logit Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
Individual’s job insecurity (ref.=job is secure)             
   Job is bit secure -0.419 *** 0.102 -0.437 *** 0.107 -0.420 *** 0.102 -0.296 ** 0.113 -0.299 ** 0.114 -0.295 ** 0.113
   Job is insecure -0.692 *** 0.119 -0.718 *** 0.123 -0.694 *** 0.119 -0.409 ** 0.136 -0.412 ** 0.136 -0.406 ** 0.136
   Unemployed or UtW -0.629 ** 0.212 -0.662 ** 0.214 -0.629 ** 0.212 -0.481 * 0.215 -0.512 * 0.221 -0.482 * 0.215
   Homemaker -0.208  0.181 -0.190  0.181 -0.209  0.181
Partner’s job insecurity (ref.=job is secure)
   Job is bit secure -0.065  0.109 -0.064  0.109 -0.066  0.110 -0.262 ** 0.101 -0.265 ** 0.101 -0.260 * 0.103
   Job is insecure -0.195  0.127 -0.191  0.126 -0.197  0.127 -0.488 *** 0.122 -0.491 *** 0.122 -0.489 *** 0.124
   Unemployed or UtW -0.503 * 0.206 -0.503 * 0.207 -0.508 * 0.204 -1.333 *** 0.226 -1.335 *** 0.226 -1.347 *** 0.230
   Homemaker -0.166  0.166 -0.167  0.165 -0.154  0.171
Individual’s education -0.067 * 0.027 -0.103 ** 0.038 -0.067 * 0.027 -0.116 *** 0.029 -0.136 ** 0.047 -0.116 *** 0.029
Partner’s education -0.076 ** 0.029 -0.076 ** 0.029 -0.102 * 0.042 0.046 # 0.027 0.046 # 0.027 0.045  0.037
Interactions     
Individual’s JI*Own educ.
   Job is bit secure * Educ. 0.021  0.034 0.023  0.041
   Job is insecure * Educ. 0.091 * 0.040 0.037  0.049
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ. 0.033  0.068 -0.029  0.084
   Homemaker * Education   0.033  0.066   
Partner’s JI*Partner’s educ.           
   Job is bit secure * Educ.   0.019  0.038    -0.011  0.031
   Job is insecure * Educ.   0.050  0.044    0.027  0.039
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ.   0.016  0.079    -0.010  0.072
   Homemaker * Education   0.035  0.056      
Cut 1 -4.519  0.275 -4.540  0.276 -4.526  0.275 -4.931  0.281 -4.941  0.281 -4.931  0.281
Cut 2 -2.433  0.261 -2.452  0.262 -2.440  0.261 -2.862  0.272 -2.871  0.272 -2.861  0.272
Cut 3 0.602  0.258 0.585  0.259 0.595  0.258 0.321  0.268 0.311  0.269 0.322  0.268
Cut 4 2.951  0.268 2.936  0.269 2.944  0.268 2.609  0.279 2.598  0.280 2.611  0.279
sigma2 u 7.651  0.531 7.656  0.531 7.644  0.532 7.441  0.538 7.424  0.538 7.444  0.538
Source: LISS panel 2008-2015, Male sample: 5,723 observations of 1,827 men. Female sample: 5,709 observations 
of 1,823 women. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<0.1) difference between men 
and women. Models are controlled for all variables listed in Table 5.2. JI = job insecurity, UtW = unable to work. 
Note. Analyses are on not imputed data sample because ordered logit models were not compatible with multiple 
imputed datasets
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Table A5.3   Ordered Logit models. Men’s and women’s relationship satisfaction and  
individual’s and partner’s job insecurity, random (differences between people)  
and fixed (changes within people over time) effects models 
Men 
Ordered Logit Model
Women 
Ordered Logit Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE
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   Job is bit secure -0.419 *** 0.102 -0.437 *** 0.107 -0.420 *** 0.102 -0.296 ** 0.113 -0.299 ** 0.114 -0.295 ** 0.113
   Job is insecure -0.692 *** 0.119 -0.718 *** 0.123 -0.694 *** 0.119 -0.409 ** 0.136 -0.412 ** 0.136 -0.406 ** 0.136
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   Homemaker -0.208  0.181 -0.190  0.181 -0.209  0.181
Partner’s job insecurity (ref.=job is secure)
   Job is bit secure -0.065  0.109 -0.064  0.109 -0.066  0.110 -0.262 ** 0.101 -0.265 ** 0.101 -0.260 * 0.103
   Job is insecure -0.195  0.127 -0.191  0.126 -0.197  0.127 -0.488 *** 0.122 -0.491 *** 0.122 -0.489 *** 0.124
   Unemployed or UtW -0.503 * 0.206 -0.503 * 0.207 -0.508 * 0.204 -1.333 *** 0.226 -1.335 *** 0.226 -1.347 *** 0.230
   Homemaker -0.166  0.166 -0.167  0.165 -0.154  0.171
Individual’s education -0.067 * 0.027 -0.103 ** 0.038 -0.067 * 0.027 -0.116 *** 0.029 -0.136 ** 0.047 -0.116 *** 0.029
Partner’s education -0.076 ** 0.029 -0.076 ** 0.029 -0.102 * 0.042 0.046 # 0.027 0.046 # 0.027 0.045  0.037
Interactions     
Individual’s JI*Own educ.
   Job is bit secure * Educ. 0.021  0.034 0.023  0.041
   Job is insecure * Educ. 0.091 * 0.040 0.037  0.049
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ. 0.033  0.068 -0.029  0.084
   Homemaker * Education   0.033  0.066   
Partner’s JI*Partner’s educ.           
   Job is bit secure * Educ.   0.019  0.038    -0.011  0.031
   Job is insecure * Educ.   0.050  0.044    0.027  0.039
   Unempl. or UtW * Educ.   0.016  0.079    -0.010  0.072
   Homemaker * Education   0.035  0.056      
Cut 1 -4.519  0.275 -4.540  0.276 -4.526  0.275 -4.931  0.281 -4.941  0.281 -4.931  0.281
Cut 2 -2.433  0.261 -2.452  0.262 -2.440  0.261 -2.862  0.272 -2.871  0.272 -2.861  0.272
Cut 3 0.602  0.258 0.585  0.259 0.595  0.258 0.321  0.268 0.311  0.269 0.322  0.268
Cut 4 2.951  0.268 2.936  0.269 2.944  0.268 2.609  0.279 2.598  0.280 2.611  0.279
sigma2 u 7.651  0.531 7.656  0.531 7.644  0.532 7.441  0.538 7.424  0.538 7.444  0.538
Source: LISS panel 2008-2015, Male sample: 5,723 observations of 1,827 men. Female sample: 5,709 observations 
of 1,823 women. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bold is significant (p<0.1) difference between men 
and women. Models are controlled for all variables listed in Table 5.2. JI = job insecurity, UtW = unable to work. 
Note. Analyses are on not imputed data sample because ordered logit models were not compatible with multiple 
imputed datasets
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Inleiding en Onderzoeksvragen
De relatie met je partner is één van de belangrijkste relaties in je leven. De kwaliteit van 
deze relatie is cruciaal. Een goede relatie draagt sterk bij aan het welzijn van beide partners 
en aan het welzijn van eventuele kinderen (Amato & Sobolewski, 2001; Proulx, et al., 2007; 
Robles, et al., 2014; Musick & Bumpass, 2012; Umberson, et al., 2006; Waite & Lehrer, 2003; 
Knopp et al., 2017). Vanuit de literatuur is het voornamelijk bekend dat de kwaliteit van de 
relatie wordt beïnvloed door de gezinssituatie (zoals het al dan niet hebben van kinderen) 
en door persoonlijke kenmerken (zoals karaktereigenschappen). Echter, ook werk en werk-
omstandigheden hebben een belangrijke invloed op de kwaliteit van de partnerrelatie. 
Hier is relatief weinig aandacht voor in de literatuur. In deze dissertatie onderzoek ik daarom 
hoe werk en werkomstandigheden de kwaliteit van de partnerrelatie beïnvloeden. 
 Zowel positieve als negatieve ervaringen op het werk en op de arbeidsmarkt 
beïnvloeden hoe mensen zich gedragen binnen hun relatie (Bakker & Demerouti, 2013; 
Eby et al., 2010). Werk heeft een positieve invloed op relaties omdat het zorgt voor inkomen 
en financiële zekerheid. Ten tweede ervaren mensen die werk hebben vaak meer structuur 
en controle over hun leven. Daarnaast draagt het hebben van werk bij aan de persoonlijke 
identiteit en de sociale status (Jahoda 1981; Paul & Moser, 2009). Negatieve ervaringen of 
omstandigheden op het werk zorgen daarentegen voor stress en minder energie voor de 
partner (Danner-Vlaardingerbroek, et al., 2013; Debrot et al., 2017). Ook kan tijd die wordt 
besteed aan werk niet aan andere activiteiten worden besteed, zoals zorg of huishoudelijk 
werk, wat eveneens de relatiekwaliteit kan beïnvloeden (Mannino & Deutsch, 2007; Tai & 
Baxter, 2018). Door al deze factoren kan werk zowel een positieve als een negatieve 
invloed hebben op de kwaliteit van de relatie. Naast de eigen baan, is de baan van de 
partner van belang voor de partnerrelatie (Eby et al., 2010); beide dragen immers bij aan 
de financiële en sociale status van het koppel. Bovendien kunnen de ervaringen van de 
partner op de arbeidsmarkt overslaan naar de partnerrelatie. 
 In welke mate positieve en negatieve ervaringen op het werk en op de arbeidsmarkt 
de relatie beïnvloedt, kan verschillen tussen mannen en vrouwen. Traditioneel waren 
vooral mannen actief op de arbeidsmarkt, maar in de tweede helft van de 20ste eeuw zijn 
vrouwen in de meeste westerse landen meer betaald werk gaan verrichten (Charles, 2011). 
De verdeling van werk en inkomen tussen partners is hierdoor gelijker geworden en in 
sommige gevallen verdienen vrouwen een hoger inkomen dan hun partner (Klesment & 
Van Bavel, 2017). Echter, veel mensen vinden werk nog steeds belangrijker voor mannen 
dan voor vrouwen (Parker & Stepler, 2017; Thijs et al., 2017; Townsend, 2002) en zijn mannen 
vaak de belangrijkste kostwinner (Klesment & Van Bavel, 2017). Hierdoor heeft het werk 
van mannen mogelijk een sterkere invloed op de relatie dan het werk van vrouwen.
 Het is mogelijk dat niet alle relaties in dezelfde mate beïnvloed worden door werk-
(omstandigheden). Mensen hebben verschillende voorkeuren voor de verdeling van werk 
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tussen partners, zo heeft de een voorkeur voor een traditionele verdeling van werk met 
de partner, terwijl de ander meer egalitaire opvattingen heeft. Mensen met egalitaire 
opvattingen zijn onder andere voor meer gelijke verdeling van werk tussen mannen en 
vrouwen. Een meer gelijke verdeling van werk kan beter zijn voor de partnerrelatie wanneer 
mensen egalitaire opvattingen hebben over genderrollen, maar slechter wanneer mensen 
meer traditionele opvattingen hebben. Daarnaast kunnen familie- en macro-economische 
omstandigheden zorgen voor meer stress en financiële druk. Ook kunnen ze (afwijkingen 
van) traditionele genderrollen benadrukken. De relatie van mensen met kinderen zou 
bijvoorbeeld sterker beïnvloed kunnen worden door armoede of werkloosheid dan 
mensen zonder kinderen, omdat kinderen zorgen voor extra financiële druk. Er is echter 
zeer weinig bekend of de invloed van werk op de kwaliteit van de partnerrelatie verschilt 
naar gender normen, de familie-context en de macro-economische context.
 De uitkomsten uit eerder onderzoek laten niet duidelijk zien of de verdeling van werk 
tussen partners de kwaliteit van de partnerrelatie beïnvloed, en zo ja, waarom dit gebeurt. 
Sommige onderzoeken tonen aan dat een traditionele verdeling van werk tussen partners, 
wanneer de man de belangrijkste kostwinner is, leidt tot betere relaties tussen de partners 
(e.g. Furdyna et al., 2008). Andere studies laten juist zien dat dat een meer gelijke verdeling 
van werk tussen mannen en vrouwen leidt tot betere relaties (Hardie et al., 2014) of dat 
de verdeling van werk weinig of geen invloed heeft op de kwaliteit van de partnerrelatie 
(e.g. Keizer & Komter, 2015; Schoen et al., 2006). 
 Niet alleen de verdeling van arbeid, maar ook werkloosheid en armoede kan de 
partnerrelatie in belangrijke mate beïnvloeden. Mensen die financiële problemen hebben 
of werkloos zijn, hebben over het algemeen een slechtere relatie met hun partner (Conger 
et al., 2010; Kinnunen & Feldt, 2004). Dit lijkt vooral te gelden voor mensen met financiële 
problemen en in mindere mate voor werkloosheid. Naast huidige economische omstandigheden 
kunnen de verwachtingen over de economische toekomst de relatiekwaliteit beïnvloeden. 
Eerder onderzoek laat zien dat mensen met meer baanonzekerheid minder goede partner-
relaties hebben (Mauno & Kinnunen, 1999), net als mensen die verwachten in de toekomst 
aan inkomen te verliezen (Kinnunen & Pulkkinen, 1998). 
 In deze dissertatie tracht ik de volgende onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden: 
In welke mate beïnvloeden werkfactoren de kwaliteit van de partnerrelatie? En in welke mate 
verschilt de invloed van werkfactoren op de relatiekwaliteit afhankelijk van genderrol-opvattingen, 
de familie-context en de macro-economische context?
Bijdragen aan literatuur
Met deze onderzoek draag ik op vier manieren bij de aan de bestaande literatuur. Allereerst 
bestudeer ik niet alleen hoe de werkomstandigheden van het individu de individuele 
perceptie van de relatiekwaliteit beïnvloeden, maar kijk ik ook of de werkomstandigheden 
van de partner de relatie beïnvloeden, het zogenaamde dyadische perspectief.
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Ten tweede toets ik verschillende theoretische mechanismen om te onderzoeken waarom 
(de verdeling van) werk de partnerrelatie beïnvloedt. Zo onderzoek ik niet alleen tijd die 
partners besteden aan werk maar ook de tijd die ze besteden aan huishoudelijke taken. 
Hierdoor worden de theoretische concepten ‘specialisatie’ (hoe verschillend zijn de taken 
van partners) en ‘equity’ (hoe gelijk is het totaal aantal taken van partners) onderscheiden 
(Kalmijn & Monden, 2011). Tevens onderzoek ik tegenstrijdige theorieën ten aanzien van 
vrouwelijke kostwinners; vanuit de ene theorie wordt verwacht dat koppels met een 
vrouwelijke kostwinnerbetere relaties hebben, vanuit een andere theorie dat ze slechtere 
relaties hebben. Tot slot onderzoek ik de invloed van (de verdeling van) werk en inkomen 
op de partnerrelatie tegelijk. Hierdoor kan de invloed van inkomen los worden gezien van 
de invloed van werk en andersom. Ik kan bijvoorbeeld onderzoeken of werkloosheid 
zorgt voor een slechtere relatiekwaliteit wanneer er rekening wordt gehouden met het 
lagere inkomen.
 Ten derde onderzoek ik of de invloed van werk op de partnerrelatie verschilt tussen 
verschillende groepen. In eerder onderzoek is vooral de directe invloed van werk op de 
relatiekwaliteit onderzocht, terwijl dit kan verschillen tussen groepen. In deze dissertatie 
kijk ik specifiek of de invloed van (de verdeling van) werk op de kwaliteit van de partner-
relatie verschilt (1) tussen mannen en vrouwen, (2) tussen mensen met meer of minder 
egalitaire genderrol-opvattingen, (3) tussen mensen met of zonder kinderen, (4) tussen 
hoger en lager opgeleiden en tot slot (5) tussen mensen die in landen wonen met een 
betere of slechtere macro-economische situatie.
 De laatste vernieuwing van deze dissertatie is het gebruik van longitudinale data 
(mensen zijn over de jaren meerdere keren geïnterviewd) en crossnationale data (mensen 
in verschillende landen zijn geïnterviewd). Dit is een belangrijke vooruitgang ten opzichte 
van de bestaande literatuur (Conger et al., 2010; Hardie et al., 2014). Eerder onderzoek heeft 
voornamelijk crosssectionele data gebruikt uit een enkel land. Ik gebruik drie dyadische 
longitudinale datasets: uit Nederland (het LISS panel), Australië (het HILDA panel) en het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk (het BHPS panel). Daarnaast gebruik ik ook crossnationale data die 
dertig Europese landen beslaat (de EQLS uit 2012). Dit zorgt ervoor dat ik kan onderzoeken 
in hoeverre de invloed van werkfactoren op de partnerrelatie verschilt tussen landen en 
waardoor deze verschillen worden verklaard. 
De empirische studies
De onderzoeksvraag wordt beantwoord in vier verschillende studies. De eerste twee 
studies gaan over de invloed van de verdeling van werk tussen partners op de kwaliteit 
van de partnerrelatie. In het eerste onderzoek bekijk ik de verdeling van werk en 
huishoudelijk werk en in het tweede onderzoek richt ik me op vrouwelijke kostwinners. 
De derde en vierde studie gaan over de invloed van economische problemen op de 
kwaliteit van de partnerrelatie. In het derde onderzoek kijk ik naar de invloed van huidige 
en verwachte economische omstandigheden op de tevredenheid met het familie leven. 
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In de laatste studie onderzoek ik de invloed van baanonzekerheid op de kwaliteit van de 
partnerrelatie. Hier licht ik elke studie kort toe. 
Studie 1. De verdeling van werk op de arbeidsmarkt en huishoudelijk werk
In deze eerste studie onderzoek ik hoe de tevredenheid met de partnerrelatie wordt 
beïnvloed door de verdeling van werk op de arbeidsmarkt en huishoudelijk werk tussen 
partners. Door beide typen werk tegelijk te onderzoeken, in plaats van slechts een van beide, 
worden de theoretische concepten ‘specialisatie’ en ‘equity’ onderscheiden (gebaseerd 
op Kalmijn & Monden, 2011). Specialisatie staat voor hoe verschillend de taken zijn die 
partners doen, bijvoorbeeld als één partner voornamelijk huishoudelijk werk doet terwijl 
de ander vooral actief is op de arbeidsmarkt. ‘Equity’ staat voor hoe gelijk het totaal aantal 
uren is dat beide partners besteden aan werk, ongeacht of dat aan huishoudelijk werk of 
werk op de arbeidsmarkt wordt besteed. In deze studie onderzoek ik de directe invloed 
van specialisatie en equity op de tevredenheid met de partnerrelatie. Ook bekijk ik in 
hoeverre deze invloed verschilt tussen mensen met meer of minder egalitaire gender rol- 
opvattingen en tussen mensen met en zonder kinderen. De hypothesen worden getoetst 
door gebruik te maken van de British Household Panel Survey (1997-2008).
 De resultaten tonen geen directe invloed van specialisatie en equity op de tevredenheid 
met de partnerrelatie. Echter, de resultaten laten zien dat wanneer koppels het werk 
verdelen in overeenstemming met de opvattingen van de man, mannen meer tevreden 
zijn met de partnerrelatie. Mannen met egalitaire genderrol-opvattingen zijn minder tevreden 
met de relatie wanneer de verdeling van werk meer gespecialiseerd is. Aan andere kant 
zijn mannen met meer traditionele genderrol-opvattingen meer tevreden met de relatie 
wanneer werk gespecialiseerd verdeeld is tussen partners. Daarnaast laten de resultaten 
zien dat voor mannen equity een positieve invloed heeft op relatietevredenheid wanneer 
zij egalitaire genderrol-opvattingen hebben, terwijl het een negatieve invloed heeft voor 
mannen met traditionelere opvattingen. Oftewel, wanneer partners evenveel tijd besteden 
aan de combinatie van werk en huishoudelijk taken, zijn mannen met meer egalitaire 
opvattingen meer tevreden met de relatie, en meer traditionele mannen minder tevreden. 
Deze modererende invloeden worden niet gevonden voor vrouwen. Ook vinden we geen 
verschillen in de invloed van zowel specialisatie als equity tussen mensen met en zonder 
kinderen. 
Studie 2. Vrouwelijke kostwinners
De tweede studie gaat over de vraag of mannen en vrouwen in koppels waar de vrouw 
de belangrijkste kostwinner is, meer of minder tevreden zijn met de relatie dan andere 
koppels. Daarnaast bestudeer ik of deze verschillen groter of kleiner zijn naarmate mensen 
meer egalitaire genderrol-opvattingen hebben. Vrouwelijke kostwinner koppels worden 
gedefinieerd als koppels waarin de vrouw werkt en de man niet, of waarin de vrouw het 
grootste deel van het huishoudinkomen vergaart. Hiermee onderscheid ik dus eenverdieners 
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van tweeverdieners waarin er één meer verdient dan de ander, wat belangrijk blijkt 
te zijn voor deze studie. Hypothesen worden geformuleerd op basis van specialisatie-, 
 onderhandelings-, rol-samenwerkings-, en ‘doing gender’-theorieën. Om deze hypothesen 
te toetsten maak ik gebruik van data uit het Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia panel (2001-2015).
 De resultaten van deze studie laten zien dat mensen minder tevreden worden met 
de partnerrelatie wanneer de vrouw meer gaat verdienen dan de man, of wanneer de 
vrouw werkt en de man niet meer. Mannen en vrouwen worden minder tevreden 
wanneer mannen niet meer werken door werkloosheid of ziekte. Bij mannen wordt dit 
verklaard door een achteruitgang in inkomen en werkuren, maar deze verklaring gaat 
minder op voor vrouwen. Verder worden over het algemeen zowel mannen als vrouwen 
minder tevreden met de partnerrelatie wanneer beide werken maar de vrouw de 
belangrijkste kostwinner is (vergeleken met wanneer de man de kostwinner was of beide 
ongeveer evenveel verdienden). Deze verschillen blijken niet verzwakt of versterkt te 
worden naarmate men meer egalitaire genderrol-opvattingen heeft. De resultaten lijken 
vooral het ‘doing gender’ perspectief te steunen, waarin wordt verondersteld dat mensen 
meer tevreden zijn met de partnerrelatie wanneer ze zich gedragen volgens traditionele 
rolverdelingen. 
Studie 3. Huidige en verwachte economische problemen
De derde studie gaat over de mate waarin de tevredenheid met het familieleven wordt 
beïnvloed door de huidige en verwachte economische problemen van koppels. Hierbij 
kijk ik naar problemen qua inkomen en qua werk. Gebaseerd op het ‘familie stress model’ 
verwacht ik dat huidige en verwachte economische problemen de tevredenheid met het 
familieleven beïnvloeden. Daarnaast veronderstel ik dat verwachte economische problemen 
een negatievere invloed hebben wanneer mensen ook huidige economische problemen 
ervaren. Verder wordt verondersteld dat huidige en verwachte economische problemen 
een negatiever effect hebben op de tevredenheid met het familieleven wanneer mensen 
kinderen hebben, of wanneer ze in landen wonen met een sterkere stijging in werkloosheid. 
Ik onderzoek deze hypothesen door gebruik te maken van de European Quality of Life 
Survey 2012, een cross-nationale dataset bestaande uit dertig Europese landen.
 De uitkomsten van dit onderzoek duiden erop dat mensen minder tevreden zijn met 
hun familieleven wanneer zij meer economische problemen ervaren of deze verwachten 
in de toekomst. Mensen zijn minder tevreden wanneer zij moeilijk financieel rondkomen, 
werkloos zijn, een daling van inkomen verwachten of onzeker zijn over hun baanbehoud. 
De negatieve invloed van verwachte economische problemen wordt over het algemeen 
niet versterkt door de huidige economische problemen die mensen ervaren. Dit laat 
zien dat ook mensen die het economisch beter hebben worden beïnvloed door 
verwachtingen over de toekomst. De tevredenheid met het familieleven van mensen met 
kinderen wordt over het algemeen vergelijkbaar beïnvloed door (verwachtte) economische 
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problemen als van mensen zonder kinderen. Ook de macro-economische omstandigheden 
versterken de negatieve invloed van (verwachte) economische problemen niet. Over het 
algemeen blijkt dus dat mensen die economische problemen hebben of die verwachten 
in de nabije toekomst minder tevreden zijn met hun familieleven, ongeacht de familie-
situatie of de macro-economische situatie.
Studie 4. Baanonzekerheid
In de vierde studie onderzoek ik de invloed van baanonzekerheid op de tevredenheid 
met de partnerrelatie. Hiervoor bestudeer ik de baanonzekerheid van zowel het individu 
als van de partner. Daarnaast onderzoek ik in hoeverre de gevolgen van baanonzekerheid 
voor de kwaliteit van de partnerrelatie verschillen tussen mannen en vrouwen en tussen 
mensen met een hoger en lager opleidingsniveau. Op basis van het ‘spillover-crossover 
model’ verwacht ik dat wanneer individuen of partners meer baanonzekerheid hebben, 
mensen minder tevreden zijn met de partnerrelatie. Daarnaast wordt verwacht dat deze 
invloeden verschillen tussen mannen en vrouwen. Tevens verwacht ik dat de invloed van 
baanonzekerheid op relatietevredenheid sterker is voor lager dan voor hoger opgeleiden 
vanwege verschillen in financiële hulpbronnen en inzetbaarheid op de arbeidsmarkt. 
De hypothesen toets ik door gebruik te maken van het Nederlandse LISS-panel (2008-2015). 
 De resultaten laten zien dat zowel mannen als vrouwen minder tevreden zijn met de 
partnerrelatie wanneer zij meer onzekerheid over hun baanbehoud ervaren, hoewel het 
bewijs overtuigender is voor mannen dan voor vrouwen. Daarnaast zorgt de baan-
onzekerheid van mannen ervoor dat vrouwen minder tevreden zijn met de partnerrelatie, 
maar niet andersom. Vooral voor lager opgeleiden blijkt de relatietevredenheid sterker 
beïnvloed te worden door baanonzekerheid en dit lijkt voornamelijk te gelden voor 
mannen en in mindere mate voor vrouwen. Ik concludeer dat de eigen baanonzekerheid 
de tevredenheid met de partnerrelatie beïnvloed, wat bewijs is voor de spillover invloed 
van baanonzekerheid. Tevens laat deze studie zien dat de baanonzekerheid van de partner 
enkel effect heeft op de relatietevredenheid van vrouwen. Lager opgeleiden zijn vooral 
kwetsbaar voor baanonzekerheid aangezien zij relatief vaak in onzekere arbeidsmarkt-
posities zitten en hierdoor sterker worden beïnvloed dan hoger opgeleiden. 
Conclusie 
De kwaliteit van hedendaagse partnerrelaties wordt beïnvloed door grote maatschappelijke 
ontwikkelingen. Doordat vrouwen meer zijn gaan participeren op de arbeidsmarkt, 
is de verdeling van werk en inkomen tussen partners veranderd. Tevens hebben macro- 
economische ontwikkelingen de economische condities van koppels veranderd. In dit 
proefschrift heb ik laten zien dat deze nieuwe verdelingen van werk en inkomen en 
economische problemen binnen gezinnen de kwaliteit van partnerrelaties hebben 
beïnvloed.
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Allereerst blijkt dat mannen meer tevreden zijn met de partnerrelatie wanneer de 
verdeling van werk tussen partners in overeenstemming is met zijn genderrolhouding. 
Mannen blijken meer tevreden te zijn met hun relatie wanneer zij de belangrijkste kost - 
winner zijn of wanneer beide partners ongeveer evenveel bijdragen. Het is afhankelijk van 
zijn genderrol-opvattingen of een traditionele of meer gelijke verdeling van werk leidt tot 
een betere relatie. Ongeacht de genderrol-opvattingen, worden mannen worden minder 
tevreden met de partnerrelatie wanneer zijn vrouwelijke partner de kostwinner wordt. 
Vrouwen lijken minder beïnvloed te worden door de verdeling van arbeid met hun 
partner, tot op het punt wanneer zij de kostwinner wordt. Vrouwelijke kostwinners blijken 
minder tevreden met de partnerrelatie dan vrouwen met andere verdelingen van werk. 
Hieruit blijkt dat de toename van vrouwen tot de arbeidsmarkt weinig invloed heeft 
gehad op hoe tevreden mensen zijn met de partnerrelatie, zolang deze toegenomen ar-
beidsparticipatie niet leidt tot vrouwelijke dominantie, namelijk zolang vrouwen niet de 
belangrijkste kostwinner worden. Dit onderzoek toont de continuïteit van traditionele 
genderrol-opvattingen in de maatschappij aan en de invloed daarvan op partnerrelaties. 
Gender en genderverwachtingen blijven een belangrijke rol in relaties spelen in huidige 
Westerse samenlevingen.
 Naast de verdeling van werk tussen partners beïnvloeden ook economische problemen 
de kwaliteit van de partnerrelatie. Koppels die te maken hebben met werkloosheid of 
financiële problemen blijken minder tevreden te zijn met hun partnerrelatie. Naast huidige 
economische problemen blijkt ook dat mensen minder tevreden zijn met hun partner-
relatie wanneer zij economische problemen verwachten, zoals wanneer zij onzeker zijn 
over hun baanbehoud of een daling in inkomen verwachten. Lager opgeleiden worden 
relatief vaak getroffen door economische problemen en zij ervaren hierdoor vaker de 
negatieve invloed op hun relatie. Daarnaast worden de relaties van lager opgeleiden 
sterker beïnvloed door economische problemen (specifiek door baanonzekerheid) dan 
relaties van hoger opgeleiden. Dit kan zorgen voor een accumulatie van problemen 
onder lager opgeleiden. 
 De invloed van economische problemen op relaties verschilt tussen mannen en 
vrouwen, voornamelijk de invloed van de werkomstandigheden van de partner. Vrouwen 
worden minder tevreden met de partnerrelatie wanneer mannen werkloos worden of 
onzekerder worden over hun baanbehoud. Echter, mannen worden niet of minder 
beïnvloedt door de werkloosheid of zorgen over baanbehoud van hun partner. Dit 
suggereert dat de baanpositie van mannen belangrijker wordt gevonden dan de 
baanpositie van vrouwen. Dit kan veroorzaakt worden doordat mannen relatief vaak de 
belangrijkste kostwinner zijn, of door gendernormen. Het blijkt dat de invloed van 
werkfactoren op partnerrelaties relatief universeel is, uitgezonderd verschillen tussen 
mannen en vrouwen. De invloed van werkfactoren op de tevredenheid met de 
partnerrelatie blijkt grotendeels hetzelfde tussen mensen met en zonder kinderen en 
onafhankelijk te zijn van macro-economische omstandigheden.
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Ik begon dit onderzoek met de vraag in welke mate werkfactoren de kwaliteit van de 
partnerrelatie beïnvloeden. Dit onderzoek toont duidelijk aan dat het werk en gezin 
verbonden zijn en dat werk, naast inkomensvergaring, de partnerrelatie beïnvloedt. 
Over het algemeen blijken mensen minder tevreden met de partnerrelatie wanneer zij 
economische problemen ervaren of de verdeling van werk sterker afwijkt van een 
traditionele verdeling, voornamelijk wanneer vrouwen de belangrijkste kostwinner zijn. 
Traditionele ideeën over man-vrouw rollen blijven van invloed in partnerrelaties in huidige 
Westerse samenlevingen.
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Partner 
relationship quality 
under pressing 
work conditions 
Longitudinal and cross-national investigations
The romantic couple relationship is a cornerstone of many people’s daily lives and the quality 
of this relationship is especially important. The quality of contemporary partner relationships 
seems to have been affected by major societal developments. Women’s increased participation 
in the labor market has brought new divisions of labor between partners and major macro-
economic developments have changed the economic conditions of couples. This book 
investigates the influence of employment on the quality of the partner relationship, and how 
this differs by gender, gender norms, the family context, and the macro-economic situation. 
The division of labor within couples influences relationship quality and people are especially 
less satisfied with the relationship when women become the primary earner. Additionally, 
those who are unemployed or experiencing financial problems are less satisfied with their 
relationship, as were those who were insecure in their job position. Especially men’s employment 
seems to affect the quality of the partner relationship, showing that traditional conceptions 
of gendered behavior continue to play an important role in contemporary partner relationships.
